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In the 21st century, knowledge is one of the key determinants of a country’s level of 
socioeconomic development. Based on this recognition, Korea’s Knowledge Sharing Program 
(KSP) was launched in 2004 by the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF) and the Korea 
Development Institute (KDI).
KSP aims to share Korea’s experience and knowledge with the partner countries to achieve 
mutual prosperity and cooperative partnership. Former high-ranking government officials are 
directly involved in the policy consultation to share their intimate knowledge of development 
challenges and to complement the analytical work of policy experts and specialists who have 
extensive experience in their fields. The government officials and practitioners effectively pair up 
with their counterparts in the development partner countries to work jointly on pressing policy 
challenges and share development knowledge in the process. The program includes policy 
research, consultation, and capacity-building activities, all to provide comprehensive tailor-made 
assistance to the development partner countries in building a stable foundation and fostering 
capabilities to pursue self-sustainable growth.
In 2014, policy consultation and a capacity building-workshop were carried out with 29 
partner countries covering more than 100 research agendas. As new partner countries, Kyrgyz 
Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Cuba were selected in consideration of the countries’ 
policy demands, growth potential, and strategic economic partnership.
The 2014/15 Knowledge Sharing Program with Hungary was carried out with the goal to 
exchange the socioeconomic development experience of the two countries for improving 
Hungary’s policymaking capacity and achieving socioeconomic development. Under the MOU 
signed between the Ministry of Strategy and Finance of Korea and the Ministry for National 
Economy of Hungary, the KSP team conducted joint research and seminars in order to support 
the establishment of the “Strategy for Crisis Management and Economic Development Policy for 
the Future Central European Knowledge-based Hub II.”
I would like to take this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude to Senior Advisor Mr. 
Dae-won Suh, Project Manager Professor Wook Sohn, as well as the project consultants including 
Professor Minsik Choi and Professor Sung Jin Kang for their immense efforts in successfully 
completing the 2014/15 KSP with Hungary. I am also grateful to Executive Director Dr. Si Wook 
Preface
Lee, Former Executive Director Dr. Hong Tack Chun, Program Director Dr. Changyong Choi, 
Program Officer Ms. Sujin Park, and all the members of the Center for International Development, 
KDI for their hard work and dedication to this program. Last, I extend my warmest thanks to the 
Hungarian counterparts, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Ministry for National 
Economy, and other related agencies, program coordinators, and participants for showing active 
cooperation and great support.
In your hands are the results of the 2014/15 KSP with Hungary. I believe that KSP will serve as 
a valuable opportunity to elevate Hungary and Korea’s mutual economic cooperation to a new 
level. I sincerely hope the final research results on the selected areas can be fully used to support 
Hungary in achieving its economic development goal in the near future.
 
Joon-Kyung Kim
President
Korea Development Institute
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The Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP) with Hungary was first launched in 
2013 following a mutual agreement between Hungary and Korea with the theme 
”Strategy for Crisis Management and Economic Development Policy for the Future 
Central European Knowledge-based Hub.” The KSP with Hungary has a special 
meaning considering the economic status itself, as Hungary is neither an ODA 
recipient country nor a low-income country, but an upper-middle-income country 
with OECD and EU membership. The joint study and ownership were enhanced 
and emphasized in implementing the research under the close cooperation of both 
countries. This also aimed to foster a mutually beneficial relationship by providing 
practical and concrete policy suggestions. 
Policy consultation for the 2014/15 KSP with Hungary was implemented under 
the consecutive theme “Strategy for Crisis Management and Economic Development 
Policy for the Future Central European Knowledge-based Hub Ⅱ.” It consists of 
three research topics selected in accordance with priority demands of the Hungarian 
government. As an implementing organization, the Korea Development Institute 
(KDI) gathered a group of experts. Table 1 lists the three consultation areas and 
researchers for the 2014/15 KSP with Hungary.
2014/15 KSP with Hungary
Sujin Park (Program Officer, Korea Development Institute)
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The Korean delegation visited Budapest from January 11 to 16, 2015 to conduct 
a High-Level Demand Survey and Pilot Study. In the 2014/15 KSP kick-off meeting 
with the Hungarian government officials, the Korean delegation presented Korea’s 
experience in relation to each topic. They had a separate meeting with the working 
groups to identify the current issues and problems that needed to be solved within 
the scope of KSP. Through intensive discussions, the Korean researchers were able 
to specify the policy consultation needs as well as collect research information and 
data.
The Korean delegation conducted an Additional Pilot Study from March 29 
to April 5, 2015 to develop a research analysis and get useful advice from the 
Hungarian side. They held additional meetings with relevant ministries and 
organizations and, thus, gathered additional information for their research. 
Considering the time constraints and lack of program information, this stage 
provided an opportunity to ensure higher quality of the final consultation.
In the next stage, the Interim Reporting and Policy Practitioners’ Workshop was 
held in Korea from May 3 to 9, 2015. Five Hungarian officials headed by Rita Hévei, 
Head of Secretariat of the Administrative State Secretary at the Ministry for National 
Economy, visited Korea for this occasion. In the Interim Reporting Workshop, 
Korean researchers presented their interim research findings and obtained feedback 
from the Hungarian delegation. In addition, the Hungarian delegation visited Korea 
Technology Finance Corporation, Busan Human Resources Development Institute, 
Strategy for Crisis Management and Economic Development Policy for the 
Future Central European Knowledge-based Hub Ⅱ
Senior Advisor: His Excellency Dae-won Suh(Former Ambassador to Hungary)
Project Manager: Dr. Changyong Choi(KDI)
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Manager
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Korea Enterprise Data, Hyundai Ulsan Plant, Seoul Employment Center, and 
Industrial Bank of Korea to meet Korean professionals and see firsthand examples 
of Korea's development experience.
From June 23 to 28, 2015, a Korean delegation led by Mr. Dae-won Suh, Former 
Ambassador to Hungary conducted the Senior Policy Dialogue and the Final 
Reporting Workshop in Budapest. The Korean delegation held the workshop to 
share the results of the 2014/15 KSP with Hungarian policymakers and officials. 
Based on the in-depth discussions, the Hungarian officials showed their interest in 
the project’s results, performance, and further projects.
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Executive Summary
Wook Sohn (KDI School of Public Policy and Management)
The 2014/15 KSP with Hungary was carried out under the MOU signed between 
the Ministry of Strategy and Finance of Korea and the Ministry for National 
Economy of Hungary in November 2013. The 2014/15 KSP with Hungary is the 
second year of cooperation through the program.
The Hungarian economy has undergone a double-dip recession since 2008. 
Under these circumstances, the government realized that the nation was not able to 
overcome the risk of crisis without resolving the structural problems of its economy. 
In response, the government pursued diverse structural reform. These policy efforts 
brought about a stable macroeconomic situation in Hungary, with improved 
domestic and overseas indicators compared to those during the 2008 financial crisis. 
Hungary was on a stable track towards growth.
However, in order to obtain long-term growth engines, it needs to pursue a 
growth model centered on domestic medium and small enterprises with high 
employment effects. In association with this growth model, the government is 
pursuing economic development strategies through industrial and employment 
policies by pushing ahead with future-oriented industrial policies, nurturing newly 
created technology companies, and increasing employment rates through job 
training of the underprivileged class.
The Ministry for National Economy of Hungary submitted a demand survey 
report based on topics helpful for Hungary’s economic growth strategies. 
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Additionally, the research topics of the 2014/15 Hungarian KSP were identified as 
high policy priorities, forming the basic conditions that increase the possibility of 
being reflected in future policies.
In order to provide specific policy proposals, this report analyzes the current 
challenging tasks faced by Hungary. These tasks are addressed through discussions 
with local experts on each topic. In addition, knowledge exchanges on specific 
content and policy direction in relation to Korea’s recent experiences are discussed. 
In particular, considering Hungary’s history as a European power and its transition 
experiences, the policy experiences of Hungary after joining the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and economic policies pursued 
by the current government were focused and consulted. As Hungary is a member 
of the OECD and European Union, the constraints it faces as a member of these 
two organizations are reflected in the consultation content, thereby increasing the 
awareness of the reality of policy consultation.
In addition, when the basic conditions or policy environment changed compared 
to the conditions when the demand survey was submitted, the changes were 
reflected in the revision process; in this process, the study topics became more 
concrete. Moreover, when the Hungarian experts visited Korea, the issues raised 
when consulting with the visited organization were included in the final report. 
Throughout the entire project, the detailed content was continuously fine-tuned, 
with necessary content added as it surfaced. Maintaining the original topic 
framework, while writing the policy advice report to accommodate the demand 
maximally, is expected to meet both nations’ standards considerably.
The 2014/15 KSP with Hungary entitled “Strategy for Economic Development 
Policy for the Future Central European Economic Hub” covers three key policy 
areas:(1) Establishing a Rating Institution for Evaluating the Competitiveness 
and Risks of Enterprises, (2) Public Employment Service and Vocational Training 
System for Effective Management of Human Resources, and (3) New Growth-
Driven Industry Policy and Ecofriendly Automotive Industry Policy under Global 
Megatrends. Our findings and policy recommendations for each policy area are 
summarized as follows.
1.  Establishing a Rating Institution for Evaluating the 
Competitiveness and Risks of Enterprises
Hungary has made progress in catching up with high-income OECD member 
countries in many aspects. However, the innovation and performance levels still 
show room for improvement. To strengthen Hungary’s research and development 
(R&D) capabilities, the entire innovation system, including innovation assessment 
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and the financial support system for innovative firms, must be analyzed.
Access to financing resources is a problem for Hungarian small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs). A significant proportion of these enterprises cannot obtain 
sufficient external financing for their operations because of poor credit history and 
lack of experience. Although government and central bank stimulation programs 
may help established enterprises, these programs appear to have no significant 
effect on newly created enterprises. The programs supported by the European 
Union (EU) also attempt to assist SMEs but are designed to support mid-size 
businesses with small credit risk and are not suitable for start-up SMEs equipped 
with innovative technologies.
Limited funds can be distributed efficiently only when the beneficiary enterprises 
are assessed correctly. Thus, when policy financing is provided, assessment systems 
for enterprises and technologies should be discussed simultaneously. Currently, 
no models or institutions that can assess technologies in innovative SMEs are well 
established in Hungary. This report addresses an innovation assessment system that 
is based not only on the credit rating of innovative SMEs but also on their business 
potential and technology.
South Korea has established a goal of expanding technology financing 
through the development of innovation assessment systems. Implementing this 
process requires four policy tasks: (1) develop a technology information database 
characterized as public goods, (2) activate private technical credit bureaus (TCBs), 
(3) develop innovation assessment capabilities among financial institutions, and (4) 
promote the use of innovation assessment information.
In light of the experience in South Korea, an assessment system is as important 
as business content for policy financing for innovative SMEs. When the Hungarian 
government establishes an institution or system for evaluating the competitiveness 
and risks of innovative SMEs and start-ups, the government may need to consider 
the following suggestions. First, the assessment capacity and loan processing speed 
of the TCBs will be increased by hiring additional specialty personnel and TCB 
staff and by strengthening the collection of TCB assessment information. Second, 
evaluating banks in terms of their efforts in innovation financing is desirable. Third, 
each bank’s loan performance for innovation should be released. Fourth, in order 
to implement the plan, the Hungarian government could establish task forces (TFs). 
Through the TFs, collaboration between ministries will be increased to develop an 
assessment model based on consumer (banks and other investors) viewpoints and to 
share innovation assessment information. Fifth, the consultation and advertising for 
innovation financing, including options relating to financial institutions and venture 
capital, should be considered.
Executive Summary•019
We should be cautious when designing and activating this innovation financing 
ecosystem based on innovation credit assessments. First, enforced allocation 
of innovation financing should be avoided. Instead, designing and providing 
incentives for banks to finance innovative firms is desirable. Second, loan approvals 
will ultimately be determined at the bank’s discretion, based on the assessment. 
The main purpose of innovation assessments is to increase the accuracy of the 
default rates when a bank decides to provide loans. Third, in addition to creating 
an innovation assessment system, policies that promote financing for innovations 
should be considered. For instance, an excessive innovation assessment service fee 
should be avoided to relieve the burden of assessment service fees on banks. Fourth, 
the effect of TCB-related policies should be evaluated, and concerns and potential 
issues that may occur in the future should be raised.
The default risk can be alleviated if enterprises are assessed based not only on 
credit but also on their innovation; this concept has been proven theoretically and 
empirically. The goal of the innovation assessment system is to increase the funding 
opportunities available to innovative start-ups and SMEs. This system will support 
the decision-making of banks, investors, and guarantee institutions. Ultimately, 
financial support for the real economy is expected to strengthen, and the soundness 
of financial institutions is expected to increase.
2.  Public Employment and Vocational Training System 
for Effective Use of Human Resources
The main task of this part of the Hungary KSP is to figure out a direction for 
the reform of the Hungarian public employment and vocational training system 
for effective use of human resources by analyzing Korea’s experience. This chapter 
starts with an analysis of the historical and institutional aspects of the Hungarian 
labor market structure. Specifically, the recent development of the Hungarian 
public employment service and skill-development system was analyzed along with 
the challenges faced by the Hungarian labor market today.
The radical economic and social changes in 1989–1990 resulted in essential 
changes in the labor market as well. As the Hungarian economy experienced a 
substantial decrease in production and a more intensive use of the labor force 
under new conditions, the population’s economic activity decreased significantly 
and remained inactive for a long period. The 2008 global economic crisis hit the 
Hungarian economy and labor market, which had been growing since early 2000, 
and the Hungarian gross domestic product (GDP) and employment rate started to 
decline.
Although the Hungarian government recently implemented various labor 
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market measures to improve labor market conditions, many challenges remain in 
implementing additional labor market reforms. Low employability, a high youth 
unemployment rate, and a significant gender gap in employment are the most 
serious challenges. The lack of sustainable funding for labor market programs such 
as a public employment service and skill-development programs is also one of the 
major difficulties.
The Korean public employment service and vocational training programs 
along with the other labor market measures were reorganized and expanded to 
deal with imminent massive unemployment during the 1997 Asian financial crisis. 
The prompt and extensive response by the Korean government was possible due 
to the timely setup of the Employment Insurance System (EIS) in 1995. With EIS 
funding, the Korean government not only provides unemployment benefits but 
also expands public employment service, public work programs, and other job 
training programs to help the unemployed find new jobs. Unlike unemployment 
insurance systems in many developed and developing countries, the Korean EIS, 
which included the employment stabilization program, the vocational competency 
development program, and the unemployment benefits program, was implemented 
as a comprehensive system.
To implement a reform to revitalize the labor market, which can eventually 
lead to a higher employment rate for youth, women, and other vulnerable groups, 
the Hungarian government should set up a sustainable funding system. Korea’s 
experience during the financial crisis showed that a reliable funding system could 
make a huge difference in carrying out labor market policies in a timely manner.
To improve the employability of vulnerable groups, the Korean government 
launched two programs that offer comprehensive services by combining vocational 
training and welfare programs: the Successful Employment Package Program and 
the Hope Ribbon Project. These two programs improved the employment rates of 
vulnerable groups. The programs have significant implications for the Hungarian 
government’s labor market reforms since vulnerable groups in Hungary also suffer 
from low employment and a lack of skills. Many advanced countries including 
Korea offer comprehensive and user-friendly public employment service and skill-
development programs that are linked to the welfare system. As we saw in Korea, 
the one-stop-service system for employment and vocational training has expanded 
to include nontraditional welfare services such as credit recovery counseling as 
well as welfare counseling services. It is also crucial that the public employment 
and vocational training programs provide services for employers. Similar to most 
developed countries, the Korean government provides subsidies and an information 
service for employers through the public employment service and job training 
service system.
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Aided by the recent developments in information technology, many countries 
have been trying to make their public employment service and vocational training 
service user friendly by setting up online service systems. Korea’s Work-Net and 
HRD-Net are good examples for the Hungarian government. With these online 
service systems, people can access the service easily and quickly.
In addition, individually focused comprehensive services including public 
employment, vocational training, and welfare can be more effectively delivered 
through an online-based system because all relevant individual data can be 
compiled without substantial effort and cost. Among the various services available 
through an online system, the most common are personalized information on 
online job applications, human resources management, and recruitment support 
services such as applicant selection services and recommendation services for 
suitable vocational training programs. In Korea, the intranet- and Internet-based 
services not only help find recruiters but also perform various services for youth 
work-experience aids and social service jobs. There are also group-counseling 
services such as achievement programs, youth vocational-guidance programs, and 
job-seeking programs. 
It is also important to maintain a well-organized partnership among the related 
parties. Appropriate outsourcing of public employment service and vocational 
training services through the private sector can increase the effectiveness of public 
services. 
Any labor market reform in public employment service and skill-development 
programs cannot be successful if the government (or markets, if applicable) ignores 
the following areas: (1) systematically assessing and monitoring the existing labor 
market program to evaluate its effectiveness,(2) consistently collecting and releasing 
data and information on labor market trends and forecasts to reduce mismatch 
in the labor market, and (3) maintaining closer links to the policies of different 
government organizations and agencies that are connected.
3.  New Growth-Driven Industry Policy and Ecofriendly 
Automotive Industry Policy under Global 
Megatrends
Examining global megatrends that are fast approaching begins with a review 
of the megatrends in the automotive industry that respond to global megatrends. 
This report compares the new growth-driven industry policy and the ecofriendly 
automotive industry policy between Hungary and Korea and provides several policy 
recommendations.
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In the future, the population will increase mainly in developing nations, with a 
shift in economic power toward Asia, rapid growth in technological improvements, 
and climate change. Consequently, in the future, the automotive industry will 
transition from developed-nation–specific consumption and developing-nation–
specific production patterns to mainly production and consumption by developing 
nations. Furthermore, the trends in population growth and aging will lead to the 
use of small smart automobiles. More important, the constraints of fossil fuels and 
climate change will result in a rapid transition in the automotive industry from 
traditional fossil-fuel-based automobiles to ecofriendly automobiles such as electric 
and hydrogen vehicles.
Based on these global megatrends in the automobile sector, the Hungarian 
government plans to promote ecofriendly automotive industries as a new growth-
driven industry. Through comparative studies of new growth-driven policies and 
ecofriendly automotive policies in Hungary and Korea, the report provides several 
policy suggestions.
First, the two countries face different economic environments in implementing 
new growth-driven industry policies. One main cause of the rapid economic growth 
in Korea was the government-led export promotion policies combined with very 
strong domestic protection until the 1980s. However, it is difficult for Hungary to 
adopt government-led industrial policies as Korea did. Korea used industrial policies 
when the country was less exposed to international pressure. Thus, Korea used 
independent export-expansion policies and promoted import-restricting policies to 
protect domestic corporations and markets.
In Hungary’s case, however, EU membership prevents the country from using 
similar independent industrial policies. It is difficult for Hungary to implement 
government-led strategic industrial policies. As an EU member, Hungary must follow 
the EU’s policy direction. Therefore, various industrial policies that contributed to 
Korea’s economic growth cannot be applied to Hungary. The policy suggestions 
should be applied to Hungary with caution.
Second, the link effects in the automotive industries should be maximized 
by combining policies used in the automotive and parts industries. In Hungary’s 
automotive industry sectors, four multinational companies have domestic SMEs. 
Therefore, more SMEs that are global must be attracted to provide components to 
the multinationals located in Hungary and export them to international partners. 
Policies should be implemented that promote international competitiveness of 
domestic component companies and increase component exports.
Third, policy strategies that combine the German model with the East Asian 
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model should be established for Hungary’s development process. Hungary is in a 
distinct environment in which the country cannot use infant industry protection 
policies as Korea did. The strategic partnership programs that started in 2012 might 
be expanded.
Fourth, policies for developing high-quality human resources should be 
implemented. Because of the lack of sufficient financial resources, it is difficult 
to promote high-quality human resources via direct government investment. 
Collaboration is suggested between universities and automotive companies, 
including national research institutes such as KIST and the automotive contract 
department between academia and automotive companies.
Fifth, additional aggressive investment in ecofriendly automobile production 
is necessary. However, initiating production of automobiles directly is not 
recommended, except that the production of buses Hungary has already begun.
Finally, ecofriendly automobile consumption promotion policies should be 
implemented more extensively. The strategies in the E-mobility plan include a 
dissemination promotion plan that does not have significant financial support. The 
plan’s tax incentives might not be enough to cover the price difference between 
fossil-fuel cars and ecofriendly cars.
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Summary
Hungary has made progress in catching up with the high-income Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member countries in many 
aspects. However, there is still room for improvement in the level of innovation 
activities and performance. In order to strengthen Hungary's research and 
development (R&D) capabilities, it is necessary to analyze the entire innovation 
system thoroughly, including innovation assessment and the financial support 
system for innovative firms.
Accessibility to financing resources is a problem for Hungarian small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). A significant proportion of these enterprises 
are not able to obtain sufficient external financing for their operations because 
of poor credit history and their young age. Although stimulation programs from 
the Hungarian government and the central bank of Hungary may be somewhat 
beneficial for established enterprises, they appear to have no significant effect on 
newly created enterprises. Programs supported by the EU are also attempting to 
assist SMEs, but they are designed to support mid-size businesses with small credit 
risk and are not suitable for start-up SMEs with innovative technologies.
Limited funds can be distributed efficiently only when beneficiary enterprises are 
assessed correctly. Thus, when policy-financing systems are developed, assessment 
systems for enterprises and technologies should be discussed simultaneously. 
■  Chapter 01
Establishing a Rating Institution for 
Evaluating the Competitiveness and 
Risks of Enterprises
Wook Sohn (KDI School of Public Policy and Management)
Balazs Laki (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Hungary)
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Currently, Hungary has no well-established models or institutions that can assess 
technologies in innovative SMEs. This report addresses an innovation assessment 
system that is based not only on the credit rating of innovative SMEs but also on 
business potential and technology.
South Korea has established a goal of expanding technology finance through 
the development of innovation assessment systems. Implementing this process 
will require four policy tasks: (1) developing a technology information database 
characterized by public goods, (2) activating private technical credit bureaus (TCBs), 
(3) increasing innovation assessment capabilities among financial institutions, and 
(4) promoting the use of innovation assessment information.
In light of the experiences in South Korea, having assessment systems is as 
important as business content with regard to policy financing for innovative 
SMEs. When the Hungarian government establishes an institution or system for 
evaluating the competitiveness and risks of innovative SMEs and start-ups, it may 
need to consider the following suggestions. First, the assessment capacity and loan 
processing speed of TCBs will be increased by hiring additional specialty personnel 
and TCB staff and by strengthening TCB assessment information collection. Second, 
evaluating banks in terms of their efforts in innovation financing is desirable. Third, 
the innovation loan performance of each bank should be released. Fourth, in order 
to implement the plan, the Hungarian government could establish task forces (TFs). 
Through the TFs, collaboration between ministries will be strengthened in order to 
develop an assessment model from consumer (banks and other investors) viewpoints 
and to share innovation assessment information. Fifth, it is worthwhile to consider 
the consultation and advertising of innovation financing, including options related 
to both financial institutions and venture capital.
We should be cautious when designing and activating this ecosystem of 
innovation financing based on innovation credit assessments. First, the enforced 
allocation of innovation financing should be avoided. Rather, designing and 
providing incentives for banks with high performance in innovation assessment 
is desirable. Second, loan approvals will ultimately be determined at the bank’s 
own discretion, according to innovation assessment outcomes. The main purpose 
of innovation assessments is to increase the accuracy of default rates when a bank 
makes a decision to provide loans. Third, in addition to improving the innovation 
assessment system, policies that support the promotion of innovation financing 
should be considered. For instance, an excessive innovation assessment service fee 
should be avoided to relieve the burden of assessment service fees on banks. Fourth, 
it is also important to evaluate the effect of TCB-related policies comprehensively 
and raise concerns and potential issues that may occur in the future.
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The default risk can be alleviated if enterprises are assessed based not only on 
credit but also on their innovation; this concept has been proven theoretically and 
empirically. The goal of the innovation assessment system is to increase the funding 
opportunities available to innovative start-ups and SMEs. The innovation assessment 
system will support the decision-making of banks, investors, and guarantee 
institutions. Ultimately, financial support for the real economy is expected to 
strengthen, and the soundness of financial institutions is expected to be enhanced.
1. Introduction
Hungary has made progress in catching up with the high-income member 
countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
in many aspects and is equipped with good-quality human capital and a high 
degree of openness in the economy. However, there is still room for improvement in 
the level of innovation activities and performance. In order to strengthen Hungary's 
research and development (R&D) capabilities, it is necessary to analyze the entire 
innovation system thoroughly, including the innovation assessment and financial 
support system for innovative firms. Thus, it is essential to promote innovative 
and competitive corporations, particularly small and medium venture enterprises 
that serve one of the axes in the national innovation system, increase research and 
development as well as innovation capabilities, and harness the ability to produce 
economic value.
One of topics of the 2013 Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP) between Hungary 
and Korea was “strengthening Hungary's R&D capability.” Baek (2014) argued that 
the government should implement diverse and extensive business policies in the 
early stage of venture business development. Baek introduced some Korean cases 
of the provision of financial resources to start-up ventures and angel investment, in 
addition to assistance from policy funds. These included the Korea Funds of Funds, 
the Angel Matching Fund, the Korea Securities Dealers Automated Quotations 
Market as a trading board of the Korea Exchange, the small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) One-stop Clinic Service, the Youth Entrepreneur Training 
Program, and the Management of Technology program.
This chapter is a follow-up study of the 2013 KSP evaluating the knowledge-
generating and transferring activities in Hungary that constitute the potential 
capability to bear start-ups and innovative SMEs. The Hungarian government has 
recognized the importance of R&D and innovative activities in SMEs for economic 
growth and aims to focus on policy to promote SMEs. In this regard, this topic has 
been proposed to investigate measures that promote small and medium venture 
enterprises and venture ecosystems based on the recent Korean experience.
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Few start-up and SME funding programs are currently available in Hungary, 
and it is difficult for start-up enterprises with low credit worthiness to access the 
credit market. Thus, the business environment is poor for innovative enterprises in 
Hungary. Although stimulation programs from the Hungarian government or the 
central bank of Hungary may be somewhat beneficial for established enterprises, 
they appear to have no significant effect on newly created enterprises. Programs 
supported by the EU are seeking to assist SMEs as well, but they are designed to 
assist mid-size businesses with small credit risk, which are not specialized for start-up 
SMEs with innovative technologies.
Accessibility to financing resources is a significant problem for Hungarian SMEs. 
Numerous enterprises that are present in the market have proper business plans, 
conduct activities in accordance with market demand and expectations, and have 
satisfactory demand for their products. However, a significant proportion of these 
enterprises are not able to obtain enough external financing for their operations, 
mainly because of two issues.
One issue is the enterprise’s young age. In the absence of a long and well-
established history, investors may find it difficult to judge such an enterprise’s 
creditability, and, therefore, they reject its requests even if it has appropriate cash-
flow-producing ability. Another issue—not independent of the first one—is not 
having sufficient funds to obtain a bank loan. Often, mainly owing to its young age, 
an enterprise can boast favorable financial reports and positive achievements. Based 
on its credit history, it satisfies the bank’s credit conditions. However, it remains 
unable to obtain credit because of the lack of acceptable tangible coverage. Banks 
strongly emphasize coverage because of the undeniable fact that the financial 
indicators of domestic SMEs, especially the smallest ones, are unreliable due to 
widely practiced tax avoidance, which, in fact, is widely accepted by the local 
society.
Planesa et al. (2001) claimed that the level of innovation could vary depending 
on the enterprise and industry size, proposing that innovative enterprises have 
more investments in intangible assets than other enterprises, and the level of 
innovation has no significant correlation with income, profitability, or failure rate. 
In particular, he stressed that since enterprises’ innovative activities are limited 
by the constraint of financing, it is necessary for those enterprises to access funds 
conveniently through policies and measures, emphasizing, in particular, the 
importance of bank credit. World Bank and infoDev (2013) described the early 
stage of innovation financing in detail and proposed the use of growth strategies, 
investment management, governance, and risk management measures for start-up 
enterprises.
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Hungary showed interest in establishing institutes or innovation assessment 
systems such as Korea Technology Finance Corporation (KIBO) to strengthen fund 
supply functions for start-ups and SMEs that lack funding based on an assessment of 
technologies, competitiveness, and future business potential. Currently, Hungary has 
no well-established models or institutions that can assess technologies in innovative 
SMEs, which is why Hungary is seeking information through case studies in Korea 
and creating detailed action plans.
In light of Korea’s experiences, having assessment systems to search and select 
beneficiary enterprises is as important as the business content with regard to 
policy financing for SMEs. Limited funds can be efficiently distributed only when 
beneficiary enterprises are assessed correctly to achieve the goal of the financial 
policy and alleviate the risk of fund loss when the majority of policy financing is 
provided via loans. Thus, when policy-financing systems are developed, assessment 
systems for enterprises and technologies should be discussed simultaneously while 
these assessment systems continue improvements and advancements to keep pace 
with economic and technical environments.
This report concentrates on the functions and roles of innovation assessment 
institutions. In particular, we address the efforts to develop an innovation 
assessment system that is based not only on the credit rating of innovative SMEs 
but also on business potential and technology, as this is a main goal of the current 
government in South Korea. Through this report, we expect to derive implications 
for innovative small and medium venture enterprise assistance policies in Hungary.
This paper does not discuss overall SME-related policies in Korea or suggest 
policies for SMEs in Hungary based on Korea’s experience. Instead, this paper 
focuses on the development of assessment systems for the financial support of 
innovative SMEs and start-up enterprises.
Many policies supporting SMEs in Korea are well summarized in the modular 
report, which is another format of the KSP that is available for reference. Lee et al. 
(2011) discussed the history of the establishment and roles of SMEs in Korea as well 
as the establishment of the Korea Credit Guarantee Fund, which sought to promote 
loans for SMEs. Lee (2012) explained the history and operation of policy financing 
and loan systems for SMEs along with the establishment and development of small 
business corporations. In addition, Park (2013) explained why large conglomerate-
oriented promotion policies changed to SME-oriented policies pertaining to industry 
policies and structural changes in Korea and described structural changes in SME 
manufacturing and technology expansion policies. Kim and Kim (2013) reported 
promotional policies and start-up support programs for venture enterprises in 
Korea.
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In addition, this paper does not discuss policy measures for overall innovation 
creation. This similar topic was dealt with in “Strengthening R&D Capabilities by 
Fostering Innovative SMEs,” one of the topics of the 2013 KSP with Hungary. This 
paper, instead, discusses the need to develop a technological evaluation system and 
the specific measures required as follow-up tasks. In Korea, technological evaluation 
systems and financial markets for innovation have room for improvement, and the 
role of private finance in supporting innovative and entrepreneurial companies 
leaves much to be desired. In fact, except for some advanced countries, such as the 
United States and Germany, there are no countries where so-called “innovative” 
technology financing is generated smoothly through a combination of angel 
investment, private venture investment, technological transactions, or mergers and 
acquisitions. What is more important for innovative technologies to develop into 
growth engines is the induction of source technology development to guarantee 
success and pushing ahead with policies to expand the market. Corresponding to 
this reality, the key to a technology evaluation system is aggressive financial support 
through identification of businesses with highly innovative ideas and the potential 
to execute them.
In Sec.2, financial support for SMEs in Hungary is reviewed, and the current 
funding status for countries and the EU is discussed. In Sec. 3, assistance systems 
for innovative SMEs in Korea based on technology competitiveness are briefly 
explained and technology-financing ecosystems based on innovation assessment 
systems that are driven by the Korean government are introduced. In Sec. 4, policy 
recommendations regarding the development direction of innovation assessment 
systems for excellent technology-held start-ups and SMEs in Hungary are proposed 
based on experiences in Korea. The conclusion of this report is presented in Sec. 5.
2.  Financing Innovative Start-Ups and SMEs 
and Rating Innovation in Hungary
After the 2007–2008 financial crises, external financing for SMEs became even 
more difficult to obtain than before. Stricter bank credit policies have greatly 
contributed to the fact that investment activity reached a historic low in 2012. In 
the summer of 2012, an interest rate reduction cycle started. This substantially 
reduced credit costs, and, therefore, the entire corporate sector’s cash-flow positions 
improved, resulting in increased investment rates of return. However, the general 
credit cost reduction could not ease certain problems faced by the SME sector, such 
as exposure to foreign open exchange rate positions, debt burden from former 
loans, and accessibility to long maturity loans as stated by Berger and Udell (1998).
Investors often place their money in venture capital funds and immobilize their 
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savings for a long term. They, therefore, entrust the management of their capital 
to investment experts, whose expertise is debatable. These experts hardly take 
any risks and contribute only a tiny—if any—proportion of their own savings to 
an investment. By using the fund’s money, they buy shares in different companies, 
which, in turn, are run by managers with limited leadership abilities and whose 
future behavior is highly unpredictable. Therefore, insecurity can be eased only 
partially even with the best incentives and controlling schemes. Venture capitalists 
and investors can never obtain as much information on companies as those 
involved in the internal company operations, that is, those who take part in the 
daily operations and operations management [Figure 1-1]. As a result, the owner’s 
decision is not often backed by appropriate information. Furthermore, investors 
may end up investing in companies that, during the course of their operations, 
never realize any revenues and that, at the time of investment, lack existing 
products and services. In other cases, respectable companies may turn out to 
have failed, and invested capital can never be reclaimed (Bank for International 
Settlement, 2013). In this study, therefore, we construct a model to describe the 
problems arising from the lack of market information. This model serves as proof 
of existing risks and attempts to identify these risks. Furthermore, it aims to serve 
as a gap analysis that is specifically provided under the Joint European Resources 
for Micro to Medium Enterprises(JEREMIE) program (market assessments for Article 
44a FEIs) and is focused on the financial impacts, in particular, business sectors. (See 
Appendix 1 for this model’s theoretical approach.)
Discovery of problems arising from lack of market information
On September 11, 2014, the European Commission and Hungary signed a 
Partnership Agreement (PA) for the 2014–2020 period. This PA is the basic planning 
document for 2014–2020 EU-financed developments. The PA is a framework 
agreement signed between the European Commission and the Hungarian 
government to cover the period from January 1, 2014 to December 31, 2020, and 
it introduces the economic and social goals that the country wishes to achieve (Figs. 
1-2 and 1-3). It also specifies the procedural and institutional framework within 
which the funds released in 2014–2020 could actually serve comprehensive national 
goals, such as achieving economic growth derived from sustainable, high-added-
value production and expanded employment (European Commission and European 
Investment Bank, 2013; European Commission, 2014).
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Unlike the development practices thus far, the emergence of refundable 
assistance schemes (grants) will definitely be novel compared to nonrefundable 
assistance schemes (financial products or instruments). The PA does not define exact 
numbers, though according to the content of submitted yet unapproved programs, 
a significant part of the resources (in the case of cohesive political resources, it may 
be as high as 10%) would reach beneficiaries as financial instruments.
Financial instruments boast several advantages besides their obvious one: they 
are less market distorting, as these assistance schemes—unlike nonrefundable 
assistance schemes—closely follow market mechanisms. They also have a larger 
development effect, and, therefore, public funds can mobilize additional private 
funds to achieve the above-mentioned goals. A major part of these assistance 
schemes is likely to be recyclable, and, therefore, they could serve as resources for 
domestic public development even after the program has ended. (Considering the 
latter strategy could prove to be crucial, depending on the outcome of the debate 
over EU cohesion politics.)
[Figure1-1] Role of High-tech Production in Exports and Manufacturing
Source: Eurostat.
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Financial instruments are present in several themed development plans, 
especially in terms of improving SME competitiveness, R&D investment, information 
and communications technology (ICT) development, and energy (particularly for 
household and business-reusable and energy-efficient investments). Financial 
instruments could also serve as a part of social catch-up developments by providing 
microloans to the poor, as has already been proven to work in developing countries.
[Figure1-2] GERD in V4 Countries
[Figure1-3] Innovation Index 2014
Source: Eurostat.
Source: Innovation Union Scoreboard 2014, EU DG RTD & EU DG GROW.
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In the case of improving SME competitiveness, nonrefundable assistance schemes 
for businesses will presumably shrink, and, therefore, their application must be duly 
justified. A combination of financial instruments and nonrefundable assistance 
schemes will become a frequent form of financing.
The goal state that should be outlined in both national and regional terms 
envisages the strengthening of a sustainable knowledge and technology ecosystem 
that is long term and internationally competitive and serves our economic system, 
particularly in terms of industrial competitiveness. It is fundamental that in the 
operative programs concerned, the efficiency of source exploitation should 
considerably surpass what was the case formerly, thus, enabling changes in the 
industrial system that would first affect the corporate sector and second allow SMEs 
to be more active in RDI than their regional competitors are. As professional areas 
change continuously and are unpredictable in the long run, the success indicator 
of the governmental innovation policy is how the government can manage the 
adaptation of technology and markets to the fast-changing environment and what 
the correction and reaction ability of this innovation policy is like.
Specialization areas and directions derived from innovation system structure
It is noteworthy in the industrial section that, even on the EU scale, the 
processing industry market share is outstanding. 
[Figure1-4] Manufacturing and Construction 2011–2012
Source: DG GROW & Eurostat.
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Sectors such as road vehicle production, electrical industry, pharmaceutical 
industry, and some areas of ICT are building on corporate achievements, playing 
a dominant role in processing industry value chains and are acting as a globally 
significant force for growth [Figure 1-4].
Certain high-tech areas within these sectors, especially pharmaceutical 
development, medical tool production, and certain aspects of ICT, have produced 
a constantly developing and strengthening technology ecosystem that is worthy 
of global attention. Hungary boasts numerous excellent high-tech corporations 
that provide concentrated R&D results, and the strengthening of their position in 
the global value chain is strongly dependent on their R&D activity. R&D FDI plays 
a key role in the domestic innovation system. (The ratio to the BERD indicator is 
one of the highest in the EU, as in Ireland.) With respect of the R&D FDI location, 
tough competition with certain developing countries outside the EU is becoming 
increasingly typical. Concentrating on activities and specialized areas that are the 
most effective and conducive to the development of our industrial-innovation 
system should best serve to strengthen the position already achieved in investment 
incentives. It is also important to note that there is a significant difference that can 
be observed among processing industry development factors among countries that 
belong to different stages of development within the EU. Among other economies 
in the region, in terms of general advancement and balanced industrial structure, 
Hungary performs at the lowest level of catching up. Regarding other quantitative 
indicators (e.g., textile export and investment), countries from the same region 
[Figure1-5] Employment in High-Tech Manufacturing 2014
Source: EBRD.
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as Hungary boast higher indicators, in certain cases even outperforming member 
countries at a consistent level [Figure 1-5]. However, with regard to quality factors, 
especially productivity and innovation, the lag of countries that have recently joined 
the EU is still significant in the case of infrastructure and business environment as 
well. RDI activity represents only a slowly growing proportion in the strengthening 
of in-house research or RDI services in the entire domestic SME sector.
Therefore, the usually weak corporate performance (e.g., export growth and 
internationalization) of the SME sector provides little to no incentive for the 
development of domestic knowledge bases, as shown in [Figure 1-6].
The key to improving competitiveness within the region is quality factors, which 
first means strengthening the corporate innovation performance. Therefore, 
ranking these industrial activities should be based on such industrial and service 
potentials for which quality and innovative approaches are dominant.
EU co-financing capital programs (JEREMIE) that have a positive impact on the 
business environment for start-ups represent significant potential in Hungary for 
realizing a knowledge and high-tech ecosystem [Figure 1-7]. A start-up ecosystem 
has emerged in recent years, especially in the areas of IT, Internet, and certain 
software development and mobile technology platforms. Moreover, this dynamic 
entrepreneurial potential, which has high growth potential, is catalyzing a closer 
link between knowledge bases and the high-tech sector that can be exploited 
with innovation management development programs that build on intensified 
investor interests and willful venture sharing. The application of capital financing 
opportunities needs extra attention from the innovation sector as well as from the 
viewpoint of FDI, restructuring, and turnaround areas.
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The cornerstone of industrial innovation is for the SME sector, which plays a 
most important role in employment, to be integrated with a strengthened position 
in the building of a technology (not necessarily high-tech) ecosystem. One approach 
could be the successful execution of a start-up ecosystem-building program. 
Another approach could be opportunities such as opening global or macroregional 
provider system relations, innovation processes, or food industry chains. This is 
why developing industrial public properties in the Hungarian innovation system 
is considered important; this includes industrial parks, integrated establishment 
systems supported by regional cluster organizations, science parks, industrial 
research institutional networks, open labs, and university-based industrial campus 
developments, as well as the establishment of techniques that improve adaptive 
innovation demand [Figure 1-3].
[Figure1-6] Performance Index 2013
Source: DG GROW.
• Consistent performers: AT, BE, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR, IE, LU, NL, SE, UK
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Increasing importance is being given to program-based research and innovation 
policies channeled through concrete “policy measures” (on which the present 
analysis is based) relative to institutional funding (i.e., budget for the functioning 
of public organizations, mostly comprising salary and administrative costs). This 
shift can also be observed in the number of policy measures that grew steadily until 
2009. DG GROW, upon closely examining the differences between policy mixes in 
countries, revealed five different profiles (European Commission, 2014). These are 
applied by countries that belong to different performance groups according to the 
Innovation Union Scoreboard [Figure 1-8].
The JEREMIE program launched by the European Commission and the European 
Investment Bank encourages the application of financial instruments in the EU 
member states. These so-called JEREMIE products play a significant role in achieving 
EU support policy goals: They provide beneficiaries with flexibly applicable and 
sustainable financing that has a significant multiplier effect on both private and 
state investments (OECD, 2012).
[Figure1-7] VC/GDP Ratio within Hungary
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During the 2007–2013 EU budget cycle, member states could deliver a part of 
their financial support from the structural funds with these instruments. Hungary 
played a pioneering role in the promotion and expansion of program and, by the 
end of the cycle, launched the most widely spread financial instrument program in 
the EU via the Economic Development Operative Program’s (GOP). At the time of 
planning, 23.9% of available GOP resources were allocated in JEREMIE products.
The intentions of the Commission are clear. In the long run, financial instruments 
will hopefully gain more ground than nonrefundable supporting schemes and 
let member states place more resources in a wider scale of such instruments. In 
the position paper sent to Hungary, the Commission encouraged Hungary to 
build on the success achieved in the past cycle and expressed their hope that 
Hungary would apply such instruments even more widely (OECD, 2013).Among 
the points emphasized, a detailed analysis supplemented by a gap analysis on the 
achievements of the 2007–2003 periods could significantly contribute to a more 
effective and purpose-driven application of financial instruments in the 2014–2020 
[Figure1-8] Policy-Mix and Innovation Performance Groups within the EU
Science : Competitive R&D
Science : Collaborative R&D
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Science and business R&D
•IE, SI, MT, PL
•FI, DE, SE, EE, GR, LV
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•DK, AT, BE, CZ, HU, ES, PT
•CY, LU, SK, LT, BG, RO
Note:   Science-competitive R&D focused: Focus on competitive R&D programs with an increasing share 
of business innovation support measures and the use of R&D tax incentives. Science-collaboration 
focused: Focus on collaborative R&D, support for loan and venture capital funds, and no use of R&D 
tax incentives. Commercializationdriven: Focus on technology-transfer mechanisms, strong support for 
entrepreneurship, loans, and venture capital, and extensive use of R&D tax incentives. Business R&D and 
innovation: Focus on direct business R&D and business innovation and use of R&D tax incentives. Science 
and business R&D: Focus on competitive R&D programs and no use of R&D tax incentives.
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period. Therefore, this study evaluates the JEREMIE program in Hungary from 2007 
to 2013.
The Hungarian JEREMIE program basically established three types of products—
credit, guarantees, and venture capital—supplemented by two combined products—
credit and nonrefundable financial support and a combination of guarantees and 
nonrefundable financial support.
Credit products
The first JEREMIE transactions were conducted at the beginning of the cycle 
in January 2008 within the framework of the microloan scheme. The rules of 
accessibility for this credit product changed several times during the program, and 
a significant boom in contracts was experienced when the so-called New Széchenyi 
Credit product was established following minor corrections. This is mainly due to 
two factors:
• they raised the credit limit for financial enterprises, 
•  and in the case of all credit intermediaries, they uniformly raised refinancing to 
100% (subsequently, this reduced to 75% for credit institutions). 
[Figure1-9] Variation in CEE Banking Market
Source: EBRD.
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The economic structure that was formed following the change in the political 
system during the 1990s is characterized by a duality: businesses can be divided 
into a small number of export-oriented corporations and numerous SMEs that are 
rather involved in the local economic life. Owing to the situation of the SMEs, their 
performance may significantly affect domestic economic situations. Despite these 
facts, there is a notable variation in the CEE banking market [Figure 1-9].
Because of the crisis, starting from the end of 2008, the dynamic growth of credit 
to domestic businesses stopped. Between September 2008 and December 2013, 
the domestic bank credit volume for businesses dropped by 18.4% from HUF8.553 
billion to HUF 6.979 billion. Upon filtering the effects of exchange rates, based on 
our own calculations, the decline was close to 24%. In the second half of 2013, as 
result of the National Credit Program, the working credit volume for SMEs grew 
significantly.
Corporate financing
The role of Hungarian credit institutions was taken over partially by foreign 
financial contributors, partially by the corporations themselves, or by bond market 
investors in the case of large corporations. The corporate loan volume from abroad 
or commercial loans not coming from banks as well as bond financing has grown 
significantly (even though this is mostly due to a low base and a few large-scale 
transactions).
The role of banks was essentially taken over by foreign financial contributors in 
the case of corporations (e.g., parent companies): their proportion grew from 40% 
at pre-crisis to nearly 50% subsequently. This way of obtaining credit is characteristic 
of multinational corporations operating in Hungary, as it is usually the parent 
company, and not the local interest, that makes a financing-related decision. The 
proportion among commercial loans that companies provide each other within their 
liabilities (11%) can be considered significant at present. Bond financing is still not 
too representative (5%), and it is limited to a small number of businesses. Overall, 
the liabilities of Hungarian corporations did not decrease nominally because of the 
crisis (though the real value of stagnation is up to 20%), and the place of domestic 
bank loans was taken over by other forms of financing.
SME financing
With the emergence of a new economic structure following the political 
transition, SMEs have played a significant role. At present, SMEs have a significant 
influence on the performance of the Hungarian economy and are responsible for a 
major part of employment.
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According to preliminary data from 2012, 58.3% of the sales turnover realized, 
which is a good indicator of a company’s performance, can be attributed to SMEs. 
Between 2001 and 2009—except for two years—the market share of the SME 
sector was at least 60%; since 2010, this has decreased slightly to 58%–59%. Unlike 
the sales turnover, in terms of the gross added value, the SME market share has 
not decreased since the crisis. The proportion has remained ~55% since 2007, and 
according to preliminary data for 2012, it was 55.2%.
According to the preliminary data for 2012, of the 2.7 million people employed 
by companies, nearly 2 million worked for SMEs. Since 2002, 72%–74% of all people 
employed worked for the SME sector. In terms of the structure of the number of 
people employed, no major changes have been observed for ten years. Among all 
the people employed, 37%–39% work for microbusinesses, 17%–19% for small 
enterprises employing 17–49 people, and 16%–17% for medium enterprises. The 
employee per capita sales turnover grew, keeping with the size of the business. 
According to preliminary data for 2012, the employee per capita sales turnover 
for medium-size enterprises was HUF 36.2 million on average, whereas for small 
enterprises, it did not exceed HUF 28.1 million on average. The employee per capita 
revenue-generating capability of companies also increased with the facility size.
In 2010, of the total gross added value of all EU businesses, the SME sector 
accounted for 58%. In terms of the added value, Hungary is below the EU average; 
however, in terms of the number of employees, Hungary is above the EU average. 
According to preliminary data for 2012, of the 629,585 businesses operating in 
Hungary, 628,707 were SMEs, which indicates a relapse. Between 2002 and 2011, 
except for 2004 and 2005, the number of operating SMEs was between 680,000 and 
700,000. According to 2010 data by Eurostat, 99.7% of businesses operating in the 
EU (EU-27) were SMEs. The ratio is above 99% in all member states.
The survival capacity of SMEs is low. In 2006, nearly 60,000 new SMEs started 
operations, but only 40.1% of them were in existence in 2011. In terms of survival, 
the ratio was the worst for companies employing 10–49 people, and only 39.6% 
of SMEs established in 2006 still operated in 2011. Microbusinesses make up 98.5% 
of SMEs, with a survival rate of 40.1%. Of the 75 SMEs established in 2006, only 36 
were still operating in 2011. The survival capacities of SMEs are strongly affected by 
the characteristics of their activities.
Overall, after 2008, the credit market became significantly stricter, and this 
tendency has not yet resulted in greater outsourcing. The narrowing of SME 
financing is affected by elements of both the supply and the demand sides. Resource 
contraction from the supply side is attributed to the characteristic ownership 
structure of the banking sector, as in most banks, the parent bank restricted foreign 
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currency supplies formerly used for foreign-currency-based financial support 
for growth. Furthermore, owing to unfortunate tendencies in the international 
financial market, financing costs increased significantly. The disappearance of cheap 
liquidity as well as pressure from the capital market both resulted in a decrease in 
supply, and for the corporate segment, significant portfolio cleaning was required, 
resulting in decreased activity in certain segments. Demand was first characterized 
by the change in the requirement directions: alongside the change in the demand 
for investment credit, the demand for short-term financing increased, the volume of 
demand for the temporary financing of receivables increased, and internal sources 
of businesses decreased significantly. The change in the credit market volumes 
followed this tendency: the credit volume of the SME sector has stagnated since 
2008, and the volume and value of payments has decreased. 
Encouraging credit market activity in the current economic and banking 
environment would support cheap refinancing and guarantee that the product 
cross-influence is secondary, as the demand for investment credit has dropped 
significantly. The vitalization of the credit market by guarantee programs is not 
viable, as the existence of a guarantee in itself does not encourage lending if there 
is no proper demand in the market. Market participants agree with this statement: 
guarantee products can only fulfill their role if their goals are to provide bank 
credit; however, owing to certain factors, supplemental coverage is needed because 
of the higher risks involved in nonstandard transactions (lack of coverage, higher 
client risk). As leverage, guarantees do not encourage the financing of clients with 
improper risks.
Guarantee products
Nevertheless, guarantee products did not become successful products of the 
program; they contributed much less JEREMIE financing than expected. During the 
entire advancement, a low number of transactions and low intermediary activity 
was characteristic. Until the beginning of 2012, only 400 transactions had been 
completed, which was partially attributable to the low demand for investment 
credit that could be involved in the program and partially to established guarantee 
products accessible in parallel. The frame of the program  shrunk several times, and 
it advanced slowly, partially owing to accountability doubts in the EU.
With the advancement of the program, an indemnity product was established 
linked to a combined credit guarantee process. Even though it did not deliver 
outstanding results, it was a very promising option. Through a single-window 
system, credit supported with guarantees and nonrefundable assistance schemes 
are both accessible. In addition to modifying the program  structure, shortening the 
processing time, insurance of a proper scale for nonrefundable financial support, 
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and revoking interest margins are strongly recommended.
The framework for guarantee products is HUF 8.5 billion from GOP, from which 
HUF 4.2 billion (~50%) was immobilized by the end of 2013. From the central 
region, an additional HUF 3.5 billion was available; this sum was completely 
immobilized by the end of 2013.
We can draw the following conclusions from the current cycle of the New 
Széchenyi Program: except for 2013, there was only very little demand, and it 
basically depended on the decision of the credit institutions, what type of indemnity 
they used in the guarantee of Garantiqa Hitelgarancia Zrt., or whether they needed 
the guarantee of MV Zrt instead. This duality was abolished by IH in December 2013 
when it ended the program.
The guarantee product was not particularly successful. Compared to the 
planned expectations(and the 20% collapse probability calculated in 2013), it 
immobilized few JEREMIE resources. During its entire advancement, a small 
number of transactions and low intermediary activity were characteristic—until the 
beginning of 2014, only 800 transactions had been conducted—partially owing to 
the low demand for investment credit in the program and partially because of the 
established guarantee products accessible in parallel.
Leasing and factoring
After 2008, the leasing market shrunk to one-third its previous size. Leasing in 
itself was developed to manage market dissatisfaction (limited capacity of bank 
asset valuation) for the purpose of financing enterprises that were viable but 
lacked bank coverage. Even though it did not belong to the supported financial 
instruments in general between 2007 and 2013, based on the current and expected 
market situation, certain leasing programs (closed- and open-ended leasing) are 
suitable for filling the existing market gap.
In the current economic situation, factoring can be used to improve corporate 
liquidity. It may be carried out by using other financial instruments, and if this 
approach is to be supported, it could play a role in advancing the Hungarian credit 
market. At the same time, new Civil Code regulations could improve the situation of 
those most in need of financial support, namely, micro- and small enterprises.
Venture capital
Capital funds supported by the JEREMIE initiative became a determining element 
of the domestic venture capital market. The EU support in all programs had to be 
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supplemented by 30% of external funds, which ensured a business approach to 
investments.
Venture capital plays a crucial role in the early stage of a SME when the 
enterprise cannot obtain traditional forms of financing (e.g., credit) despite 
outstanding potential for growth because it is not yet well established and it does 
not possess invested instruments that could help it obtain credit. It should be noted 
that venture capital is not a viable alternative for most SMEs because it is innovative 
and accessible for enterprises that have a huge potential for growth and who can 
ensure big revenue.
In 2007–2013, two products were available: the New Hungary Venture Capital 
(Új Magyarország Kockázati Tőke) and the New Széchenyi Venture Capital I (Új 
Széchenyi Kockázati Tőke I). GOP allocated a total of HUF 86 billion for this purpose, 
from which HUF 26 billion was spent by the end of 2013. From the HUF 4 billion 
framework of the central region, HUF 2.4 billion was immobilized by the end of 
2013. By the end of 2015, together with the venture capital fund management’s 
own share, financial support will enable HUF 131.4 billion of investment.
The main goal of the programs is to improve the capital situation of SMEs that 
are still in an early (seeding and launching) stage. Until 2010, the Hungarian credit 
market was underdeveloped, large-scale transactions were dominant, and only a 
few market participants dealt with capital financing of SMEs in their seeding and 
launching stages.
Within the framework of these programs, MV Zrt. (Venture Finance Hungary 
Private Limited Company) mediated resources to venture capital funds, thus, 
expanding options to raise capital for SMEs. The direct partners of MV Zrt. are 
venture capital management funds, and resources can reach businesses through 
their assistance. In addition to carrying out investment activity, it is the duty of these 
management funds to involve private capital in the resources obtained via MV Zrt.
Capital funds supported from JEREMIE-financed funds became a determining 
element of the domestic venture capital market. Even though the achievements 
from investments by funds that were announced in the first and second rounds (the 
second to a smaller extent) can be shown, they provided an outstanding quantity of 
financial resources for their target groups. For the coming years, accessible resources 
in the market ensure enough supply, and, thus, further outsourcing opportunities 
seem limited in the case of further selected funds (third and fourth rounds), because 
this obviously means oversupply. However, this does not necessarily mean that 
resources cannot be outsourced by the end of 2015; it is just likely that the quality 
of portfolios will be far from ideal because of “forced” transactions.
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The main opposition between supply and demand is that businesses that can 
accept venture capital support are characteristically in big cities (in Hungary, this 
means only Budapest) and form near big cities/are sustained in big cities, while 
according to the regulation, central Hungary can manage a significantly lesser 
amount of resources. The main imperfection of the domestic venture capital 
market is the business environment (high tax burden, complexity of tax regulations, 
administrative burden, and underdeveloped innovation institution system) and 
infrastructure (especially human infrastructure, and lack of financial and corporate 
training in secondary and higher education).
SZTA (Széchenyi Venture Capital Investment) cannot compete with bank credit 
or other state investment agencies, as they do not require applicants to have 
coverage. In case of existing credit, the bank welcomes a professional co-owner, 
which is beneficial for the bank, too. Clients choose SZTA because the size of the 
transaction is in accordance with demand. They usually work with no IT, biotech, 
renewable energy, and multinational companies because their competitors work 
with such companies already; instead, they work with companies that compete in 
the rather traditional industrial segments such as the metallurgical industry.
Intermediary network
For the sake of program execution, an expanded external intermediary network 
was involved. JEREMIE products could not earn enough space in bank portfolios. 
This was partially because internal bank operations found it difficult to manage 
these products, partly due to administrative regulations that made alternatively 
accessible products more attractive. Financial enterprises were mostly established 
with the purpose of selling JEREMIE products, and following 2011, they served as 
the unequivocal motors of credit product expansion and played a significant role in 
the success of the combined microloan product. Once they reached the limits of the 
framework in central Hungary, they focused their activities on the countryside.
Local business development funds have dealt with microfinancing since the 
1990s. Initially, they were the major sellers of credit products; later, the combined 
microloan products became a major element in their portfolio.
Thus far, two announcements have been made about choosing venture capital 
funds: in 2009, they chose eight growth funds, and in 2012, they launched eight 
growth funds and four seed funds. In 2013, an additional four growth funds were 
selected.
The general principles of improving the financing system for SMEs and start-
ups are as follows. (1) In addition to this macro-approach study, it is important 
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to prepare the complete resource map and the strategic overview of credit and 
guarantee products supported from state and EU funds suggested and accessible 
during the 2014–2020 planning period. (2) In this regard, a structured definition of 
the financial support policy that these financial instruments are aiming for should 
be provided. Therefore, programs that play a strategic role and aim to support 
innovative and developing businesses in the first place should be detached and 
should be given special attention, along with programs that are mainly announced 
for absorption purposes. (3) A revision of the institutional monitoring system, 
which shows parallelism, is also suggested. (4) In terms of administration, reducing 
administrative burden is crucial (electronic procedures linked with integration, 
automation, positive discrimination of former successful applicants, etc.). (5) The 
problems that emerged during the last support period in close relation to JEREMIE 
products were related to financial instruments and enterprises participating in the 
program; they also emerged in intermediary institutes in terms of exclusive support, 
consulting, and education support. (6) Potential beneficiaries need calculable, 
single-window administration that is planned and timed publicly with the planning 
of resource allocation for continuously arriving applications. Financial services 
will probably take on the assistance of noncredit clients as well, as the cross-sales 
potential is huge, and they are also experienced in the process of closing contracts 
related to financial support, payment, and verification.
3.  Innovation Assessment and Finance in 
Korea1) 
Innovation or technology financing supplies funds for technology ideas, 
development, and commercialization based on valuations of the technologies or 
ideas that have the potential to generate future revenue. Innovation financing 
is largely divided into investment financing, loan financing, and policy funds, 
depending on the characteristics of the technology and the growth stage of the 
corporation. Investment financing is provided based on the expectation of future 
revenue from certain assets. Typically, this form of financing is provided by venture 
capital in the early stage of a corporation characterized by high risk and high return. 
Loan financing is supplied based on the capability to repay the loan principal and 
the financial information assessed by financial institutions. Banks normally provide 
this form of financing in the growth stage.
1)  This section is based on two reports: one from the Korean Government (2014) and the other from 
the Financial Services Commission (2014).
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In Korea, innovation financing is mainly supplied in the form of loans, using 
the government-supported loan guarantee program. Banks provide innovative 
corporations with loans based on a technology credit guarantee, primarily by the 
Korea Technology Finance Corporation (KOTEC). Investment financing is relatively 
smaller than loan financing because of the significant risk aversion in Korea; 
however, there is a trend toward gradual expansion of venture investment. Policy 
funds provide assistance with technology transfer and the commercialization of 
innovative corporations.
As of the end of 2013, innovation financing was about KRW 26 trillion. Of this, 
loan financing based on KOTEC credit guarantees was KRW 19.4 trillion, which 
accounted for 73% of all innovation financing. Investment financing (KRW 5.9 
trillion) was provided in the form of investment in equity shares of technology 
corporations by venture capital. Technology transfer and commercialization are 
supported by government-funded and public research institutions, which use funds 
allocated by the Small and Medium Business Administration, which was only KRW 
0.5 trillion.2)
It is critical that innovation financing be based on a credible and accurate 
innovation or technology assessment system; this is a prerequisite for the expansion 
of innovation financing. An efficient assessment system will play an effective role in 
reducing the uncertainty and asymmetric information that is inherent in innovation 
financing. In addition, a highly credible innovation assessment system will decrease 
risks to financial institutions and enable the creation of venture investment.
2)  Financing for all types of SMEs at the end of 2013 was KRW 488.9 trillion from loans, KRW 5.9 billion 
from investments, and KRW 0.8 billion from equity and bond issuance.
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3.1. Innovation Financing Issues
Despite the strong encouragement of innovation financing by financial 
institutions, appropriate infrastructure and incentive schemes have not been 
provided. The innovation assessment system is characterized by public goods, which 
require risk diversification and the creation of synergy through the collaboration of 
interested participants instead of individual financial institutions.
First, the banking sector did not develop an infrastructure sufficient for 
innovation assessment because of a lack of incentives and interest in innovation 
financing related to the loan supply. Although the Korea Development Bank (KDB) 
has an independent department that assesses technologies for loan examination, it 
is not actively used. Additionally, an independent innovation assessment model and 
innovation information database model have not yet been developed. Commercial 
banks aim to develop infrastructure, such as human resource expansion, to create 
loan demand for technology and innovation corporations, but this has not been 
actively pursued. Efforts to provide human resources are still in an early stage, and 
no systematic approach has been adopted because of a lack of experience and 
expertise.
The Korea Credit Guarantee Fund (KODIT) performs guarantee tasks based 
on credit assessment. However, the demand for innovation assessment has been 
increasing because of the expansion of technology-related trading corporations. 
KODIT has used external assessment information to examine guarantees in response 
[Figure1-10] Innovation Financing in Korea as of the End of 2013
Source: Korean Government (2014).
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Chapter  1 _Establishing a Rating Institution for Evaluating the Competitiveness and Risks of Enterprises • 051
to the expansion of innovation assessment.3)
KOTEC performs innovation assessment tasks for guaranteeing technology by 
using specialized internal personnel and assessment models. It was established solely 
to provide guarantees based on innovation assessment; therefore, its fundamental 
task is innovation assessment. KOTEC has specialized personnel that assess the 
innovation-based merit of technology.4) KOTEC’s internal personnel produce 
assessment results that are based on their internal models. In addition, it has 
developed a database (about 60,000 datasets) containing its trading corporations 
and guarantee-related assessment results.
Unfortunately, the current market for innovation assessment does not provide 
sufficient information for the assessment of innovation and the innovation financing 
requirements of financial institutions. Because it has focused on the early stage of 
R&D and technology development, its use is limited to innovation financing carried 
out by financial institutions. Assessment can be divided into the following categories 
according to policy purposes and specialized technology fields: (1) assessment of 
the objectives of innovation financing, (2) assessment of the objectives of R&D 
technology transfer, and (3) assessment of specific industry fields. KOTEC produces 
information for its own decision-making when deciding on technology guarantees, 
which is why it has limited accessibility, and its demands differ from the demands of 
financial institutions. There are no assessment markets or institutions that provide 
innovation assessments that are in line with the demands and purposes of financial 
institutions.
Another reason for the difficulty in forming an appropriate assessment market 
for innovation financing is the lack of interest in and the absence of use of 
innovation financing by financial institutions. Because most innovation financing is 
dependent on technology guarantees, the risk of which is borne by KOTEC, financial 
institutions are not enthusiastic about providing innovation financing. Furthermore, 
there is no motivation for financial institutions to expand innovation financing 
because of the large risk involved. Because of the high dependence on guarantees 
and collateral (nearly 80% of all SME loans), the number of specialized personnel 
in innovation financing is insufficient, and the systems for assessing innovation are 
inadequate (see <Table 1-1>).
3)  Since January 2014, the SMART3 system of the Korea Invention Promotion Association has been 
used to assess knowledge assets.
4)  About 530 staff members are employed in assessment, of which approximately 130 hold Ph.D.s and 
are qualified specialized personnel.
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3.2.  Recent Efforts in Developing an Innovation 
Assessment System
Based on the determination that Korea lacks an innovation assessment ecosystem 
to address technology-financing issues, Korea has established a goal to expand 
technology finance through the development of innovation assessment systems. 
Implementing this process will require four policy tasks: developing a technology 
information database (DB) characterized by public goods, activating a private 
technical credit bureau, building innovation assessment capabilities among financial 
institutions, and promoting the use of the innovation assessment information. 
These four tasks are discussed in more detail below.5)
3.2.1. Development of a technology database
The most difficult task in innovation assessment is to find the information 
required and to retrieve the required foundational data. Patent and market 
information, which are essential in assessing innovation, are distributed by several 
sources, such as domestic and international research institutions, associations, 
working papers, and academic journals.6) In general, 70% of the total assessment 
time is required for the information search and the case analysis required for 
innovation assessments.
A system that heightens the accessibility of dispersed technical and trading 
information is a prerequisite for the activation of innovation assessment. 
If accessibility to innovation information is increased through the efficient 
<Table 1-1> Conditions of Loans to SMEs by Financial Institutions (as of end 2011)
Source: Korea Federation of Small and Medium Business (2012).
Real estate 
collateral
Guarantee 
by 
guarantee 
institution
Savings 
deposit 
collateral
Personal 
guarantee
Bank 
guarantee Pure credit
34.9% 32.3% 5.9% 6.9% 7.8% 21.4%
5)  Shin (2014) also pointed out the issue of SME financing and the venture capital market in South 
Korea and recommended activating innovation financing to achieve the creative economy 
government goal.
6)  For instance, the Korea Institute of Science and Technology Information holds about 100 million 
sources of science and technology papers, and the Korea Institute of Patent Information (KIPI) 
holds about 200 million sources of national and international patents and intellectual property 
information.
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development of a technology database (TDB), it is likely to reduce the cost of 
assessment and the difficulty of the information searches performed by financial 
institutions. Innovation information, unlike financial information, changes rapidly, 
so up-to-date information is important. Therefore, high costs and many human 
resources are required to integrate and manage innovation information.
An innovation or technology database is a highly important public good, 
considering the effect of economies of scale on integration of information as 
well as the costs incurred in maintaining the database. If all financial institutions 
and technology assessment bureaus constructed innovation information DBs, 
much effort and cost would be incurred, including the inefficiency of duplicate 
information.7) The function of the DB would be to reprocess and reclassify the 
information so that it is appropriate for financial institutions rather than a simple 
accumulation of innovation information.
An innovation information DB is a public good, which also creates the possibility 
of its use by a certain institution only; therefore, an efficient governance structure 
is important. Thus, the main principles of the technology DB would be as follows: 
(1) specialty and independence should be maintained to provide information that 
meets the demand for high responsiveness, and (2) the integration effect should 
be maximized by encouraging the sharing of technical and trading information 
between interested participants, thereby preventing the exclusive use of innovation 
information.
A technology DB is designed to meet these standards. It is necessary to develop 
a DB that is owned by consumers and producers of the innovation information to 
fulfill the characteristic of a public good. Therefore, a TDB should be established 
as a joint venture in which the consumers of innovation assessment information 
participate.8)
A TDB accumulates innovation information, correct information, and market 
information, as well as assessment and trading information. It aims to have 
agreements to facilitate information sharing with institutions that produce 
innovation information, such as KIPI and various research institutes. Operational 
costs, such as personnel costs related to the TDB, are designed to be purveyed 
through the service fee charged for using the information in the DB.
7)  For instance, personal and corporation credit information is managed via the Korea Federation 
of Banks (KFB) in order to take advantage of the characteristics of public goods and centralized 
management of the database.
8)  Consumers include policy financial institutions such as the KDB, the Industrial Bank of Korea, KODIT, 
KOTEC, commercial banks, capital market infrastructure institutions, etc.
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According to the above-mentioned Credit Information Act, the KFB, a credit 
information collection organization, can function as a TDB by intensively managing 
technology information.9) About four million pieces of data, including information 
collected from 32 private and public organizations, were supplied to 23 institutions, 
including banks, guarantee institutions, and technical credit bureaus(TCBs). Up 
to the end of 2014, the number of information-providing organizations and data 
pieces increased to approximately 100 million and 10 million, respectively, and the 
institutions using the data will be expanded gradually.
3.2.2. Activation of technical credit bureaus
It is more economical to outsource innovation assessment tasks to external 
specialist institutions because of the complications and the institutions’ expertise in 
innovation assessment. If financial institutions such as banks internalize innovation 
assessment tasks, they need a large number of technical experts, perhaps as many 
as KOTEC has. When outsourcing assessment tasks, financial institutions should 
understand the assessment outcome and reflect on the results in their decision-
making.
To activate innovation financing, the role of TCBs has become important in 
reducing information gaps through collaboration with financial institutions. The 
participation of various private experts should be activated to provide useful 
information to financial institutions and increase the reliability of the assessments. 
In advanced countries, many private specialty TCBs are present in various areas, 
such as IT, bioengineering, chemistry, and nanotechnology, to meet the demands of 
financial institutions.
In order to encourage many institutions to participate in TCBs, the Korean 
government requires only minimum standards for the business of innovation 
assessment regarding personnel and physical requirements.10) This business 
opportunity is open to (1) credit bureaus such as corporation credit bureaus or 
credit rating agencies, (2) accounting firms or patent offices that satisfy certain 
requirements, and (3) corporations that satisfy the legal requirements. Three 
companies—KOTEC, Korea Enterprise Data, and NICE Information Service—were 
designated to operate as TCBs in 2014. In addition, a regulation to prevent conflict 
of interest was introduced to ensure the independence and reliability of the 
innovation assessment.
  9)  The Korean government also assigned the KFB when it developed an individual and corporation 
credit bureau before this TDB.
10) The personnel requirement includes technical and financial experts, and the physical requirement 
includes an innovation assessment model and computer facilities.
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The weighted sum of the innovation grade and credit rating produces an 
innovation credit rating (the grade system is the same between the innovation 
credit rating and the credit rating). For instance, a firm with a credit rating of only 
a B may not be able to get a bank loan. However, if an innovation grade of T2 (the 
second best) is added, the overall innovation credit rating can be upgraded to an A, 
which allows the innovative firm to be funded by a bank.
3.2.3.  Building up the capabilities of financial institutions in innovation 
assessment
It is critical for financial institutions, as consumers of assessment information, 
to enhance their innovation assessment capabilities in order to activate innovation 
financing and firmly establish the innovation assessment system. It is necessary for 
financial institutions to develop infrastructure and experts to understand and use 
the assessment of TCBs and increase their use. In addition to the efforts of financial 
institutions, it is important to have appropriate incentives that promote the 
development of assessment infrastructure through policy measures.
It is also necessary to increase the understanding of innovation assessment 
by making financial institutions participate actively, even in the early stage of 
developing innovation financing infrastructures. Therefore, financial institutions 
such as banks are encouraged to participate jointly in innovation assessment 
system development projects in order to develop standard models and innovation-
assessment-related task manuals. Standard assessment models, DB formats, reports 
required for the innovation assessment ecosystem, and manuals for the examination 
of loans are developed and distributed to financial institutions.
Incentives are assigned through policy-finance-related borrowing limits and 
interest rate adjustments by taking into account the performance of innovation 
financing and the assessment infrastructure level. In a case where a loan is provided 
as the result of an innovation assessment by external TCBs, exemptions or alleviation 
from responsibility are given, unless there is a special reason. Incentives can 
be provided by raising the scores of the management evaluations if financial 
institutions, such as banks, actively employ specialty personnel in technology fields 
and provide specialized assessment teams.
3.2.4. Promotion of the use of innovation assessment information
It is important to promote the use of assessment information to increase 
transparency and assessment specialization. Technical strength assessment is a 
mandatory field in loan examination by financial institutions such as banks, but it 
tends to be assessed arbitrarily and perfunctorily.11) If an innovation corporation 
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receives funding through the capital market, or if its technologies change, an 
objective assessment or related information disclosure is not easily available.
Banks are encouraged to use assessment outcomes produced by TCBs and 
loan examinations, although technical strength is ultimately determined at the 
sole discretion of the bank. Assessment outcomes produced by TCBs can be used 
mandatorily in policy financing because of policy-oriented characteristics. These 
will be expanded gradually into a general loan examination based on the use of 
TCB outcomes. These include financial intermediary support loans from the Bank 
of Korea, on-lending, guarantees by KODIT and KOTEC, etc. If outcomes assessed 
by TCBs are used in loan examinations for SMEs or enterprises of middle standing, 
some incentives will be given to these financial institutions.12) 
There should be encouragement to use assessment information in listings or 
disclosures in order to protect investors. If a soon-to-be-listed company submits 
a certain grade of innovation assessment produced by TCBs, it will be regarded 
as satisfying the technical strength requirement. Items related to a corporation’s 
technical strength, such as business details and business risk contained in the 
securities registration statement, are described with reference to the assessment 
outcomes produced by the TCBs.
When this development plan is successfully implemented, we can have a 
concrete system of information collection, processing, and use. Technical 
information distributed over many technical fields is collected constantly through 
information-source organizations and cooperative network development. Then the 
information is processed through technical information analysis, reclassification, 
and modularization to suit the use purpose of the TCB or financial institutions.13) 
Ultimately, the innovation assessment outcomes of TCBs are used by loan examiners 
of banks, in guarantee examinations by KODIT and KOTEC, and in decision-making 
by investors when making investments.
If the four tasks listed above are functioning well, then the ecosystem of 
innovation assessments in Korea will look like the system shown in [Figure 1-11]. The 
TDB accumulates information on technical strength, patent rights, marketability, 
11)  The credit assessment model used in banks is composed of financial and nonfinancial parts. 
Technical strength assessment and technical strength items are assessed in the nonfinancial part.
12)  Possible areas of incentive mechanisms are the distribution of financial intermediary support loans 
(formerly known as aggregate credit ceiling loans) by the Bank of Korea, loan limits and interest 
rate adjustments for on-lending by the Korea Finance Corporation, and adjustment of limits and 
the guarantee ratio provided by KODIT and KOTEC.
13)  Collected technical information is analyzed according to demand by financial institutions and 
their requirements, and classified and accumulated into technical strength, technical rights, 
marketability, and trading and assessment information.
Chapter  1 _Establishing a Rating Institution for Evaluating the Competitiveness and Risks of Enterprises • 057
and trade and assessment of enterprises and provides this information to TCBs, 
KOTEC, and KODIT. TCBs and credit guarantee institutions will perform innovation 
assessments after performing due diligence on business capabilities using the 
financial information provided by corporation credit bureau and DBs from the 
Korea Federation of Banks along with information from the TDB. Information from 
this innovation assessment is used for credit assessments, investment decisions by 
investors, and decision-making on venture capital investments, trade transfer, and 
litigation. The innovation assessment ecosystem interacts with financial institutions, 
TCBs, and TDBs constantly, and plays a role in flexible networks where innovation 
and assessment information is shared.
4. Policy Recommendations
Innovation financing is the provision of necessary funds, based on assessments 
of technology and ideas. Despite various attempts to activate innovation financing, 
supplied amounts have not been sufficient for innovation- and technology-based 
enterprises in Korea. This is due to the conservative funding practices of financial 
institutions, which rely mainly on collateral and guarantees. Another reason for the 
unsatisfactory fund supply is that the insufficient market for innovation assessment, 
which is a fundamental element for the success of innovation financing, fails to 
provide sufficient information on technology and innovation to meet the demands 
of banks and other financial institutions.
This situation can be applied to the case of Hungary. In Hungary, financing for 
innovative SMEs is provided by the private sector based on venture capital and 
funding at a national or EU level, but few instances of credit financing through 
financial institutions have been reported. One reason for the lack of credit financing 
among innovative SMEs or start-up enterprises is their low credit ratings; most of 
them cannot pass the vigorous examinations that are required to qualify for loans. 
Therefore, few systems exist to supply funding or guarantee credit based on an 
assessment of innovation and business merit.
058 • 2014/15 Knowledge Sharing Program with Hungary
Although programs such as Funding for Growth or the SZTA provide finance for 
SMEs, they do not target innovation-based companies.14) The JEREMIE Initiative, one 
of the EU financing initiatives, may be supplied to innovation-based corporations, 
but this fund is also designed to seek profit, so companies with high innovation as 
well as high risk may not be approved. Growth Scheme Plus is a program in which 
the central bank and a commercial bank share the risk, but this fund is focused on 
traditional sectors such as agricultural and retail industries rather than innovative 
enterprises. As a result, SMEs with high innovation capabilities are forced to lean on 
EU funds to survive.
To receive funding from the SZTA, business management capability, 
marketability and potential, and business plans are reviewed as part of the selection 
process for investment. For new industrial areas, life science, and ICT, external 
subject matter experts are invited to judge the technology. The interest rate for this 
program is lower than that of the JEREMIE Initiative (the interest rate of JEREMIE is 
30% per annum while that of SZTA is 10%–15% per annum), and it is not focused 
14)  However, it is also true that the Funding for Growth Scheme, which is run by the central bank of 
Hungary, has been improved in terms of financing for SMEs. In recent years, high-risk SMEs that 
were unable to get funding otherwise have been approved under the Funding for Growth Scheme 
Plus.
[Figure1-11] Innovation Assessment Ecosystem
Source: Korean Government (2014).
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on profit by selling corporations, in contrast with the JEREMIE-financed funds. The 
main targets of the SZTA are not start-up enterprises; however, this fund may be 
approved for companies that are restructuring through innovative technologies, 
considering the previous business outcomes. There is no official database that 
summarizes credit histories or investment success or failure; an unofficial database 
could be found but not shared. Even if the Hungarian Venture Capital Association 
aggregates and stores information each year, it is not possible to confirm whether 
or not data from a large number of corporations are accumulated.
It is also evident that many corporations waste their time attracting 
investments without validation or guidance on investment merit based on market 
competitiveness and business operation capabilities. This is why not only financing 
support but also support for entry to relevant markets and education are needed 
to advance SMEs and start-up corporations. Furthermore, a vast amount of data is 
needed to establish technical and innovative credit bureaus, but no such data are 
found in current Hungarian industrial fields. Thus, a model similar to the KOTEC 
model in Korea can be applicable to energy, agricultural technologies, and life 
science except for ICT in Hungary, and we believe such a model could succeed if the 
corresponding subject matter experts assess the levels of innovation in enterprises 
and a low interest rate is ensured.
Becsky-Nagy (2014) explained venture capital investment and growth strategies 
for technology-intensive SMEs and predicted that those SMEs will play an important 
role in economic growth in Hungary. However, despite the presence of various 
funding programs, a number of technology-intensive SMEs in Hungary are not 
secured sufficiently, so it is also expected that they may not play a major role in 
economic growth in the immediate future. Karsai (2012) reported that investments 
in venture capital and private equity in Hungary have increased rapidly in the last 20 
years, and 90% of the investment fund now comes from private sectors. However, 
he also pointed out that this rapid increase slowed down and lost its momentum 
significantly after the 2008 financial crisis. The OECD (2014) also pointed out 
that the EU’s restructuring support fund for Hungary has moved its focus from 
an infrastructure-oriented fund to a fund supporting SMEs that are responsible 
for a significant amount of employment. Cooperation between the EU and the 
Hungarian government as well as monitoring and evaluating policy outcomes were 
also identified as important for successful policy changes.
In light of Korea’s experiences, having assessment systems is as important as 
the business content with regard to policy financing for SMEs. When the purpose 
of policy funds is not to protect and promote SMEs overall but to search for and 
promote SMEs whose growth potentials are high due to innovative technologies, 
it is critical to evaluate their innovation, business merits, and potential during the 
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selection process of beneficiary enterprises. Thus, when policy-financing systems are 
developed, assessment systems for enterprises and technologies should be discussed 
while these assessment systems continue improvements and advancement to keep 
pace with economic and technical environments. It is also important to ensure that 
financial resources are not wasted through in-depth follow-up regarding the use of 
policy funds after selecting beneficiaries and supplying the funds; the achievements 
of corporations should be stored as data to be reflected in future financial support.
To activate innovation financing, it is necessary to develop an innovation 
assessment system suitable for decisions on innovation loans and investments 
from the viewpoint of financial institutions. Unlike tangible collateral, the value of 
intangible technology or innovation is difficult to assess objectively; therefore, grade 
assessment, rather than value assessment, should be done in the early stage of 
innovation assessment. Then a TDB, easily accessible by financial institutions, should 
be constructed to enable the establishment of a TCB that generates innovation 
credit ratings using the TDB. Furthermore, institutional bases should be broadened 
to activate innovation loans and expand investments based on innovation value 
assessment.15)
When the Hungarian government establishes an institution or system for 
evaluating the competitiveness and risks of innovative SMEs and start-ups, it may 
need to consider the following suggestions.
First, the assessment capacity and loan processing speed of TCBs will be increased 
by hiring additional specialty personnel and TCB staff and by strengthening 
TCB assessment information collection.16) Innovation financing performance and 
capabilities should be evaluated for each bank. Various outstanding incentives 
should be awarded to banks based on the information gathered from assessments.
Second, evaluation of banks in terms of their efforts in innovation financing 
according to four categories is desirable: the proportion of innovation financing, 
technology commercialization support, the proportion of credit support, and 
human resources equipped with specialties. (An example of evaluation items and 
points is provided in <Table 1-2>.) Consensus on the evaluation should be reached 
by the banks, and the final assessment items and indexes should be determined 
through simulation. The final evaluation results should be distributed based on the 
relative assessment grade among the evaluated banks.
15)  Examples include the creation of an investment fund based on an innovation value assessment and 
the expansion of the size of the fund to recover the invested amount when the investment fails.
16)  For example, it is necessary to use intensively collected innovation-related information from TCB 
assessment documents when assessing similar innovations.
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<Table 1-2> Example of Innovation Assessment of Innovation Financing
Source: Financial Services Commission (2014).
Evaluation 
category Evaluation item
1. Innovation financing
Proportion 
of innovation 
financing
A proportion of the innovation financing* balance compared to the 
total loan balance for SMEs by bank.
* Innovation financing: TCB loans except for guarantee-based 
loans, loans, and investments based on assessment by innovation 
TCBs.
Proportion 
of innovation 
corporations
A proportion of the number of borrowers using innovation 
financing compared to the number of total SME borrowers in a 
bank.
2. Entrepreneurship
Degree of technical 
strength use
The average increase of an innovation credit rating compared to 
the credit rating of borrowers.
Support of 
newly founded 
enterprises
The proportion of the number of SMEs founded within seven years 
compared to the total number of SME borrowers in a bank.
3. Credit financing
Proportion of credit 
support
The proportion of loan and investment balance compared to the 
innovation financing balance in a bank.
Increase rate of 
credit support
The increase rate in the credit support balance in the current year 
compared to that of the previous year.
4. Human resources
Innovation 
financing specialty 
personnel
The number of specialty personnel, including skilled employees, 
those with over three years of technical assessment, and 
engineering graduates.
The number of trainees that complete internally or externally 
commissioned education in relation to innovation financing and 
training hours.
Innovation 
financing specialty 
teams
The presence of innovation financing specialty teams.
The production performance of innovation financing assessments 
and innovation-financing-based loans.
Innovation 
financing 
examination model
Technical items in nonfinancial assessments of banks are associated 
with TCB assessment.
Bank credit rating is adjusted when TCB assesses a superior 
innovation (credit) rate.
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Third, the innovation loan performance of each bank should be released. In 
Korea, this information is published on KFB web pages. The performance is divided 
into KOTEC-guarantee-based loans, Korea Finance Corporation on-lending loans, 
and the banks’ own loans; the number of loans and their amounts should be 
updated on a regular basis.
Fourth, in order to implement the plan, the Hungarian government could 
establish task forces (TFs). Through the TFs, collaboration between ministries will 
be strengthened in order to develop an assessment model from consumer (banks 
and other investors) viewpoints and to share innovation assessment information. 
In addition, measures to broaden the use of TCBs in government procurement 
business and R&D projects should be sought. It is suggested that three TFs be set 
up, consisting of financial institutions, TCBs, and DB experts: (1) a TDB development 
TF consisting of DB experts, technical experts, financial institutions, and TCBs, who 
collaborate in discussing DB configuration, information collection, and sharing 
methods, (2) a TCB-related preparation TF consisting of preliminary TCBs, financial 
institutions, and TDB-related parties, who collaborate to develop standard models 
and assessment procedures, (3) an innovation assessment information use TF 
consisting of the financial regulatory authorities, thereby providing a measure 
of reflection on the credit assessment model, the development of the work 
manual, and its use in listing and disclosure. An example of the schedule for the 
implementation plan is provided in <Table 1-3>.
<Table  1-3> Implementation Plan Schedule (example)
Source: Korean Government (2014).
Category January March May September December
TDB 
founding
TDB founding
Driving unit 
started
Provide TDB 
operating 
plan
TDB founding, 
employment 
of personnel
Computer system 
construction
DB 
construc-
tion
TDB development/TF 
configuration
Analysis of assessment 
tasks and demand
DB architecture 
development
MOU with 
information-holding 
organizations
DB construction
Standard 
model 
develop-
ment, etc.
Analysis of demand, such as 
the credit assessment model
Research outsourcing 
for standard model 
development
Provide use plan for banks, 
etc.
Develop and complement 
standard model
Work manual 
development
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Fifth, it is worthwhile to consider the consultation and advertisement of 
innovation financing, including options related to both financial institutions and 
venture capital. Success stories should be actively sought through the “innovation 
finance best practices competition,” with awards and incentives given to excellent 
cases.
Two of the most important considerations while supplying policy funds are the 
selection of beneficiary corporations and post-evaluation. To increase the efficiency 
of policy funds, it is quite right that enterprises whose potential growth is high 
receive all the benefits of policy funds. Therefore, the assessment of potential 
growth regarding beneficiary candidates should be objective, and a transparent 
selection process should take place based on objective assessments.
The KIBO Technology Rating System (KTRS) is a good example of such an effort 
(see Appendix 2 for a brief description of KTRS). However, this does not mean that 
KTRS is well suited to innovation assessment systems in Hungary. Instead, similar 
to the way in which KIBO developed KTRS to reduce the credit guarantee default 
rate and select better beneficiary enterprises and introduced the “KTRS Feedback 
System” to raise the reliability of the developed assessment system, Hungary 
needs to study their own assessment systems to produce better results with limited 
financial resources and further improve existing systems.
Because KIBO’s data collection has continued for a long time, studies on 
these data are thriving as well. Kim et al. (2013) studied the macroeconomic 
variables that most affected corporate bankruptcy to set the main variables in the 
innovation assessment model based on previous studies. They restructured the 
model, comparing it with existing models for improvement. Lee (2010) identified 
innovation assessment factors that can influence the survival of SMEs that receive 
technology guarantees via a survival analysis using the innovation assessment 
data from KIBO and established the bankruptcy prediction model. Kim and Yi 
(2011) analyzed the start-up enterprise data in KIBO and verified that approval of 
guarantees was positively correlated with guarantee-related performance such as 
employment and investment regardless of the guarantee received, the duration 
of the guarantee received, or the guarantee amount. The results indicated that an 
approved guarantee could result in additional performance gain, and guarantee 
institutions improved funding capabilities of corporations that received guarantees 
by eliminating the asymmetry of information via thorough monitoring.
However, even after fund beneficiaries are selected, an in-depth follow-up 
should be continued to determine whether policy funds are used in accordance 
with the fund goals. Thus, if related data are collected to be used as important 
foundations in improving future assessment systems or determining future policy 
064 • 2014/15 Knowledge Sharing Program with Hungary
directions, the waste of assisted policy funds can be prevented and more-efficient 
resource allocation can be achieved.
The prerequisite of adoption and improvements of such assessment systems or 
observation and analysis on beneficiary enterprises is to secure human resources 
that can assess enterprises and their innovations and analyze their performance. 
In general, without the human resources necessary for competent assessment 
and analysis, any assessment system will fail because the assessment and analysis 
of enterprise innovation and potential requires subject matter expertise. Such 
innovation assessment experts not only evaluate subject matter in science and 
technology as well as any innovative fields, they are also employed as a human 
resource pool to plan and run national R&D projects over the entire field of 
national R&D. Thus, the development and advancement of assessment systems must 
be parallel with the development of human resources who can run and apply the 
systems.
The default risk can be alleviated if enterprises are assessed based not only on 
credit but also on their innovation; this concept was proven theoretically. Fostering 
human resources for innovation assessments and securing expertise are also 
important in parallel with the development of innovation assessment infrastructure. 
Finally, accumulating information regarding innovation assessment is important 
as well as coordination between interested parties to use the accumulated 
information.
5. Conclusion 
Although start-ups and SMEs possess innovative technologies that could 
potentially be well received commercially, they face difficulties in terms of funding 
due to poor credit evaluations or low collateral. If their innovation is assessed along 
with existing credit assessments upon approval of their loan applications, this policy 
change may support innovative firms and use their potential as the nation’s growth 
engine, not only for advanced countries but also for emerging market countries as 
well.17) This chapter reviews the status of innovation financing in Hungary and South 
Korea and proposes policy measures to expand innovation financing in Hungary 
based on the policies in South Korea over recent years.
17)  Park and Lim (2015) empirically verified that using innovation assessment information can be 
helpful for credit risk management to predict innovative enterprise default from the viewpoint of 
banks or guarantee institutions. The results of default prediction with respect to more than 10,000 
enterprises that applied innovation assessments guaranteed by KIBO in 2007 and 2009 showed 
that prudential regulation of loan and guarantee institutions improved significantly if innovation 
assessment information was used.
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It took a long time for Korea to construct the technological evaluation system 
that exists today, and Korea has learned a lot through trial and error in the process. 
Some of Korea’s experiences include inaccuracy of review for guarantee deals due 
to the lack of a technological evaluation system, experiences with and responses 
to high delinquency rates caused by excessively generous guarantees, difficulty in 
obtaining and nurturing professional human resources for technological evaluation, 
responses to the challenge of constructing a collaborative system among relevant 
institutions to create a technology database, and coordination of interests related 
to technology credit bureaus. While many of these difficulties were overcome 
by the current evaluation system for innovative businesses, the need for further 
improvement remains. Surely, in Korea to date, it has been difficult to demonstrate 
one’s achievement with respect to innovation finance because its ecosystem has 
been implemented only recently.
However, the Korean government and a research institute have assessed the 
performance of innovation finance and released its results in May 2015. According 
to Seo and Lee (2015), since the government encouraged domestic banks to deal 
with technology financing through technology evaluation, the size of deals related 
to technology financing has increased. However, new transactions involving 
borrowers of technology credit with no transactions during the previous year 
accounted for just 28.4% of the total amount funded. Additionally, businesses with 
excellent technological strength comprise just 13.1% of the total loans; loans with 
a rank of T7 or lower (indicating a lack of technological strength) make up 6% of 
the total. Support for small businesses having difficulty with financing is 22% of 
the total, and 73.5% of the loans has a short repayment period (within a year). 
These survey results indicate that when demand for technology evaluation increases 
rapidly, the quality of the technology evaluation falls, and technology financing 
can be made only in classification even without a thorough evaluation. In addition, 
when evaluation staff is unable to meet too much demand, an additional 15 days 
is needed to initiate loans and accordingly the dissatisfaction of small businesses 
increases. Only when loans are actually made to evaluated firms, the innovation 
evaluation fee can be recognized as a cost for a loan, which can be more than 
offset by interest income received from the firms; therefore, banks have incentive to 
welcome over-evaluation, and TCBs tend to be generous in giving high-technology 
credit to an evaluated firm.
Based on the experience with loans made to innovative technology companies 
in Korea, we must be cautious when designing and activating this ecosystem of 
innovation financing based on innovation credit assessments.
First, enforced allocation of innovation financing loans should be avoided. 
Rather, designing and providing incentives for banks with high performance of 
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innovation assessment is desirable. For government-driven financing for innovative 
SMEs to be more effective, it is important that assistance from financial markets 
be based on market principles. Guarnaschelli et al. (2014) argued that the core of 
innovation financing is not loan assistance through innovative funding techniques; 
rather, it is to create a social environment through partnership between private 
and public sectors, emphasizing the importance of financial assistance via market 
principles. Jones and Kim (2014) discussed the financial policies for innovative SMEs 
in South Korea, stating that financial assistance for the venture capital market is 
not functioning as intended and arguing that any negative effects derived from 
policy-financing assistance should be minimized through financial assistance based 
on market principles rather than policy-funding schemes. Ilyina and Samaniego 
(2008) proved that rapidly growing industries in countries with advanced financial 
development resulted from intensive R&D investments as they paid attention to the 
fact that financial assistance benefits were different from industry to industry. The 
results of their study imply that well-developed financial markets affect the R&D 
investment and growth rate of specific industries.
Second, there might be a concern that promoting innovation-assessment-based 
loans may result in an increased delinquency ratio. However, loan approvals will 
ultimately be determined at the bank’s own discretion, according to innovation 
assessment outcomes. The main purpose of innovation assessments that are 
mandatory in relation to policy financing is to avoid providing loans to corporations 
with high insolvency rates. This will increase the accuracy of default rates when a 
bank makes a decision on providing loans. In addition to conventional financial 
information, innovation information will be used to increase the accuracy of credit 
determinations and estimations.
Third, in addition to building up the innovation assessment system, policies that 
support the promotion of innovation financing should be considered. For instance, 
an excessive innovation assessment service fee should be avoided to relieve the 
burden of assessment service fees on banks. When banks provide loans based on 
innovation assessments, some funds can assist in subsidizing the interest rate gap to 
reduce the burden on corporations that have technical strength but lack collateral. 
In addition, the TCB-assessment-based loan performance of each bank can be 
considered to be under review to facilitate the settlement of innovation financing 
and identify the difficulties experienced by financial institutions.
Fourth, it is also important to evaluate the effect of TCB-related policies 
comprehensively and raise concerns and potential issues that may occur in the 
future. Furthermore, additional policies may be required that can induce long-
term stability of loans and guarantee schemes based on innovation assessment 
information such as assistance with assessment fees or credit risk sharing such as 
Chapter  1 _Establishing a Rating Institution for Evaluating the Competitiveness and Risks of Enterprises • 067
securitization.18)
The goals of the innovation assessment system are to increase the funding 
opportunities available to innovative start-ups and SMEs. The innovation assessment 
system will support the decision-making of banks and guarantee institutions. After 
this plan is implemented, technical strengths are assessed using the assessment 
information from specialty innovation TCBs in the credit assessment and loan 
examination processes. In addition, innovation assessments will be conducted using 
relevant information provided by external TCBs, thereby increasing the objectivity 
and specialty of the innovation assessment. Guarantee institutions and banks will 
use specialty innovation assessment information during the examination process. 
Ultimately, financial support for the real economy is expected to strengthen, 
and the soundness of financial institutions is expected to enhance. Assistance 
with sufficient seed funding and required growth capital is provided through 
objective assessments of creative knowledge, including technologies and ideas. An 
important foundation is provided for the activation of investment financing, the 
innovation assessment capability of financial institutions improves, and a combined 
investment and loan system is developed. A potential fund is provided to reward 
excellent innovation companies and strengthen the protection for investors by listing, 
disclosure, and security issuance based on a specialty innovation assessment. Objective 
examinations of technical strength result in reduced risks for loans and investments 
and the creation of new financial demands specific to innovative ventures and SMEs.
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Appendix 1:  A Theoretical Model of Market Failure 
Assessment in Small and Open Economies
This model is constructed to describe problems that derive from the lack of 
market information. They will serve as proof of existing risks, and they will attempt 
to identify these risks.
The function provides a base for the model and, therefore, provides a proper 
definition of the function and its requirements are of crucial importance. Either 
pure progressive ([Figure 1-A1], black line) or pure regressive ([Figure 1-A1], blue 
line) expenditures are considered. The desired aims could not be approached owing 
to the effects of the black economy in the progressive case and the effects on low-
income taxpayers in the regressive case. Linear expenditures ([Figure 1-A1], gray 
line) from these aspects might be better to use, but they do not necessarily imply 
releasing sources from the hidden economy.
A model-based approach
A few details of the designed system have already been discussed. The 
requirements for establishing the model discussed are hereby presented in detail 
below.
(1)  Continuity: If different tax rates in different bands are used, then instead of a 
fragmented outcome, the function like model is much more equable. Let this 
[Figure 1-12]  Pure Regressive (Blue), Pure Progressive (Black), and Linear (Gray) Expenditure Function
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function be  it describes what expenditures should be incorporated by 
the taxpayers under some revenue conditions. Therefore, it is quite important 
that structural breaks not be presented.
(2)  Progressivity: Another important aspect of this function is that below some 
limit, it should show progressive properties.
(3)  Revenue: The state should provide the same revenue as it would have 
presented in the previous model in the same timeframe.
(4)  Sum solidarity: Not the tax rate but the tax sum for all  
 should be satisfied as high-income taxpayers should 
nominally pay more than low-income taxpayers. This is mathematically 
defined as 
From the above-mentioned criteria, we can obtain a preliminary form of the 
function: it is quite similar to a distribution function, more closely resembling the 
distribution function of a log-normal distribution. The main difference is that the 
tail of the distribution does not converge to 0 but to some constant value.
Doubts expressed over the model:
•  There is no evidence that the revenue function should show regressive 
properties. In this case, the optimal function could be a progressive one.
•  There is no guarantee that the black economy has the power to compensate 
for the loss of revenues.
•  Should the function remain regressive, we still have to define its parameters 
(drop, limiting value, etc.).
These are well-founded doubts, and, therefore, they cannot be disregarded in 
the model’s setup. Therefore, a general model should be designed first, in which it 
is allowed that a function is progressive, regressive, or progressive-regressive. The 
optimal expenditure function [ ] in the given economy and even timeframe can 
be deducted only from this model framework.
The model
While designing the model, we can basically start with two approaches. The 
first one is to calculate , the optimal expenditure function through the budget, 
and fit it to the need of society. The other option would be to calculate a social 
optimum, and fit it to state expenses. Both approaches have their own advantages 
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and disadvantages. The main disadvantage of the second approach is that it is 
difficult to quantify something when people hardly know what the best option for 
them is, or there are too many alternatives, and it is extremely difficult to choose 
the optimal one. Therefore, public expenditure should be the starting point.
The base of the model is a game. Assume that the game has N rounds. All rounds 
correspond to one year in the economy. Let , be the new expenditure and  
be the old expenditure. All N rounds are played.
The game
Let  be the state revenue in the year. Then,  shows the state revenue with 
the new model and , that with the old one.
To compute , we need a complex dataset on certain properties of the white 
economy. Therefore, let  be the distribution function of taxpayers in a given 
year in the white economy. Then,  is
To define , we need different types of data[  will be calculated recursively; 
in this phase, we assume that it is already known]. On the other hand, we need 
further statistical data beyond . Let  be the income distribution function 
in the gray economy in year .
There should also be a correction factor, which again is not considered to be 
constant, but to be different for different income levels. This correction factor 
is applied to the willingness itself, as it specifies that at income level what ratio 
of taxpayers are willing to make an effort in the new system. Let  be this 
correction factor in year . By applying mutatis mutandis, we get
The determination of , , and  is fairly easy in the base term, as 
we have some statistical data that can be used. In this model, we are assuming that 
under the same conditions in the economy, these distributions do not change and 
only shift according to the GDP growth. In other words, the original form of these 
distributions is constant, but it changes in the new system. This change is shown by 
the function of willingness, 
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Therefore, the following integral equation should be solved:
Correction factors: Growth and outflow
Thus far, except for the integral calculations, the calculations were relatively 
simple. A constant closed economy is assumed, where an endless number of 
subjects of taxation is not characteristic. However, this is far from reality, especially 
ifour model is used in a small and open economy like Hungary. During the further 
development of the model, it is assume that the present GDP growth is known 
precisely, and reliable projections are presented of the next N years. Based on this, 
let  be the GDP growth rate in year in the old model.
Based on the above,
where  is the additional growth that affects taxpayers (as a result of the 
change) at income level  in year i, and  is the earnings in the new system at 
income level  in year i[per definition, if , then ].
If we assume i-1 to be the base, then at the end of year 
                          
The earnings from the model change are easy to compute: 
t(x). Thus,
As it is an open economy, a part of the extra money not calculated thus far will 
leak out of the country:
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whereas
Therefore, the GDP growth rate in the new model in year is
Correction factor:Income
Based on the above, year N state income based on the new method can be easily 
corrected with GDP growth:
The calculation of the old method should be corrected as well. Thus , in 
point of fact:
Thus, the corrected model is
 
It is important to note that the model established is as general as possible. This 
is why functions and integrals are used for the calculations, as an economy with an 
endless number of participants is assumed.
As can be seen from the equations, 
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Appendix 2:  Overview of the KIBO Technology Rating 
System(KTRS)19)
In this appendix, KTRS, which is the innovation assessment system of KIBO, 
is introduced. Most enterprise assessment systems are operated through 
credit assessments. However, technology-based and innovative enterprises are 
disadvantageous in terms of good financial assessments. This is especially true 
for start-up companies, which is why they have difficulties achieving recognition 
in the market. Furthermore, their technology assets may be difficult to reflect in 
the market due to information asymmetry. KIBO has developed an innovation 
assessment system called KTRS, through which the potential commercialization 
of innovation enterprises is rated based on technology merits, marketability, 
profitability, and other business environments, excluding financial indexes.
KTRS is a model used to determine the potential commercialization of innovation 
by measuring future growth potential and default possibilities of an enterprise and 
associated technologies. The grade is calculated based on a technology assessment 
table consisting of 33 items that can evaluate main business capabilities, technical 
merits, marketability, and profitability.Internal environment variables include years 
in business, main business area, age of CEO, number of employees, and own factory 
or not.External environment variables include the SME manufacturing production 
index, the leading composite index, the KOSPI, the average manufacturing capacity 
utilization index, government bond yields, business survey index, and won-dollar 
exchange rate. With respect to the 33 items, the KTRSSM, which is a model for start-
up enterprises (within five years after business start), consists of 23 items. Conversely, 
KTRSBM, which is a model for small enterprises (more than five years after business 
start and less than 1 billion won of annual turnover), consists of 18 items.
The assessment indexes used in KTRS were developed through assessment 
results conducted for five years based on the technological merit assessment model 
that was developed with the Small and Medium Business Administration in 1999 
as well as overseas case studies and expert consultation. To increase reliability 
and consistency of the assessment, the “KTRS Feedback System” was adopted 
to minimize deviation and prevent errors due to subjective scoring. One of the 
strengths of KTFS is it can be easily adjusted or modified in accordance with use, 
19)  This appendix is provided by Juyoung Song and Heechang Park at KOTEC, extracting from the 2014 
Vietnam KSP final report (not published yet). Some of the contents were rewritten by the authors 
and them to be relevant to the 2014 Hungary KSP topic.
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purpose, or goals. It has been improved and advanced continuously since its 
development in 2005. The assessment indexes of this system can be used differently 
as policy fund criteria for innovative SMEs depending on the use, purpose, or 
business area.
1. History of KTRS
KOTEC developed the KTRS in July 2005. Before launching KTRS, KOTEC used 
a simple technology rating process called “technology evaluation checklist” since 
1995. KOTEC opened the Technology Appraisal Center in 1997 and introduced 
a technology appraisal guarantee program in 1999. Subsequently, KOTEC has 
gradually improved the technology evaluation checklist by analyzing the correlation 
between the result of evaluations and the performance data of client companies, 
because it is difficult to prove the checklist-based evaluation’s validity and track 
down the evaluation results. After six years of research on the simple technology 
rating process, KOTEC launched KTRS in July 2005.
KTRS is a useful screening tool to evaluate technology—or knowledge-based 
SMEs who lack sufficient financial records. As this system quantifies a company’s 
prospects in terms of a technology-rating grade, the final grade is enough to 
determine whether a company will be supported for a loan guarantee.
KTRS differs from a conventional credit rating system in many aspects. While a 
conventional credit rating system focuses on the financial conditions and historical 
data of companies, KTRS accommodates the nonfinancial aspects of a company, 
such as the technology business feasibility, with an emphasis on its potential. In this 
sense, KTRS is suitable to KOTEC’s business goal, which is to identify and support 
companies having technology business potential.
Recently, KTRS moved from being used just an internal screening tool for 
providing loan guarantees to being used as a more general tool for independent 
businesses such as Technology Certificate and Technology Credit Bureau Data.Now, 
KOTEC aims to position itself as an information provider to other key independent 
players such as banks, venture capitalists, and R&D institutions.
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<Table 1-4> Brief History of KTRS
Date Classification Promotion details
December 
1999
Old model
Develop general technology evaluation model 
(prototype)
July
2005
Implementation of 
KTRS
Reflect the research result
December 
2005
Patent application
Apply for a domestic patent for a technology 
evaluation system
December 
2006
Overseas patent 
application
KTRS PCT international patent application
April 
2007
Patent registration KTRS domestic patent application (No. 10-0713546)
August 2008 Improve KTRS
Enhance and implement the evaluation index (KTRS-
v1.3)
November 
2008
KTRS SM 
implementation
Develop and implement the evaluation model for 
start-ups
November 
2008
International patent 
application
KTRS international patent application (Singapore)
December 
2008
R&D evaluation model Develop and implementR&D evaluation model
October 2009 Patent registration KTRSSM domestic patent model (No. 10-0921618)
August 2010 Patent registration
Domestic patent application of KTRS feedback system 
(No. 10-0976054, No. 10-0986889)
January 2011 KTRS upgrade
Application of proposal for enhancing KTRS (KTRS-
v2.0)
January 2012 KTRSSM
Expand the application scope of KTRSSM from three 
years to five years after the business establishment
April
2012
Youth start-up model
Developand implement youth start-up evaluation 
model
August 2012
Convergence 
evaluation model
Develop and implement KTRS into the detailed 
evaluation model
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2. Key Components of KTRS
KTRS is a technology business feasibility evaluation model that assesses 
enterprises and their technology with regard to their future growth potential. For 
the purpose of policy support for technology finance, KOTEC operates two tracks 
(KTRS and policy-purpose models), ten categories, and 53 subcategories below 
according to the business or industry.
<Table 1-4> continued
Date Classification Promotion details
January 2013 Improve KTRSSM
The first enhancement of KTRSSM
- Develop technology evaluation index for seventypes 
of businesses
- Develop the calculation method for business growth 
potential and enhance the calculation method of risk 
level, etc.
March 2013 Develop KTRSBM
Develop technology evaluation index for seven types 
of businesses
- Changeto the same calculation method as KTRSSM 
from the existing AHP (analytic hierarchy process) 
weighting-based calculation method for rating
January 2014
Improve KTRS-affiliated 
model
(KTRS,
KTRSSM,
KTRSBM)
Enhancethe technology evaluation rating model and 
reestablish the system
- Maintain the consistency of the technology 
evaluation index and the calculation method among 
KTRS-affiliated models
July
2014
Evaluation model for 
preliminary start-ups
Develop and implement the evaluation model for 
preliminary start-ups
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The critical part of KTRS is the set of indicators used to evaluate the technology 
and business prospects of a subject company or technology. These indicators are 
largely composed of four modules: (1) management potential, (2) technology 
prospect, (3) market feasibility, and (4) business/profit prospect.
Furthermore, each module is classified into 33 evaluation indicators. The start-up 
model (KTRSSM) has 23 items, and the basic model for small businesses (KTRSBM) 
has 18 items scored from A to E (five grades) according to the internal manual set 
by KOTEC. Another noteworthy aspect of KTRS is that it is customized to represent 
the differences in industry sectors, classifying the indicators into seven groups from 
general manufacturing to the software industry. These indicators were initially 
derived from the “evaluation checklist” and a consensus of experts on key corporate 
success factors; however, they have been refined or restructured over the years. 
Every indicator is an important input variable used in determining the final KTRS 
[Figure 1-13] KTRS Evaluation Framework
KTRS Series Model
General manufacturing, bio,  envionment, SW, Dot COMs, 
design, convergence
General manufacturing, bio,  envionment, SW, Dot COMs, 
design, convergence
General manufacturing, bio,  envionment, SW, Dot COMs, 
design, convergence
For R&D company
appraisal
Technology-based
companies
For R&D task
appraisal
knowledge-based
companies
All industries
R&D (engineering),  R&D (                 ), Advertisement
development, security system, medical, education
Startup
Non-Startup R&D (engineering),  R&D (                 ), Advertisement
development, security system, medical, education
Theater, movie, drama, on-line game, mobile game, 
TV animation, musical performance, character, other 
game, other movie/animation, other performance 
music
Energy support technology, high efficiency 
technology, eco-finiendly production and post 
processing technology
KTRS (7 industries)
KTRS- SM (7 industries)
KTRS- BM (7 industries)
R&D appraisal module (2 areas)
Green technology appraisal
module (3 areas)
Younger generation startup
appraisal module
One-man creative business
appraisal module (2 areas)
Cultural content appraisal
module (11 genres)
Innovative Knowledge Service
Appraisal Module (6 areas for
startup / non-startup)
A
p
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al
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o
m
p
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All companies
Policy-purpose Model
Startups within 5 years from
establishment
Firms over 5 years from establishment 
and with revenue no greater than 
KRW 1 billion
Finance support for mock-up
creation after completion of R&D
Green growth industry
businesses
Young-generation (aged 20 to 39) startups
(within 3 years from establishment) with KOTEC
guarantee of no greater than KRW 200 Million
One-man business satisfying industry
conditions and with guarantee of 
no greater than KRW 300 Million
Business satisfying industry
conditions and with guarantee of 
no greater than KRW 300 Million
Cultural content firms
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grade (from AAA to D).
The final grade is based on a weighted combination of the technology level and 
the risk level. The technology level is the quantification result of the company’s 
technological and commercial viability. Any particular company’s technology level is 
determined from how it is rated against a number of different indicators. The final 
technology level is determined from a weighted combination of these indicator 
ratings as performed using an AHP analysis. In fact, these weightings and indicators 
can be different for different industry sectors. The real key to a good technology-
level rating is the correct determination of these weightings.
The risk level is a quantification of the risk associated with three major factors: 
evaluation results of the indicators, the company’s own commercialization risks, 
and external risks in the environment (i.e., economic cycle, etc.). Macroeconomic 
environment variables are input to account for the external risk. The risk to 
commercialization is determined from the indicators used earlier. The actual risk 
level is determined by the application of a statistical logistic regression model that 
is based on the input data and results accumulated from the analysis of technology 
appraisal cases that have been performed previously.
[Figure 1-14] KTRS Rating Process
20)  The major features of the KTRS approach are quoted from the European Commission, “South 
Korea SME Innovation Support Schemes: Final Report on IPF Review to South Korea,” April 2012, 
document ID IPF 12-2013.
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3. Major Features of the KTRS Approach20)
Most technology-rating systems include similar benchmarks, at least to some 
extent. The greatest challenge with the technology rating is that technology is 
difficult to quantify, and the rating heavily relies on the appraisers’ expertise. 
Accordingly, financial institutions have separately conducted technology rating and 
credit analysis, whereas KTRS integrates PDs in the rating methodology. Despite 
being a nonfinancial model, KTRS has managed to minimize the discretionary or 
arbitrary assessment of the appraisers. The EU IPF report describes KTRS as per 
below.
Removing assessor subjectivity
One of the important success factors in KTRS and another good practice is 
the strong focus on the removal of the assessor subjectivity from the appraisal. 
This has been approached from two angles: (1) attempting to make more of the 
assessment indicators objective and/or quantitative and (2) calibrating the assessors 
and feedback to assessors relative to others. It is recognized that the minimization 
of the assessor subjectivity is very important in establishing trust in our system. 
This approach of providing feedback to assessors could probably be used in many 
programs that require an assessment as part of the evaluation procedure. Because 
the feedback is based on a statistical analysis of an assessor performance over all 
their assessments and relative to other assessors, it is essential to record assessment 
results electronically and store them internally in sufficient numbers to allow a valid 
statistical analysis.
Tailoring the system to different sectors and uses
Considerable efforts have been made to adapt the system to better suit different 
sectors, and currently, various models are used for seven different industry sectors. A 
good illustration of the commitment to the constant development of the approach 
is the recent development of the model for the cultural contents industry, as 
described above. It is also worth noting that there are existing models or models in 
the development stage for start-ups, knowledge-based service industries, and one-
person enterprises.
Sustainable developing system
The KTRS system is a “growing” system in that it is constantly being refined and 
adapted to make it easier to use and more reliable and suitable for different uses. 
This dedication to the constant refinement of the system is another good practice 
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and an important factor in establishing the success of the approach. In 2013, the 
system included an analysis on the correlations between the KTRS grade and the 
probability of business growth (i.e., revenue and employment) beyond the existing 
analysis on the correlations between the KTRS grade and the PDs (probability of 
defaults).
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Summary
The radical changes in the economy and society during 1989–1990 resulted 
in essential changes in the labor market as well. As the Hungarian economy 
experienced a substantial decrease in production and more intensive use of the 
labor force under the new conditions, the population’s economic activity decreased 
significantly and has remained inactive for a long time. The 2008 world economic 
crisis hit the Hungarian economy and labor market, which had been growing 
constantly since early 2000, and the Hungarian GDP and employment started to 
decline.
Even though the Hungarian government has recently implemented various 
active labor market measures to improve the labor market conditions, there remain 
many challenges in implementing further labor market reform. Low employability, 
a high youth unemployment rate, and a significant gender gap in employment are 
the most serious challenges. The lack of sustainable funding for active labor market 
programs such as public employment service and skill-development programs is also 
one of the major difficulties.
The main task of this KSP project is to determine a direction for reform of the 
Hungarian public employment and vocational training system for effective use of 
human resources by analyzing Korea’s experience.
■  Chapter 02
Public Employment and Vocational 
Training System for Effective Use of 
Human Resources
Minsik Choi (Ewha Womans University)
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The Korean public employment service and vocational training programs 
along with the other active labor market measures were considerably reorganized 
and expanded to deal with imminent massive unemployment when the 1997 
Asian financial crisis hit the country. The prompt and extensive responses by 
the Korean government were all possible, thanks to the timely set up of the 
Employment Insurance System (EIS) in 1995. With the EIS funding, the Korean 
government provides only unemployment benefits, but it also expanded public 
employment service, public work programs, and other job training programs to 
help the unemployed find new jobs. Unlike unemployment insurance systems 
in many developed and developing countries, the Korean EIS was implemented 
as a comprehensive system covering the employment stabilization program, the 
vocational competency development program, and the unemployment benefit 
program.
In order to improve the employability of vulnerable groups, the Korean 
government launched two programs that offer comprehensive service combining 
vocational training and welfare programs—the Successful Employment Package 
Program and the Hope Ribbon Project—and these two programs have had positive 
effects on improving the vulnerable groups’ employment. These programs seem to 
provide some significant implications for the Hungarian government’s labor market 
reform, since Hungary also suffers from low employment and lack of skills among its 
vulnerable groups. As we saw in Korea, the one-stop-service system for employment 
and vocational training expanded to include nontraditional welfare services such 
as credit recovery counseling as well as a welfare counseling service. It is also crucial 
that the public employment and vocational training service provide services for 
employers. Like most developed countries, the Korean government also provides 
subsidies and information service for employers with its public employment service 
and job training service system.
With help from the recent development in information technology, many 
countries have tried to make their public employment service and vocational 
training service user friendly by setting up online-based service systems. Korea’s 
Work-Net and HRD-Net are good examples that the Hungarian government could 
consider setting up. With this online-based service system, people can access the 
service easily and timely.
Additionally, individually focused comprehensive services including public 
employment, vocational training, and welfare can be more effectively delivered 
through an online-based system because it enables the compilation of all the 
relevant individual data without substantial effort and cost. Among the various 
services available through an online-based system, the most common services 
are personalized information on online job applications, human resources 
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management, and recruitment support services such as applicant-selection services 
and recommendation services for suitable vocational training programs. In Korea, 
the intranet- and Internet-based services not only help find recruiters, they also 
provide help for various services for youth work experience aids and social service 
jobs. There are also group-counseling services such as achievement programs, youth 
vocational-guidance programs, and job-seeking programs.
1.  Introduction: Hungarian Labor Market 
Transitions
At the turn of the 1990s, radical political, economic, and social changes took 
place in the central and eastern European countries. Accordingly, Hungary 
underwent considerable socioeconomic changes for the last 25 years. The changes 
in the international environment—the accession to NATO and becoming an EU 
member in 2004—played particularly important roles in shaping today’s Hungary.
The radical changes of the economy and society during 1989–1990 resulted in 
essential changes in the labor market as well: the full employment era ended, and 
the unemployment rate started increasing constantly. As the population’s economic 
activity decreased significantly, the number of employees declined by 1.4 million, 
which is 27% of the total labor force. Among others, the closure or transformation 
of enterprises and cooperatives is the main cause of the decline. As the Hungarian 
economy experienced a substantial decrease in production and a more intense use 
of the labor force under the new conditions, the number of economically inactive 
people rose. In order to avoid unemployment, a large number of people chose 
pensions or some kind of retirement provision, while young people remained in 
school longer than usual, hoping for better chances for employment. After 1998, 
the number of inactive people fell slightly, but 2.6 million people age 15–64 still 
remained inactive in 2009. The number of inactive people has increased by 7% 
(166,000) since 1992.
The years following the regime change saw a major economic transformation, 
which caused a considerable employment decline. At the very beginning of the 
1990s, the Hungarian employment rate still exceeded 60% and then fell to 52% 
in 1996. While employment fell significantly in the first period after the regime 
change, the employment rate grew a bit to 57%. In 2008 and 2009, due to the 
world economic crisis, the employment rate began decreasing to 55.4%. Only 18% 
of young people (age 15–24) were employed.
In the past two decades, in line with the population’s increasing average 
educational attainment, the proportion of those with primary educational 
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attainment among all employed people fell significantly, while that of people 
having attained secondary or tertiary education rose considerably. Over the same 
period, employment rates fell in all three groups, though to different extents. 
The importance of educational attainment is evident in the fact that while the 
employment rate of people with primary education did not reach 26% in 2009, the 
rate for those with university or college degrees was around 80%.
As we can see in [Figure 2-1], the GDP grew steadily in the first half of the 2000s 
and declined as the crisis hit. The most interesting fact regarding the connection 
between the GDP and employment level is that employment has shown very weak 
growth even when the GDP growth rate was relatively high. In other words, the 
productivity of the Hungarian labor force increased.
[Figure 2-1] Employment Rate Trends in Hungary
Source: Eurostat (http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu).
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As shown in [Figure 2-2], the employment rates in Hungary have been relatively 
low compared to the average employment rates of the EU. Even though the 
employment rate has risen since 2010 and reached about 62% in 2014, it is still lower 
than the EU average. One of the causes of the low employment rate in Hungary 
can be found in its industrial structure (see <Table 2-1>). The manufacturing sector 
and the wholesale and retail trade sector take relatively substantial shares of 
employment. This structure explains the rigidity and the regional gap of the low 
employment rate in Hungary.
[Figure 2-2] Employment Rate Trends in Hungary (ages 15–64)
Source: Eurostat (http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu).
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<Table 2-1> Composition of Employed Persons by Sector
Source: Fazekas & Neumann (2014).
(Unit: % )
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 3.5 3.4 3.8 3.9 3.6
Mining and quarrying 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2
Manufacturing 22.7 22.3 23.0 22.4 22.5
Electricity, gas, steam, and air 
conditioning supply
1.2 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.9
Water supply; sewerage, waste 
management, and remediation activities
1.3 1.4 1.5 1.8 1.7
Construction 7.0 6.6 6.2 5.7 5.7
Wholesale and retail trade, repair of 
motor vehicles and motorcycles
13.6 13.6 13.6 13.2 12.9
Transportation and storage 6.9 7.1 6.9 6.9 6.9
Accommodation and food service 
activities
3.9 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.0
Information and communication 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.5 2.6
Financial and insurance activities 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5
Real estate activities 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5
Professional, scientific, and technical 
activities
2.8 2.9 2.6 2.6 3.0
Administrative and support service 
activities
3.1 3.0 3.0 3.4 3.5
Public administration and defense, 
compulsory social security
9.2 9.1 9.2 9.5 10.4
Education 9.4 9.4 9.2 9.0 8.8
Human health and social work activities 6.9 7.3 7.1 7.3 7.2
Arts, entertainment, and recreation 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.3
Other services 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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Hungary’s unemployment rate remained lower than the EU average until 
2007, and then it increased above the EU average unemployment rate. However, 
beginning in 2013, Hungary’s unemployment rate started decreasing again [Figure 
2-3]. The relatively low unemployment rate in Hungary can also be partly explained 
by the relatively low labor-participation rate. However, there are big gaps in 
unemployment rates among different regions. The unemployment rates in urban 
areas are much lower than the intermediate regions and predominantly rural 
regions [Figure 2-4].
[Figure 2-3] Unemployment Rates in Hungary
[Figure 2-4] Unemployment Rates by Residential Area (age 25 years or over)
Source: Eurostat (http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu).
Source: Eurostat (http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu).
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The long-term unemployment rate in Hungary also remained lower than the 
EU average until 2006, at which time, it increased above the average EU long-term 
unemployment rate through 2012 and then started decreasing again in 2013 [Figure 
2-5]. The global economic crisis in 2008 was the underlying factor in the increased 
unemployment rate between 2007 and 2012.
[Figure 2-5] Long-Term Unemployment Rate
[Figure 2-6] Part-Time Workers as a Percent of Total Employment in Hungary
Source: Eurostat (http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu).
Source: Eurostat (http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu).
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As we can see from [Figure 2-6] and [Figure 2-8], the relative rigidity of the 
Hungarian labor market is related to the low vacancy rate and low proportion 
of temporary (or part-time) employment. The percentages of employees with 
temporary contracts in Hungary are nearly half the EU average.
[Figure 2-7] Quarterly Percentages of Employees with Temporary Contracts
[Figure 2-8] Yearly Percentages of Employees with Temporary Contracts Compared with EU
Source: Eurostat (http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu).
Source: Eurostat (http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu).
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2.  Recent Labor Market Development in 
Hungary
The employment rate among the population between ages 20 and 64 has 
significantly increased in recent years. Because of the slightly improving European 
macroeconomic environments, Hungary managed to increase employment to a 
greater extent than the majority of the EU members, reaching 63.2% in the 20–64 
age group in 2013, which exceeded the peak of 2007 (63%) prior to the outbreak of 
the global crisis. In the fourth quarter of 2014, the Hungarian employment rate was 
62.6%, still lower than the EU average (see [Figure 2-9]).
Following the change of government in 2010, a significant increase in the level 
of employment started compared to the low levels in previous years. In 2014, the 
employment rate reached its highest level since the democratic transformation of 
Hungary in 1989. The employment expansion is due to several reasons and can be 
observed in different segments of the labor market. The measures that aimed to 
boost labor market activities between 2010 and 2013 were effective. During this 
period, the number of employees increased by 60,000 among public workers and 
by 50,000 among those employed outside of Hungary. The number of employees 
in the domestic, private sectors was expanded by 75,000. The increase particularly 
affected the atypical forms of employment, such as simplified employment or part-
time employment. Between 2010 and 2013, the number of those employed through 
[Figure 2-9] EU Employment Rates in the 4th Quarter of 2014
Source: Eurostat (http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu).
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simplified employment and part time grew by 50% and 20%, respectively. However, 
the recent development of employment between 2013 and 2014 is unquestionably 
attributed to economic growth.
The Job Protection Act offering significant tax allowances on the employment 
costs of specific groups contributed to the employment growth. Thus, the 
employment structure also improved compared to the last few years.
There was also an alarming rise in unemployment during 2009–2010—similar to 
the EU trends—due to the global crisis, but after the peak in 2011 (11.2%), the trend 
decreased to 10.2% by 2013. The annual average number of registered job seekers 
decreased significantly, to a greater extent compared to the previous year: in 2013, 
there were 528,000 job seekers, which was 30,000 fewer people compared with the 
previous year. The extension of the active labor market measures financed by EU 
funds, which were strengthened as part of the New Széchenyi Plan and within the 
framework of the SzéllKálmán Plan, played an important role. At the same time, 
there was a slight increase in the EU unemployment rate. All if these processes took 
place parallel to the significant increase of the participation rate: the rate of the 
economically active population increased from 67.9% in 2010 to 70.3% in 2013.
Solving the problem of unemployment is closely related to the Hungarian 
government’s primary goal of economic development and social policy: to increase 
the labor market participation and level of employment. In the interest of the key 
[Figure 2-10] EU Unemployment Rates in the 4th Quarter of 2014
Source: Eurostat (http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu).
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Europe 2020 target, for years, the Hungarian government has made significant 
efforts to increase the employment of disadvantaged groups. Their efforts include 
the following measures: induce young people to enter the job market, help the 
active but elderly group participate more in the labor market, make employment 
a more attractive option for the inactive people outside the employment market, 
encourage jobseekers to access support services to help improve their ability, skills, 
and reemployment, and help match the worker’s skills to the needs of the actual 
labor market.
Supply- and demand-side incentives had a major impact on the labor market 
trends. The expansion of the labor supply was supported by government measures 
such as tightening unemployment benefits and altering the eligibility criteria of 
old-age and disability pensions by motivating the concerned groups to return to 
the labor market. On the demand side, extending the public work schemes fostered 
employment growth, while the shift in favor of flexible forms of employment 
facilitated by the amendments of the Labor Code and the Job Protection Action 
Plan supporting employers who employed the most disadvantaged groups 
characterized by high labor supply flexibility (persons below age 25, above age 55, 
the low skilled, the long-term unemployed, and mothers returning from maternity 
leave) also contributed to the change. Employment expansion followed the 
economic trend more dynamically than before due to the more extensive spread of 
flexible forms of employment such as part-time employment. The growth of public 
sector employment is attributable primarily to the public work schemes that were 
expanded at the end 2014.The winter public work provided temporary employment 
for almost 200,000 underprivileged jobseekers. The training programs promoting 
the preservation and development of employee skills target the reemployment of 
the participants in the primary labor market.
3.  National Employment Service and Skill 
Development in Hungary
This section briefly introduces the activities and socioeconomic and public 
administrative surroundings of the National Employment Service (NES), Hungary’s 
public employment service organization. We present the history, programs, tasks, 
financial resources, and international relations, as well as the corresponding 
organizational structure of this public employment service.
There are many active labor market policy interventions in Hungary that are 
available for the job seekers, such as the Job Protection Act, SME job creation and 
job retention support, and a large-scale active labor market program co-financed 
by the European Social Fund (ESF), among others. Among many measures, the 
096 • 2014/15 Knowledge Sharing Program with Hungary
Hungarian government has tried to motivate more people to seek jobs actively by 
changing the unemployment benefit system. The major features of this effort are 
summarized as follows: (1) the benefit is provided for a short time, (2) there is a 
cooperative obligation with the PES (Public Employment Service) and its violation 
can lead to sanctions, and (3) the job seeker has to accept the services and programs 
offered by the PES and accept a job offer for suitable employment when presented.
Besides public work, training opportunity and participation in labor market 
programs can be offered to jobseekers. The above-mentioned employment 
strategies are accompanied by the possibility of receiving the remaining amount of 
the unemployment benefit in one lump sum in case the client finds a job before the 
benefit eligibility period expires. The benefit’s fixed amount is 80% of the minimum 
old-age pension (HUF 22,800). For the period of public work, a wage is paid and the 
benefit payout is suspended.
Modernization of public administration: Magyary Program
To understand the employment service, we need to broaden our horizon for a 
moment. The National Employment Service went through a modernization process 
during the last few years. In order to modernize the state administration, Hungary 
aims to build the overall national network of government windows (one-stop shops) 
for easier access by citizens, which expects to be completed by December 31, 2017. 
A further aim is to improve cooperation between the public administration and 
specific social groups. In doing so, the government intends to make the operation 
of the state service transparent.
Legal frame of public employment service in Hungary
According to Act IV of the 1991 Job Assistance and Unemployment Benefits 
(Employment Act), all persons eligible for employment and all employers shall have 
the right of free access to the services of the National Employment Service. Labor 
market services, job assistance activities, public work programs, and other similar 
means shall accomplish the prevention, handling, and resolution of employment-
related crisis situations and the prevention and reduction—as well as the mitigation 
of the detrimental consequences—of unemployment. The government shall 
supervise and control the instruments of employment for the prevention and 
reduction of unemployment, which will not only benefit the jobseeker(s) but also 
the organizational structure of the labor market. The government shall prepare and 
execute its employment policy and the related decisions in due observation of the 
overall context and consequences thereof.
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Job-assistance tools
According to the Employment Act, NES has the following job-assistance tools: 
training assistance, promoting intensive job seeking, assistance for unemployed 
persons to become entrepreneurs, assistance to employers in creating new jobs, 
assistance with self-employment, promoting job creation and job preservation, 
assistance to employment of people with changed work capacity, assistance 
with labor market programs, and employability-improvement services. There are 
different kinds of employability-improvement services provided by the NES, such as 
job clubs where job seekers can receive counseling, the Vocational Rehabilitation 
Centre where people with disabilities receive support, and the Vocational and 
Employment Information Centre (FIT) and EUROFIT where mostly young job seekers 
are welcome and prepared for work, even abroad.
Financing of employment policy measures
Hungary used to have four different funds for financing the employment policy: 
the Employment Fund was used for active measures, the Solidarity Fund for passive 
measures, the Wage-Guarantee Fund for financing the wages of the employees 
of bankrupt firms, and the Vocational Training Fund for vocational training and 
education(VET). Those funds were combined into the Labor Market Fund and 
eventually changed to the National Employment Fund in 2010. The objectives of the 
National Employment Fund (NEF) are the following:
• Provide allowances to jobseekers
• Facilitate employment, create new jobs, and maintain existing jobs 
• Provide support to jobseekers and facilitate their adjustments in the workforce 
•  Promote the social security of the employees of economic units under 
liquidation 
•  Support training system improvements
•  Assist in the partial financing of benefits provided before the legal age limit in 
line with early retirement pension benefits
•  Provide funding for the provision of subsidies and benefits financed by the 
allotment accounts
•  Provide financial assistance for the operating costs and improvement expenses 
of the EURES in Hungary
The National Employment Fund shall comprise the following allotment accounts 
according to the appropriation of funds based on the following ground principles: 
•  Solidarity allotment account from which to provide job-seeker benefits, 
prepension job-seeker allowances, unemployment benefits, incentive benefits 
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provided to jobseekers, unemployment aid prior to retirement, incentive 
benefits provided to jobseekers, expense reimbursement, as well as postal costs 
in connection with the above
•  Employment allotment account to provide job-assistance subsidies, labor 
market services that are not provided by the government employment agency, 
cover the costs of functions held in primary and secondary schools and 
arranged by the National Employment Service to provide information about 
the labor market and vocational and occupational guidance, and provide 
funding for postal costs incurred in connection with income compensation 
benefits
•  Wage guarantee allotment account to provide funding for the provisions 
prescribed in Act LXVI of the 1994 Wage Guarantee Fund and for postal 
expenses in connection with the payment of such, training allotment account 
to provide funding for the tasks and programs described in the Act on 
Vocational Training Contributions, and assistance for the Improvement of 
Vocational Training Programs and the Act on Adult Education
The National Employment Fund is under the control of the Minister of National 
Economy. The detailed funding sources of the NEF are the following: Employers 
have to pay a social contribution tax, which contains health insurance, pension 
insurance, and the employer’s contribution (solidarity contribution). This is 27% of 
the gross wage, but only a part of it will be channeled into the NEF (according to 
the Yearly Budget Act). Employers have to pay a VET contribution of 1.5% of the 
gross wage. The European source expenditures of the NEF are active measures and 
passive measures.
The National Employment Fund consists of several sub-funds (allotment 
accounts). Employment policy will be covered by the so-called Employment and 
VET sub-Funds. In 2015, the Central Budget Act earmarked HUF 14 billion for the 
expenditures of that sub-fund in 2015, which is less than 5% of the NEF, but HUF 
80–90 billion comes from EU sources and public work will be financed with HUF 227 
billion. This money is divided into centralized and decentralized parts.
<Table 2-2> Income and Expenditures of the Total Hungarian Budget and National Employment Fund
Source: Ministry of Economy, Hungary (2015).
Income Expenditures
Total Hungarian budget HUF 16,313 billion HUF 17,190 billion
National Employment Fund HUF 361 billion HUF 427 billion
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4. Public Work Programs
The objective of the Hungarian government is to improve the job-creation 
potential of enterprises and worker employability in order to increase employment 
opportunities and strengthen job security. 
The Public Work Scheme is a special form of employment relationship; it 
is supported by "transit employment," the objective of which is to facilitate 
successful return or access of public workers to the primary labor market. One of 
the basic objectives of the Public Work Scheme is to increase the employment of 
disadvantaged persons in the labor market, such as those with low education levels.
One of the main objectives established by the government at the beginning of 
2013 was to create meaningful, useful, and value-creating job opportunities for at 
least 300,000 persons on a yearly basis, within the framework of public employment. 
Persons entitled to employment-substitute benefits are obliged to cooperate 
with the public employment service and to accept a job for suitable employment 
when presented. Public work is the most common form of cooperation. Besides 
public work, training opportunities and participation in labor market programs 
can be offered to jobseekers. For the period of public work, wages are paid, and 
the benefit payout is suspended. The fixed amount of the employment-substitute 
benefit is 80% of the minimum old-age pension (HUF 22,800).
The Public Work Scheme can offer an alternative to the allowances to those 
who cannot find employment in the primary labor market. The main goal of the 
Public Work Scheme is to boost the employment and employment capacity of 
disadvantaged and low-qualified people.
The fact that 4.2 million people are employed presently in Hungary compared to 
3.8 million in 2010 is of extreme importance. Over the past year and a half, about 
8%–9% of public workers managed to find jobs in the market sector, and this ratio 
<Table 2-3> National Employment Service Structure
Source: Ministry of Economy, Hungary (2015).
Centralized part Decentralized part
•  Central employment, training, and labor 
market programs aimed at integration
•  Research
•  Job creation support
•  Public benefit organization support
•  Programs cofinanced by the EU 
•  Active measures/active support: training, 
employment support, entrepreneurship 
support, job preservation, and labor 
market programs 
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is constantly increasing. The objective is that by the end of 2018 those who intend 
to find jobs are employed. According to the administrative data of the National 
Labor Office (NLO), the number of registered jobseekers was 380,200 at the end of 
September 2014. According to the NLO data, the monthly net number of persons 
in the public work program was 225,840 between September 20, 2014 and October 
20, 2014.
In accordance with preliminary planning, the Start Public Work Programs for 
this year started March 1, 2015. The government's intention was to ensure that 
all jobseekers who had the capability and were ready to work were provided the 
opportunity, at least within the framework of public employment, to cover their 
own minimum needs and those of their families from income, not from aid. As 
a result, the average number of people involved in public employment is further 
increasing and it is expected to reach 220,000.
Training in the frame of public work programs
The training programs implemented within the framework of public 
employment provide greater opportunities for future employees to acquire the 
skills necessary to find jobs in the competitive sector or for self-employment. Special 
attention is paid to training of the most disadvantaged people; therefore, a specific 
training branch was initiated in 2013 in the most disadvantaged small regions. All 
of these OKJ(National Qualifications Register) trainings are based on the labor 
[Figure 2-11] Employment in Public Work in Hungary
Source: Ministry of Economy, Hungary (2015).
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market demands of local public and market employers, for such occupations as 
cheese makers, workers at animal farms, health development assistants, cleaning-
technology-skilled workers, shoemakers, etc.
Because of the high ratio of people with multiple disadvantages, i.e., without 
professional qualifications and with low education levels, the training related 
to the winter public employment was implemented mainly in the form of basic 
competency building and remedial training.
Finding jobs to replace public work is continuously measured by examining 
administrative databases (e.g., the National Tax and Customs Authority, which 
has information about the insured people who are employed, and the National 
Employment Service, which has information about the registered people looking for 
jobs). The data are evaluated with data warehouse output. One of the key figures 
is from the examination of the labor market status on the 180th day following the 
end of the public work. Based on that, in 2012, 51.1% of people leaving public 
employment worked on the examined day, and in 2013, it was 60.9%. Within that 
figure, 11.6% worked in the primary labor market, while in 2013 this ratio was even 
better, 13%.
The resources for the implementation of the public employment training 
programs were ensured by the SROP “I learn again!” priority project for which the 
project budget was increased by HUF 24 billion. HUF 3.2 billion of the HUF 24 billion 
appropriation was earmarked for professional implementation expenditures (labor 
costs, IT tools, paper and office supplies, postage, etc.), and HUF 20.8 billion for 
target group support, providing the opportunity to train 100,000 persons.
The main training by the NES provides the following skills: (1) professional 
skills that may also be used in the open labor market, (2) knowledge related to 
renewable energy sources, (3) skills from the so-called "jack-of-all-trades" training 
that may be used in social cooperatives, and (4) remedial programs assisting 
independent living solutions.
 With the purpose to serve the growth of the Hungarian economy from 2014 to 
2020, Economic Development and Innovation Operative Programme (EDIOP), the 
"competitive labor force" priority axis, supports the labor supply development by 
assisting with competency development and training for adults, on the one hand, 
and by developing the training system in a way that it is adjusted to the needs of 
the economy, on the other hand. The purposes of this program are the following: 
better adjustment of the short- and long-term labor supply, assist with satisfying 
the economy’s labor demand, and contribute to improving competitiveness. 
Special attention must be given to people with low education levels who should 
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be provided the opportunity for training, whereby their chances for access to the 
open labor market increase. The Ministry for National Economy prepared the 
amendment of the Employment Act, which, similar to the jobseekers without 
a public employment relationship, makes it obligatory for the people in public 
employment to accept a job offer deemed acceptable by the above Act. Any 
violation of the jobseeker's obligation to accept a suitable job shall not only entail 
deletion from the job-seeker registry but also exclusion from public employment.
[Box 2-1] Financing of VET and Adult Learning in Hungary
In Hungary, adult education (and training) is regarded as an important activity. The law 
defines this activity as education and training provided outside the school system on a 
regular basis. It includes language or vocational training and services related to adult training 
performed in institutes, of any level, but targeted to obtain certain competencies.
Every ministry is indirectly involved in the financing of training, but the direct funding comes 
from the Ministry for National Economy. The Ministry for National Economy presently deals 
with finance, employment policy, vocational education and training, domestic and foreign 
trade, etc.
However, in a narrow sense, what we mean by adult education and training, that is, the 
bulk of activities, services, and performance, are the primary responsibility of the Ministry 
for National Economy, where documents, decrees, and acts are prepared and modified and 
relevant programs are designed, giving rise to communication and international cooperation.
Probably the most characteristic change in the funding of adult learning (hereinafter, ALE) 
in the last 11 years is the emergence of EU funding and its gradual increase, especially in 
the last third of this period. Another important feature is that the number of adults enrolled 
in education and training increased until the end of 2011. Around 2006—because of the 
budget cuts—normative subsidies for ALE and personal income tax allowances ceased, and 
this worsened even more in 2012. The possibility for setting the employees’ educational 
and training costs against the VET contribution tax also ceased. (As we shall see later, some 
of the achieved benefits—probably according to the improved budget balance—were 
reestablished.)
According to the VET and ALE report that the Department of the Ministry for National 
Economy submitted to the OECD, we can summarize the current situation as follows:
•  The number of adults enrolled in ALE unambiguously increased between 2009 and 2011.
•  In the long term, the entire ALE as a sub-sector of the economy will probably stagnate.
•  Between 2006 and 2010, the financial governance simultaneously reduced certain items 
(personal income tax allowances, normative subsidies for ALE) and increased other items 
(EU funding and consequently their national contribution)—all in close connection with 
the recession of the world economy.
• ALE’s local funding resources will lessen in the long term.
• The development levels will stagnate or slowly increase.
•  For the educational sector as a whole, implementing the reform elements that serve 
higher levels of efficiency and quality has been accelerated.
There are several different types of funding measures to support Hungarian companies’ 
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training activities. First, training subsidies make up one group of financing schemes in VET/
ALE. Subsidies for practical training are the first type of subsidy. The aim of this support is to 
encourage the practical training of secondary school pupils in companies. The target groups 
of this funding scheme are companies paying the obligatory vocational training contribution. 
Different calculation methods are applied to the different vocations: e.g., multiply the basic 
normative (defined in the annual Hungarian State Budget Law as EUR 1500/pupil/year) by the 
factor defined for a certain vocation (multiplier between 0.7 and 2.1). The vocation factors 
(multipliers) are defined in Government Decree No. 280/2011 (XII. 20.)
Meanwhile, the core criteria for allocation are to (1) sign apprenticeship contracts with pupils 
(countersigned by the chamber concerned) or an agreement of cooperation with a secondary 
school or contracts with students of higher vocational education,(2) guarantee the allowance 
to pupils in line with the relevant law,(3)compile the education program of the on-the-job 
(practical) training, and(4) keep a log of the practical training, labor safety, and attendance.
The second type of scheme is “deduction of earnings before taxes.” The aim and target 
group are identical to those of subsidies for practical training. This subsidy is a tax allowance. 
As for its extent, the earnings before taxes can be reduced by 24% of the minimum wage 
(applicable in Hungary) every month for each secondary school pupil. The core criteria for 
eligibility are to (1) sign apprenticeship contracts with pupils (countersigned by the chamber 
concerned) or agreement of cooperation with a secondary school or contracts with students 
of higher vocational education, (2) guarantee the allowance to pupils in line with the relevant 
law, (3) compile the education program of the on-the-job (practical) training, and (4) keep a 
log of the practical training, labor safety, and attendance.
The third type of scheme is “subsidies for own employees’ training.” The aim of this subsidy 
is to support training of the company’s own employees. The target group contains companies 
that provide practical training. The subsidy amount is a maximum of 16.5% of the gross VET 
contribution. The main criteria are as follows: (1) minimum of 45 apprentices, (2) training 
provided according to the 2013 Adult Learning Act, (3) training not in the form of distance 
training, (4) minimum length of the training is 20 hours; training venue is within the territory 
of the European Union, and the companies receiving this subsidy must provide data on the 
training.
The Minister for National Economy decides on the second biggest group of subsidies. Two 
types of schemes exist within this category: (1)training subsidies and(2)aid for workshop 
establishment and development.
Eligibility for the training subsidy is as follows: (1) a minimum of 50 newly created jobs, (2) 
an investor’s seat or branch office in Hungary, (3) a letter of intent or application form to be 
submitted before the start of the training project, (4) 18-month full-time employment of at 
least 70% of the trained employees after the training, (5) trainees must be directly employed 
by the investor, (6) the training  organizer must have permission for adult training when 
the training takes place in Hungary; (7) in case the investor resorts to any kind of regional 
subsidy, the trainings essential to the commencement and the operation of the investment 
cannot be supported, (8) trainings considered to be obligatory to the investor according to 
the Hungarian law cannot be subsidized, and (9) the number of employees who participate in 
the trainings cannot exceed the number of new employees (however, the participants do not 
have to be newly employed).
Aid amount: Maximum of EUR 0.5 M (HUF 155 M) if the number of trainees is between 50 
and 250
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Maximum of EUR 1 M (HUF 310 M) if the number of trainees is between 251 and 500 
Maximum of EUR 1.5 M (HUF 465 M) if the number of trainees is between 501 and 750
Maximum of EUR 2 M (HUF 620 M) if the number of trainees is >750
However, the subsidy per capita cannot exceed EUR 3,000. This subsidy is granted in all 
regions of Hungary, and it is above the maximum intensity ratio fixed by the European Union. 
Generally, the intensity rate of the training subsidy cannot be more than 50% of the eligible 
costs. However, the above intensity rate shall be increased by
10% if the training is given to disadvantaged workers,
10% in the case of medium enterprises, and
20% in the case of small enterprises;
however, it cannot be more than 70% of eligible costs.
As for the aid for workshop establishment and development, the eligibility criteria are as 
follows: (1) an investor’s seat or branch office in Hungary, (2) large enterprise, (3) increase 
of 50 students with a contract, (4)the created positions must be maintained for at least five 
consecutive years,(5) turnover of the beneficiary companies in the previous two business 
years will occur if they experience at least  four times  a reduction of the vocational training 
contribution calculated based on the students with apprenticeship contracts,  (6) letter of 
intent or application form to be submitted before the start of the project, (7) use of the 
established workshop for practical aims for five school years, and (8) expenditure of revenue 
from the use of the established workshop for practical training.
Aid amount: a maximum of EUR 8,000 per student with a contract; however, the total 
subsidy amount cannot exceed EUR 2 million. The number of students refers to students as 
well those who are employed at the time of the submission of the application for the subsidy 
and will be trained in the established workshop. This subsidy is granted in all regions of 
Hungary, and it is above the maximum intensity ratio fixed by the European Union.
Aid intensity: a maximum of 73% of the eligible costs. Eligible costs of the subsidy: building 
costs and asset acquisition costs of the workshop defined in the relevant annex of the decree.
The application may be realized by a one-step or two-step procedure as follows.
Two-step procedure: A letter of intent containing the main project parameters shall be 
submitted to the Ministry for National Economy, and the application form shall be submitted 
to the Ministry for National Economy during the year following the acceptance of the 
confirmation letter of the Minister for National Economy.
One-step procedure: Submission of the application form to the Ministry for National 
Economy.
System and financing of VET in Hungary
A challenge for the Hungarian government is the considerable lack of qualified workforce 
at the level of VET graduates, or, in other words, qualified labor. This is due to both 
demographic and structural reasons. While in the 1990s, 170,000 young people obtained 
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ISCED level 2 qualification (általánosiskola, ending at the age of 14/15 in Hungary), but in 
2014, the number decreased to only 120,000. This means a 50,000 decrease in the student 
population. This decrease is most noticeable in vocational education and training.
What also worsens the situation is the high number of retired people: 50,000 in the 
upcoming years. These employees are mostly working in VET professions of high labor-market 
demand. Meanwhile, 60% of those registered as unemployed do not have a qualification. 
Overall, the challenge is considerable and needs strong and immediate intervention.
The Hungarian government’s response to the above challenges is clarified in the policy paper 
“VET for Economy” approved by the government in February 2015. The policy initiatives 
drawn up in this paper will lead and drive VET developments in the coming years.
The two main elements of this concept are (1) developing and enhancing the apprenticeship 
scheme and (2) enhancing the institutional structure and the training to be offered.
As already mentioned, the Hungarian government pays close attention to improving its policy 
initiatives for vocational education and training. The overall policy target is to enhance VET 
provision in order to ensure labor market matching and to provide a qualified workforce for 
labor market demand. In order to reach this goal, many policy initiatives have been taken 
and will be initiated in the near future. One initiative supports apprenticeships, which is also 
in line with the European Commission’s policy and receives large support and high attention 
from the Hungarian policy stakeholders.
In order to strengthen dual VET, or, in other words, the apprenticeship scheme, the 
government aims to extend the number of apprenticeship contracts from the present 
50,000 to 70,000 by 2018. Presently, there are 8,000 companies involved in dual VET. This 
should increase to 20,000. One initiative to reach this target is called “Guarantee by the 
Chamber.” The Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry works as the government’s 
key partner and plays a large role in the development of the dual VET system. One of its 
roles is to negotiate and convince companies to take up apprentices. As of summer 2015, by 
rule, all VET students are to accomplish their practical training as apprentices at companies. 
The Chamber provides this guarantee so that all students can find placements. Only when 
reasonable and identifiable reasons exist may the student accomplish his/her practical training 
in the school workshop.
Beginning September 2015, the governance of 300 VET institutions will move from the 
present Klebelsberg Institution Maintenance Centre to the Ministry for National Economy. 
Parallel to this, the government established the National Office of Vocational Education 
and Training and Adult Learning. The Office will organize vocational centers at the county 
level as well as in the capital. This governance model should provide greater autonomy at 
the regional level to ensure participation. The centers will provide space and infrastructure 
for adult learning and VET for adults (CVET, continuing vocational education and training), 
contributing to the policy aim to extend participation in lifelong learning in Hungary.
In the 2016/17 school year, vocational secondary schools (szakközépiskola providing a 
Secondary School Leaving Certificate like the general upper secondary schools) are to be 
modified into szakgimnázium. In these new types of institutions, VET students will obtain the 
Secondary School Leaving Certificate (maturity exam), and beyond that, with one extra year 
of schooling, a VET Technician Qualification as well.
The present VET schools (szakiskola) will be modified into vocational secondary schools 
(szakközépiskola). These students will have the possibility, having completed their three-year 
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5.  New Directions of Hungarian Labor Market 
Initiatives
The Hungarian government’s primary employment policy aim is to create 
more private sector workplaces and encourage companies to provide jobs for an 
increasing number of employees with or without subsidies. The call for applications 
for the maintenance of jobs and job creation was launched in 2014, financed by 
the National Employment Fund with a budget of HUF 26 billion. The government 
considers the creation of jobs a priority; therefore, it aims to spend a significant 
part—60% of the European Structural and Investment Funds provided for 2014–
2020. The objectives include developing enterprise competitiveness, creating new 
workplaces, developing workforce competitiveness, enhancing innovation capacity, 
and focusing on developing the industrial and service sectors. The government 
focuses on subsidizing the creation and maintenance of workplaces in deprived 
areas, encouraging investments implemented by enterprises, and increasing 
employment of registered job seekers in the newly created workplaces. By means of 
the above, the local economy will be stronger.
The task of the employment policy is to provide temporary employment for the 
long-term unemployed or inactive, including those with low education levels and 
those living in areas lacking jobs—primarily in the eastern and northern regions—
until the job creation starts in the enterprises. Lately, the measures taken by the 
government aim to offer jobs instead of giving aid, even in the short run.
The government enhanced the instruments helping to move from public work 
to the open labor market. On the one hand, the activating element of public work 
grew stronger with the large-scale training program for public workers, where the 
public workers’ competencies and skills were developed. On the other hand, the 
social cooperative was developed, which provides temporary employment of the 
unemployed relying on local opportunities, partly from state subsidies and partly 
from its own revenue; its aim is to transfer those participating in the program to 
the open labor market in the long run. In 2013, the scheme for the development 
of social cooperative co-funded by the ESF was launched. This project will be 
implemented before June 2015 with a budget of HUF 15 billion. This measure helps 
financial sustainability and the strengthening of social enterprises and improves the 
employability of the deprived.
VET studies, to continue their studies for an extra two years in general subjects and pass the 
Secondary School Leaving Examination.
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Hungary has strengthened the active labor market measures by promoting 
employment for the unemployed and the inactive. As a result, more than 205,000 
people on average per month participated in the active measures in 2013, which is a 
37% increase compared to the previous year (about 150,000 people). Because of the 
restructuring of unemployment benefits and the activation measures, the number 
of registered jobseekers went down from 527,624 (2013) to 398,643 (2014 Q3). The 
average monthly number of participants in active measures (without public work) 
went up to 84,100 in 2013, a 189% increase compared to 2011. Because of the 
increase in participation in active measures and due to the decrease of the number 
of registered jobseekers, the activation rate went up from 17.1% (2011) to 28% in 
2013 <Table 2-4>.
In the 2014–2020 periods, active labor market programs will comprise more 
than 78% of the budget (~EUR 1.3 billion) for priority axis “employment” in the 
economic development. Within this ratio, 40% is dedicated to measures under the 
Youth Guarantee (active labor market measures fostering youth entrepreneurship 
and apprenticeship programs), while more than 38% constitutes large-scale active 
labor market programs to improve the employability of disadvantaged jobseekers 
over age 25.
In October 2014, proposals for two programs aimed at youth were submitted. 
The first was a large-scale active labor market program delivered by Public 
Employment Service (PES) with a budget of EUR 133 million targeting at least 
40,000 young people. The second proposal promoted youth entrepreneurship with 
a budget of EUR 13 million and aimed to train at least 1,600 young people, among 
whom 965 will start enterprises.
<Table 2-4> Changes in Hungarian Labor Markets
Source: Ministry of Economy, Hungary (2015).
(Unit: Number of people)
Participants in active labor market measures
Year 2011 2012 2013
Average monthly number of 
participants in active measures
120,297 149,760 205,471
From this: average monthly 
number of public workers
75,810 92,142 121,367
Average number of jobseekers 582,868 559,102 527,624
Activation rate (%) 17.1 21.1 28.0
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During the past few years, the Hungarian government introduced a number of 
measures to mobilize the labor force: the long-term reforms of the labor market’s 
supply side brought social service system reform, strengthened the active labor 
market instruments, introduced a new public work program, adopted a new labor 
code, and transformed the labor income tax system. All of these measures were 
complemented on the demand side. The new tax system and employer benefit 
system affected hundreds of thousands of people and directly reduced employment 
costs. By restructuring vocational and adult training and introducing dual elements 
of vocational training, the government has taken significant steps to bridge the gap 
between labor supply and demand.
[Figure 2-12] Composition of Employment Growth by Main Sectors
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office.
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For instance, recent Hungarian economic growth boosted the job-creation 
capacity of the private sector. As we can see in [Figure 2-12], the largest expansion 
of employment happened in the private sectors beginning in 2012. The employment 
growth reached a greater level in the disadvantaged regions (except southern 
Transdanubia). The eastern part of the country shows dynamic employment growth, 
which exceeds the country average <Table 2-5>.
6. Recent Challenges in Hungarian Labor Markets
Despite the recent employment expansion, the Hungarian labor market still faces 
serious challenges. First, labor force inactivity is the foremost problem. Figure 2-13 
shows the 2014 Hungarian labor force structure of the population between ages 20 
and 64. More than the half the population in this age group is still inactive.
Second, Hungary’s youth unemployment rate is still considerably high and 
has increased constantly. Since 2005, it has been higher than the EU average. 
Considering that the youth unemployment rate usually doubles the overall 
unemployment rate in most EU countries and other countries, Hungary’s youth 
unemployment rate is quite serious. In Hungary, it was possible to tackle the 
situation with targeted measures. The country still considers youth unemployment 
a top priority and an important challenge. "First Job Guarantee" was launched 
in 2012, and from the beginning of 2013, the targeted allowances of the Job 
Protection Action Plan also helped young job seekers find their first jobs. Several 
<Table 2-5> Recent Changes in Hungary’s Regional Employment
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office.
(Unit: %)
2014 QI 2014 QII
Central-Hungary 103.8 104.4
Central-Transdanubla 104.7 105.8
Western-Transdanubla 108.1 106.0
Southern-Transdanubla 108.0 103.0
N0rden-Hungary 111.9 106.5
Norden-Great Plaln 112.6 104.7
Southern-Great Plaln 104.8 104.3
Total 106.8 104.8
Changes in the number of employed compared to same 
period of previous year
110 • 2014/15 Knowledge Sharing Program with Hungary Chapter  2 _Public Employment and Vocational Training System for Effective Use of Human Resources • 111
EU cofinanced programs (like Youth Guarantee) aim to help youth employment 
by providing apprentice programs for gaining experience, active labor market 
measures that improve employability and focus on youth, programs that support 
youth in becoming entrepreneurs, and measures aimed to strengthen skills and 
provide career guidance.
[Figure 2-13] Labor Force Structure of the Population between Ages 20 and 64 in Hungary in 2014
[Figure 2-14] Youth Unemployment Rate, Ages 15–24
Source: The Ministry of Economy, Hungary.
Source: Eurostat (http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu).
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Third, the gender employment gap between the EU and Hungary is also 
significant. The gender employment gap in Hungary is historically high and has 
been more than 10% since 2002. The participation level in the women’s labor 
market has been rising constantly, in line with favorable labor market trends in 
the last three years, reaching 57% in the 20–64 age group in 2013, which is a 0.6% 
increase compared to 2012 (2012, 56.4%; 2010–2012, +1.4%), the highest level for 
decades. For comparison, the index rose slightly on average in the 28 EU member 
states until the end of 2012 (2012, 62.3%; 2010–2012, +0.3%).
In summary, the Hungarian labor market is characterized by a low labor force 
participation rate and a low employment rate, which signifies a malfunctioning 
labor market and ineffective labor market policies. While there could be several 
ways to revitalize the Hungarian labor market, we will focus on the public 
employment service and vocational training policies in Hungary. Among the labor 
market policies, public employment service and training programs are the most 
emphasized active labor market measures to improve employability in OECD 
countries, because many labor market programs are administered by the public 
employment service (OECD, 2015).
The Hungarian government also places increasing priority on measures to 
enhance the effectiveness of public employment service and skill-development 
programs to increase the employability of its inactive labor force. The Hungarian 
government recognized that the establishment of a well-functioning PES is 
[Figure 2-15] Employment Rates by Gender (15–64 years) in Hungary (2002–2014)
Source: Eurostat (http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu).
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essential to its successful human resource management and started setting up the 
institutional infrastructure for these services and has made much progress lately. 
However, the actual services need further development to reach their full capacity.
Figure 2-16 shows the strategic human resource management situations in OECD 
countries. Strategic human resource management allows governments to align 
their workforce with their goals. It enables governments to “have the right number 
of people with the right skills at the right place” (Kroll, 2002). Such practices help 
governments increase efficiency, responsiveness, and quality in service delivery. A 
sample of OECD work on strategic workforce management reveals the extent to 
which governments use performance assessments, capacity reviews, and other tools 
to engage in and promote strategic workforce planning (OECD, 2010). Among 
31 OECD countries, Korea’s index is above 0.7 and similar to the UK and Belgium, 
which means Korea’s strategic human resource management is relatively effective, 
while Hungary’s index is a little above 0.1, and it is the lowest among 31 OECD 
countries (OECD, 2010).21)
21)  The recent composite index for Hungary must be higher than that of 2010 shown in the figure, 
since the Hungarian government has been implementing several active labor market measures.
[Figure 2-16] Use of Strategic Human Resource Management Practices in the Central Government (2010)
Source: OECD (2010).
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In order to help the Hungarian government’s efforts to improve its effectiveness 
of strategic human resource management, we will look at the Korean public 
employment service and skill-development programs to draw policy implications 
for Hungary. Like many other developing countries, Korean programs in public 
employment and training did not fully evolve during its high economic growth 
period. It was the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s when the Korean 
government started placing increased priority on these labor market measures 
along with the other active labor market programs to deal with imminent massive 
unemployment resulting from the crisis.
7. Korean Public Employment Service
In order to help the Hungarian government’s efforts to improve its effectiveness 
of strategic human resource management, we will look at the Korean public 
employment service and skill-development programs to draw policy implications 
for Hungary. Like many other developing countries, Korean programs in public 
employment and training did not fully evolve during its high economic growth 
period. It was the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s when the Korean 
government started placing increased priority on these labor market measures 
along with the other active labor market programs to deal with imminent massive 
unemployment resulting from the crisis.22)
Korean PES system developed several innovative programs and instruments, 
most representative, the one-stop-service delivery system, the interlinkages between 
employment assistance and unemployment benefits accompanied by vocational 
training, and a successful employment package program. Since the late 1990s, 
there were several reforms and reorganizations in the PES programs. As a result, 
the one-stop delivery system that provides unemployment benefits, assistance in 
job placement, vocational skill development, and employment security was set up. 
The interlinkages between the programs were well established, which enabled 
the delivery system to work more efficiently. The effectiveness of the service was 
also improved by developing a network among local governments, local business 
associations, labor unions, and vocational training agencies (Oh et al., 2013).
The current Korean PES delivery system structure is shown in [Figure 2-17]. The 
main agency carrying out PES now is the Job Center. In addition, local governments 
provide PES through their employment service agencies. Private employment service 
agencies have been very active as well, in cooperation with the Job Center and 
22) See Box 2-4 for information about the EIS.
114 • 2014/15 Knowledge Sharing Program with Hungary Chapter  2 _Public Employment and Vocational Training System for Effective Use of Human Resources • 115
under its supervision.
The number of private offices in Korea is four times as many as the number of 
public offices <Table 2-6>. Private employment services played very important roles 
during the crisis. However, the office network of the Ministry of Labor as well as 
municipalities has expanded significantly: the number of PES offices increased by 
173% from 52 to 142, and the PES workforce more than tripled during the crisis, 
while the number of private employment offices increased modestly.
[Figure 2-17] PES Delivery System in Korea
Source: KEIS (2012).
<Table 2-6> Public and Private Employment Offices
Note: Data not available 
Source: Ministry of Labor (2002).
Ministry of Labor 
offices
Local government 
offices
Private employment 
offices
1995
(before
 the crisis)
1999 (a)
(after
 the crisis)
1995
(before
 the crisis)
1999 (a)
(after
 the crisis)
1995
(before
 the crisis)
1999 (a)
(after 
the crisis)
Offices 52 142 285 285 1,271 1,756
Staff 1,000 3,200 360 * 3,500 *
Ministry of Employment & Labor
(Employment Policy Bureau)
The job Center
branch
The job Center
Employment
Service
Agencies
(Local Gov't)
Local Administration of
Employment & Labor
Branch, Local Administration of
Employment & Labor
Private Employment Service Agencies(Private consigned enterprises)
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The number of registered jobseekers and annual placement rates indicate that 
private agencies have higher market penetration than the public employment 
service. The rate of vacancies reported to public offices was below 2% of the labor 
force before the 1997 crisis. After that, the public employment service expanded, 
and, accordingly, the rate significantly increased. Notably, the nature of vacancies 
at private and public agencies is quite different. Private agencies are known for 
placing a large number of low-skilled workers, while the placements by the public 
employment service tend to be of longer duration (Ministry of Labor, 2002).
Between 1998 and 1999, right after the economic crisis, the ministry’s offices 
filled almost 50% of the job vacancies. The share of vacancies reported to the public 
employment service increased from 3% in 1995 to 13% in total hiring in 1998. The 
market share of the public employment service, however, remains comparatively 
[Figure 2-18]  Performance of Employment Services in Korea (1989 to 1999): Annual Flows as a 
Percent of Total Labor Force
Source: OECD(2000).
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low [Figure 2-18].
According to previous research on the effectiveness of public employment service 
in OECD countries, it is critical for the effectiveness of labor market policy measures 
to have coherent integration of the three core public employment services: (1) 
job brokerage,(2) unemployment benefit administration, and (3) referral of the 
unemployed to active labor market programs (OECD, 1996a; 1997b). In most OECD 
countries, these services are integrated, and Korea established an integrated service 
offering one-stop service. The one-stop service centers handle all the conventional 
public employment services. They provide labor market information and counseling 
services, register vacancies, help with job searches and job placements, and facilitate 
various employment-related claims and unemployment benefits.
There was much progress in Korea’s public employment service system after the 
crisis, and it evolved to an even more comprehensive service system. In addition 
to one-stop service for the core functions described above, the job centers began 
offering credit recovery counseling and welfare counseling, previously provided 
through local government offices. Ten such centers were launched in 2014, and an 
additional 30 centers will be added in 2015. The Korean government will set up 70 
welfare-plus-job centers by 2017. According to a report from one of the welfare-
plus-job centers located in the outskirts of Seoul, the center’s visitors increased 
by 36% after welfare-related counseling was offered (a performance report of 
the Namyangju welfare-plus-job center is available athttp://www.work.go.kr/
namyangju).
In order to provide convenient and user-friendly public employment service, the 
comprehensive Web-based Work-Net service was introduced in 1997, and it was 
updated to incorporate the recent IT development in Korea (see Box 2-2).
[Box 2-2] Work-Net 
In 1998, Work-Net(work.go.kr) started its service, and provides information about job 
openings/searches and jobs/careers as a public employment portal. It has been providing 
incorporated job information from private employment portals(Jobkorea, Saramin, and 
Career) and metropolitan governments since July 2011. Online career services are available 
via smart phones and tablet PCs.
In 1995, the organization was restructured as the Central Employment Information Archive 
under the Ministry of Labor. Since then it began offering additional employment information 
services through two networks (the employment insurance network and the employment 
information network), turning itself into a truly central organization in employment 
information services. In particular, it offered employment information in a fast and accurate 
way and provided labor-market analysis data to respond to massive unemployment in 
the aftermath of the financial crisis, serving as pivotal infrastructure to overcome the 
unemployment crisis.
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In 1998, the organization opened the Work-Net employment support information network to 
provide integrated employment information in the quickest and most accurate manner.
In 2001, the organization was restructured as the Central Employment Information Center 
under the Human Resources Development Service of Korea. Since then, it has linked work-
training qualifications.
In 2006, as the Basic Act on Employment Policy was revised, the organization became the 
Korea Employment Information Service (KEIS), an independent employment information 
organization. Since then, KEIS has made its best efforts to serve as a pivotal national 
organization on employment information, the employment information hub, the center 
of employment networks, a specialized organization on workforce demand and supply, 
the mecca of occupational research, and the central organization for career guidance and 
counseling.
During 2009–2012, to achieve an efficient human resource allocation, the organization 
started an online career service and a service incorporating job information on the Web for 
job seekers and enterprises, especially for young job seekers and SMEs.
The operating structure is divided into Internet services and intranet services. Internet services 
provide subscribed members with local- and industry-specific regional and occupational job 
information. They also offer personalized information about online job applications and 
e-mail applications, and employment assistance such as job search history and a mail service. 
For subscribed enterprises, they provide regional, occupational, and major information about 
human resources. They also offer personalized information about online job applications 
and human resources management, and recruitment-support services such as applicant-
selection services and university and vocational training center recommendations. There 
are vocational information services and employment trend services as well. Intranet services 
include job placements through employment center agents and local government officials. 
Job placements include job statistics and SMS/FAX monitoring. Intranet services not only 
find recruiters, they also offer various services for youth work experience and social service 
jobs. There are group-counseling services such as achievement programs, youth vocational-
guidance programs, and job-seeking programs as well.
Users (classification) are classified as follows: external users (those who provide jobs, e.g., 
enterprises), and job seekers (individuals). Internal users are employment centers and local 
governments. The managing operator is the Korea Employment Information Service.
According to Article 18 of the Employment Policy Framework Act, "Korea Employment 
Information Service is established in order to efficiently carry out employment support services 
and entrusted services on collecting (job seeker) employment information and investigate 
vocational information, in accordance with Article 40."
The entrusted services in accordance with Article 40 are
• collect and provide employment and vocational information,
• work on the data related to supply and demand trends of human resources, and
• create and disseminate employment statistics.
They are currently operated by the Work-Net team in the Employment Network Division 
(http://www.keis.or.kr/www/staff/NR_OrganList.do).
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8. Korean Vocational Training Policies
8.1.  Development of the Korean Vocational Training 
System
As global economic competition increasingly requires countries to compete on 
the quality of goods and services, every country requires a labor force with a range 
of mid-level trade, technical, and professional skills besides the high-level skills 
associated with university education (OECD, 2011). Therefore, nowadays it is critical 
to provide vocational training programs to promote adaptation or upgrade of 
workers’ skills for strategic human resource management.
<Table 2-7> Work-Net’s Yearly Job Offering, Job Seeking, Employment Status
Source: Korea Employment Information Service (2012).
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 (Jan–Oct)
Number of job 
applications
602,381 674,266 928,276 933,184 823,474
Number of new jobs 1,249,837 1,456,516 2,173,391 2,154,163 1,959,421
Number of new job 
seekers (A)
2,361,669 3,256,415 3,390,254 3,284,664 2,839,833
Number of effective 
jobs
1,394,663 1,669,919 3,098,692 3,155,404 2,281,325
Number of effective 
job seekers
5,277,601 7,618,123 8,676,838 8,269,743 8,293,439
Number of job 
placements
6,433,794 9,733,515 18,337,389 9,141,666 2,137,100
Number of employed 635,849 864,755 947,097 957,288 999,454
Number of employed 
excluding public work 
(B)
599,473 783,469 885,759 908,873 947,482
Employment rate (B/A) 25.4% 24.1% 26.1% 27.7% 33.4%
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In Korea, the job-skill-development system has evolved from a government-led 
system to one with more private sector involvement in response to the structural 
change of the nation’s economy, which demands a more skilled workforce (Ra, 
2012). In general, vocational training is categorized into public vocational training 
and in-plant vocational training, according to the type of service provider. The 
Korean government provides public vocational training programs through several 
training centers all over the country. In-house (or plant) training was left to the 
business and was not subject to government regulation. The government provides 
subsidies for part or all of the training expenses as long as employers offer approved 
in-house programs (Kang, 2012).
During the 1990s, the vocational training system underwent a considerable 
revision, as the number of college graduates greatly increased and the industrial 
structure rapidly changed. Enrollment in primary training courses decreased while 
secondary training and job-conversion training courses were more in demand. The 
current structure of vocational skills development programs in Korea is shown in 
[Figure 2-19]. The most important aspect of the current structure is the improvement 
of the program’s effectiveness, and emphasis is placed on the vocational training 
programs for the employed rather than the unemployed (Lee et al., 2014).
[Figure 2-19] Structure of Vocational Skills Development Programs in Korea
Source: Ministry of Employment and Labor, Korea (2013).
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In 1995, the EIS introduced a new training system as one of its components. The 
new system consists of four different schemes that provide subsidies to(1) employers 
who operate in-plant training systems,(2) employers who allow paid leave for the 
purpose of further training,(3) employers who enroll their employees in education 
and training courses operated outside their firms, and(4) employees and older 
workers who pursue further education (this includes tuition loans). Because of 
the timely introduction of EIS, the Korean government could respond swiftly to 
the increased demand for vocational training during the financial crisis. The 1999 
data on the expenditures and the number of participating employers suggest 
that in-plant vocational training is most important among the four programs 
<Table 2-8>. The training programs are financed through employers’ mandatory 
contribution to the EIS. Overall, the EIS funds 40% to 90% of the training costs.
<Table 2-8> Training Programs for the Employed, January to June 1999
Note: Data not available.
Source: KLI (1999a).
Total
In-plant   
vocational 
training
Number of firms providing 
training
23,011
(100%)
16,338
(71%)
Number of trained workers (A)
266,478
(100%)
257,069
(96.5%)
Program expenditures(000s of 
won) (B)
44,842,332
(100%)
27,776,943
(61.9%)
Average expenditure per 
participant (B/A)
168.3 108.1
Paid training   
leave
Subsidies 
for course   
attendance
Loans for 
school fees
Number of firms providing 
training
148
(0.6%)
*
6,525
(28.4%)
Number of trained workers (A)
1,425
(0.5%)
15
(0%)
7,963
(3%)
Program expenditures
 (000s of won) (B)
2,604,783
(5.8%)
13,525
(0%)
14,447,081
(32.2%)
Average expenditure per 
participant (B/A)
1,827.9 901.7 1,812.9
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Training programs for the unemployed also expanded quickly during the 
financial crisis. The main training programs offered to the unemployed were as 
follows. The first program was the reemployment training of workers dismissed 
from the employers covered by the EIS. The second were the training programs for 
employment promotion. This program focused on dismissed workers not insured 
by the EIS (mostly temporary, daily, and part-time workers). The third and fourth 
programs were training for unemployed who newly entered the labor market and 
training programs for business start-ups targeted at elderly unemployed, disabled 
individuals, and school dropouts. Finally, human resource development training 
programs that provide craftsmanship training and training for 3D (difficult, dirty, 
or dangerous) jobs were also offered. While the first program was funded by 
the EIS, the others were financed through the general government budget. The 
participation rate was great: between 1998 and 1999, more than 350,000 people, 
about one-fifth of the total unemployed, attended training courses <Table 2-9>.
However, most of these training programs have relatively high dropout rates, 
and possibilities for reemployment after completing the training courses remain 
low. Based of the OECD countries’ experience, the future of training program 
reforms should take into account the following suggestions. First, it is important to 
better target the programs for the disadvantaged labor market groups. According 
to the evaluations of the training for the unemployed, well-targeted programs tend 
to be relatively successful. For example, the positive labor market outcomes seem 
to outweigh the costs to train disadvantaged women and those unemployed at the 
risk of becoming long-term unemployed. Second, training program reforms can also 
improve the provision of the proper content of a training program so it can match 
the need of the unemployed. Training vouchers can be a solution but only when the 
public employment programs provide appropriate professional guidance with them 
(OECD, 2013).
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<Table 2-9> Outcomes of Training Programs for the Unemployed
Note: Data not available
a  Completion rate equals the number of trainees who completed the course divided by the total number 
of trainees.
b  The figures in parentheses are the proportion of trainees who found employment and are calculated 
over those who completed the course.
Source: Ministry of Labor (2002).
Total
Reemploy-
ment 
traininga 
of the 
unem
ployed 
under the 
EIS
Training programs not financed by the EIS
Reemploy
ment 
traininga 
of the 
unem
ployed 
under the 
EIS
Craftsmen 3Djobs Business start-ups
New labor 
market 
entrants
Other 
programs
1998
Total number 
of trainees
362,941
(100%)
170,096
(46.9%)
101,709
(28%)
14,515
(4%)
11,000
(3%)
13,598
(3.7%)
4,012
(11.9%)
9,011
(2.5%)
Number of 
trainees who 
completed the 
course
193,837 116,429 37,465 12,942 8,724 12,515 5,762 *
Completion 
ratea
53.4% 68.4% 36.8% 89.2% 79.3% 92% 13.4% *
Found 
employmentb
43,470
(22.4%)
26,193
(22.5%)
7,218
(19.3%)
6,326
(48.9%)
2,610
(29.9%)
561
(4.5%)
562
(9.8%)
*
1999
Total number 
of trainees
358,351
(100%)
226,356
(63.2%)
69,466
(19.4%)
16,817
(4.7%)
9,122
(2.5%)
7,725
(2.2%)
10,022
(2.8%)
18,843
(5.3%)
Number of 
trainees who 
completed the 
course
131,638 93,268 21,534 4,576 936 4,933 3,872 2,519
Completion 
ratea
36.7% 41.2% 31% 27.2% 10.3% 63.9% 38.6% 13.4%
Found 
employmentb
48.864
(37.1%)
36,223
(38.8%)
7,299
(33.9%)
1,672
(36.5%)
936
(100%)
517
(10.5%)
1,608
(41.5%)
607
(24.1%)
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8.2. Financing Vocational Training Programs in Korea
The most challenging issue in public employment service and skill-development 
programs in Hungary is the overall lack of a solid funding source, as in many 
developing countries. An appropriate financing policy is needed to secure funding 
for policy implementation and improvement of policy outcomes.
Hungary needs to develop various vocational training programs to enhance 
the possibility for future employment of the currently unemployed and other 
disadvantaged groups. Even though this need is well recognized by the Hungarian 
government and the public, the lack of funding prevents them from implementing 
effective measures. In Hungary, as in other newer EU countries, the European Social 
Fund (ESF) has funded active labor market programs (ALMPs) and, thus, offset at 
least some of the decline in state ALMP funding. However, the ESP could not replace 
the state’s funding source of ALMPs permanently, and Hungary needs to find a solid 
system to fund ALMPs. For this purpose, the Korean Employment Insurance system 
provides a good example.
In this section, we present the information on the Korean EIS contribution rate 
in detail. In addition, we examine separately the international experience with 
training levy schemes to find a policy implication for Hungary. In many countries, 
the training expenditure is the largest expenditure of all ALMPs. As can be 
confirmed in <Table 2-10>, the training expenditure is 40% of all expenditures in 27 
European Union countries.
<Table 2-10> Share of EU27 Expenditure (2008) on ALMPs by Type of Measure
Source: Eurostat.
Measure % of total ALMP expenditure
Training 39.0
Employment incentives 24.0
Supported employment and rehabilitation 16.1
Direct job creation 13.4
Start-up incentives 7.2
Job rotation and sharing 0.4
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Vocational Training Levy System (Levy-Grant)
In the mid-1970s, the South Korean government introduced the “Vocational 
Training Levy System” (VTL), which was a fiscal milestone in establishing a public 
vocational training system. The VTL is a levy-exemption system that imposed 
duties on training and penalties for not implementing training in plants. The VTL 
system aimed to fulfill the demand for the general skills necessary for economic 
growth. The VTL system enforced levies on large companies, as large companies 
were considered to have the capacity to provide vocational training. The state also 
provided public vocational training services. Large companies were able to provide 
and procure skills autonomously; however, the SMEs could not achieve the capacity 
of a self-sufficient training system. Furthermore, there were few private vocational 
training institutions to support SMEs’ vocational training due to the uncertain 
profitability in the private sector. As the Korean government introduced the 
Employment Insurance Act in 1995, the VTL system ended.
Newly introduced through EIS is a levy-grant system based on employment 
insurance premiums. Therefore, it provides subsidies to companies that offer 
training services in plants. The EIS enforces budget reserves in order to promote 
upgrade training of the employed. Even though the income-redistribution effect 
was expected for SMEs through the new system, training opportunities for 
vulnerable groups and SMEs were diminished after EIS was introduced. Therefore, 
the current task is to focus on the equity of vocational training in Korea rather than 
its efficiency.
<Table 2-11> and <Table 2-12> show the sum of the contribution rates. The three 
main EIS programs do not exceed 3% of the total payroll. The financial situation of 
the Employment Insurance Fund (EIF), a special account in the Bank of Korea, and 
the macroeconomic situations determine the contribution rate. All contributions for 
EIS are deposited into the EIF managed by the Ministry of Labor.
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<Table 2-11> Contribution Rate of Each Program (1995~2003)
<Table 2-12> Contribution Rate of Each Program (2003~2014)
Source: Ministry of Labor (2012).
Source: Ministry of Employment and Labor (2014).
(unit: %)
(unit: %)
July 1, 1995–
Dec. 31, 1998
Jan. 1, 1999–
Dec. 31, 2003
Employees Employers Employees Employers
Unemployment benefits 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5
Employment Stabilization Program - 0.2 - 0.3
Vocational 
Competency 
Development 
Program
<150 employees - 0.1 - 0.1
>150 employees 
(priority firms)
- 0.3 - 0.3
Vocational 
Competency 
Development 
Program (150–
999 employees)
- 0.5 - 0.5
Vocational 
Competency 
Development 
Program (1,000+
employees)
- 0.5 - 0.7
2003-2005 2011-2014
Employees Employers Employees Employers
Unemployment benefits 0.45 0.45 0.55 0.55
Employment Stabilization Program - 0.15 - -
Vocational 
Competency 
Development 
Program
<150 employees - 0.1 - 0.25
>150 employees 
(priority firms)
- 0.3 - 0.45
Vocational 
Competency 
Development 
Program (150–
999 employees)
- 0.5 - 0.65
Vocational 
Competency 
Development 
Program (1,000+
employees)
- 0.7 - 0.85
126 • 2014/15 Knowledge Sharing Program with Hungary Chapter  2 _Public Employment and Vocational Training System for Effective Use of Human Resources • 127
[Box 2-3] The Employment Insurance System in Korea
The EIS was set up in 1995 as a part of the social protection system with the Industrial 
Accidents Compensation Insurance, Medical Insurance, and the National Pension System. 
The EIS was designed as a comprehensive system that helped not only to reduce the 
risk of income loss when unemployed but also to support employment and vocational 
competency and offer employment assistance. The three major components of the EIS are 
the Employment Stabilization Program, the Vocational Competency Development Program, 
and the Unemployment Benefit Program.
The EIS was initially set up to provide protection for regular workers in firms with more 
than 30 workers. The employment security and skill-development components were only 
available to firms with more than 70 workers. However, during the 1997 economic crisis, 
the EIS expanded in January 1998 to include coverage for firms with more than ten workers, 
five workers in March 1998, and finally, all firms regardless of their staff size (Ministry of 
Labor, 2005).
The EIS funding source is from social contributions calculated as a proportion of the total 
wage. Three different contribution schemes are applied: (1) the employment security part 
of the EIS is 0.3% of the total wage,(2) for vocational training, the contribution rate runs 
from 0.1% to 0.7% of the total wage, depending on the size of the firm, and (3) for the 
unemployment benefits, the contribution rate is 1% of the total wage. Employers pay the 
contributions for the employment security and training part of the EIS. Both employers and 
employees contribute equally to the unemployment benefits. Total contributions are usually 
2% of the total wage but can be raised to 3% of the wage when economic situations 
call for it. The EIS fund kept a surplus before the 1997 financial crisis because Korea had 
maintained nearly 100% employment between 1995 and 1997, and there was no major 
spending.
Employment
Stabilization
Program
Employment adjustment assistance, regional employment 
promotion grants, employment promotion subsidies for the elderly, 
employment promotion facility subsidies, provision of labor market 
information.
Employment promotion subsidies, shift-work change assistance, S 
& M expertise employment subsidies, SME working hour reduction 
assistance, SME working condition innovation assistance, SME 
new industry advancement subsidies, employment maintaining 
assistance, outplacement assistance subsidies, reemployment 
subsidies, construction worker EI maintenance assistance, 
construction worker installment of retirement deduction assistance, 
construction worker continuous employment assistance, childcare 
leave allowances, post- and prenatal vacation allowances, childcare 
facility assistance, continuous employment after childbearing and 
childbirth assistance, peak-wage preservation allowances, job 
exhibition assistance, and other sub-programs
Chapter  2 _Public Employment and Vocational Training System for Effective Use of Human Resources • 127
8.3. New Challenges of the Korean Training System 
Since the 1997 financial crisis, the population that fell into the low-income 
group increased, resulting in income polarization. It is necessary to break the vicious 
circle of low income leading to low skills and vice versa. However, there is a high 
possibility for those who are in the vulnerable groups to be excluded from the 
current vocational training funding system since they are not qualified to be insured 
by the EIS. As a result, vulnerable groups' demand for vocational training is likely to 
decrease without adequate support for training costs and income compensation.
Korea’s vocational training funding system focuses more on the employed than 
the unemployed, since the positive externality is more prevalent in the general job 
competency training that is more suitable for the unemployed. There is also a gap 
between large firms and SMEs in the provision of job training for their workers. 
SMEs are likely to invest inadequately in their workers’ job training due to budget 
constraints. There are differences in investment patterns for vocational training 
between big firms and SMEs. Few enterprises with 10–29 workers provide vocational 
training within their plants, and they provide only a small number of workers with 
opportunities for training. Furthermore, many SMEs do not provide any training 
opportunities to low-skilled and low-wage workers who are most likely to need 
vocational training.
As of 2008, Korea’s vocational training participation rate was around 27%, 
which is above the average of the EU 25 countries’ participation rate of 20.7%, 
but it is under the average of the EU 25 countries without the transition countries 
(28.2%). In Korea, there are 37 hours per year of vocational training, which is still 
relatively short compared to EU countries(an average of 66 hours per year in the EU 
Source: Ministry of Labor (2010).
Vocational
Competency
Development
Program
Vocational competency development training (in-house vocational 
training subsidies, employee training subsidies, loans for training 
facilities, aid for reemployment training of displaced workers), 
assistance with training fees
Paid-leave training, outplacement training, vocational competency 
development account system, training course assistance, vocational 
competency development card system, female household-head 
training, priority job training, and other sub-programs
Unemployment 
Benefit
Program
Job-seeking benefits, distant-area job-seeking benefits, moving 
assistance, early reemployment allowances
Injury and disease allowances, job capability improvement 
allowance, and other sub-programs
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25 countries) (Lee, 2008).
Overall, the vocational training system needs to change from a supplier-oriented 
service to client-oriented services in order to deal with new threats to the Korean 
economy. As income distribution in Korea became more polarized, a new group 
with special needs emerged. For example, traditionally, the vulnerable groups were 
those of absolute poverty, females, the disabled, and the elderly; however, after 
the crisis, long-term unemployment, nonregular workers, SMEs, and manufacturing 
workers newly emerged as large parts of the vulnerable groups. Therefore, 
vocational training service must be extended to cover the needs of these working 
poor groups.
The Korean government launched a consortium for vocational training for 
SMEs. The government provides expenses for facilities, equipment, labor costs, and 
training courses to the SME training agency consortium in order to promote the 
vocational capacities of SME employees. In 2013, the project modified its regulations 
to better serve the demands of the firms and expanded the scope of its beneficiaries 
by evaluating not only the programs of the first participating firms who directly 
contracted with the government, but also the participation rates of the second and 
third participating firms.
With a constant increase of the consortium offices and implementation of 
more effective and diverse vocational trainings, 223,186 workers from 32,623 
firms participated in the programs. Additionally, among the graduates of the 
training programs for future employees, 76.9% were employed in 2013. Overall, 
the program was significantly effective, improved the vocational skills of SME 
employees, and solved the mismatch problem between employers and jobseekers 
by providing adequate training to the unemployed (Ministry of Employment and 
Labor, 2014b).
The Korean government has also supported the SME learning organization. 
In order to increase, share, and create knowledge, experience, and expertise 
in SMEs, the government supports the establishment of a learning culture and 
building a learning infrastructure in SMEs, which strengthens competitiveness 
and enhances their employees' vocational skills. SMEs are experiencing difficulties 
developing formal vocational training because of the lack of infrastructure and 
their need for a constant labor supply. They are also interested in developing firm-
specific skills, which are learned mostly within the workplace. In 2006, HRD Korea 
implemented a program supporting the organized vocational training in SMEs, 
which helps systematic learning and transmission of job-related knowledge, skills, 
and experience within the workplace. It provides funding for organized learning 
activities, invitations to professional trainers, learning networks, and awards for 
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excellent participants for selected firms for one year (renewable up to three years). 
Because many SMEs have difficulties finding substitute labor for trainees, it offers a 
program that connects work and education, so the employees can participate in the 
program while still working. In 2013, 1,725 learning organizations from236 SMEs 
were funded by this program, which greatly contributed to the establishment of 
the SME vocational education system.
According to the evaluation of the 2013 Support for Learning Organization, the 
support contributed to SME participation in the vocational training program and 
use of firm-specific skills (Ministry of Employment and Labor, 2014b).
The Korean government offers excellent training courses for SME employers and 
employees to improve their core vocational capacities and, thus, contribute to the 
SMEs’ competitiveness as well. Most of the courses are practical training courses that 
focus on problem solving and case studies. In 2012, the program was divided into 
intermediate courses (“general training”) and advanced courses (“special training”) 
for core skilled workers (Ministry of Employment and Labor, 2014b).
In order to address these changes more efficiently, the Korean government also 
reorganized the information system for vocational education and training services 
and launched a new Web-based information system called HRD-Net in 2003 and 
expanded its functions to meet the users’ new demands. With this new user-friendly 
information system, the government aims to improve its effectiveness in providing 
practical information for vocational training (see Box 2-4).
[Box 2-4] HRD-Net
HRD-Net supports vocational training programs, trainee registration, and training costs with 
job centers, local governments, and training institutions. Additionally, HRD-Net provides a 
variety of information on training and online enrollment such as personalized information 
and individual training histories on its homepage for lifelong learning.
In 2003, HRD-Net was reformed as part of the vocational training system, and in 2006, it 
completed its reform as the Internet-based vocational training information service. In 2008, 
HRD-Net started an individual vocational training account system and expanded the account 
system in 2009. The vocational training-certification-work information was connected in 
2012, and it began providing mobile services in 2015.
The Korea Employment Information Service operates the HRD-Net. The Human Resources 
Development Team within the Employment Network Division is in charge of managing and 
developing HRD-Net. Customers are divided into nonmembers, individual members, and 
enterprise members and operated accordingly.
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8.4. Other Advanced Countries’ Cases
There are various ways to fund training programs. The main issues are whether 
the enterprises pay the EIS premium with or without the state funding and how 
the prices of the training units are measured. According to these two standards, we 
can categorize the funding systems of other countries. <Table 2-13> compares the 
funding systems of five different countries.
 
The provided services are as follows:
Training information
• State-funded vocational training
• Employer-funded vocational training
• Integrated training courses
• Vocational training for job seekers
• Vocational training for the employed
• Evaluation grades for training institutions
Qualification information
• Job-field searches
• Yearly exam schedules
• National technique qualification
• National professional qualification
• Authorized private qualifications
Job information
• Recruitment information
• Job-field searches
• Regional searches
• Customized searches
Open sources
• e-Learning
• Broadcasted lectures on vocational training
Source: HRD-Net webpage.
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9.  Active Labor Market Programs for the 
Working Poor in Korea
The socioeconomic status of working poor households in Korea is shown in 
<Table 2-14>. Female-headed households are more likely to fall in the working poor 
category than male-headed households are. The households that are in working 
poor condition have household heads who are generally less educated and older 
than 60.23) Four-person households account for 27.1% of the working poor and 
together with two-person households, they account for more than 50% of the 
working poor households.
<Table 2-14> Socioeconomic Characteristics of Working Poor Households (2012)
(Unit:%) 
Working nonpoor Working poor Total poor 
Gender
Male 87.3 58.5 45.0
Female 12.7 41.5 55.0
Age
under 20 5.7 2.5 2.5
30s 33.6 16.0 6.6
40s 35.9 30.9 11.8
50s 18.2 17.8 12.5
above 60 6.6 32.9 66.5
Education level
Middle school graduate 20.6 36.3 60.3
High school graduate 43.6 39.8 26.0
Junior college graduate 8.3 12.6 5.3
College graduate 23.3 8.4 7.1
Graduate school graduate 4.1 2.9 1.3
23 )  Note that the households headed by those in their 40s also account for a higher ratio of the 
working poor. This is due mainly to the fact that the households headed by those in their 40s are 
the largest group.
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The working poor’s employment status among the economically active 
population indicates that most of them are daily workers. Currently, there are 
slightly more working poor who are employed than unemployed; however, most of 
them have unsecured temporary jobs. This emphasizes the importance of vocational 
training for the working poor in order to get permanent or temporary jobs. 
However, the high proportion of daily jobs proves that daily livelihoods rather than 
job quality or job security are most important to the working poor <Table 2-15>. 
In order to address the poverty issues of the working poor, the Korean 
government has launched two programs that offer comprehensive services 
combining vocational training and welfare programs: (1) Successful Employment 
Package Program and (2) Hope Ribbon Project.
Successful Employment Package Program
The Successful Employment Package Program was introduced in 2009 to provide 
subsidies (up to KRW 2 million, about USD 2,000 per person) for self-leading 
vocational training, and participants can choose the programs that are suitable for 
themselves. Participants are selected based on individual vocational training history 
and participation history, possession of certificates, and their desired job field. 
Both unemployed and employed (temporary and daily workers, workers in SMEs) 
can participate regardless of whether they are insured by EIS. By including the 
participants not insured by EIS, it aims to solve the problem of exclusion within the 
labor market. Participants use the “Learning Card System” to participate in training.
 
<Table 2-14> continued
(Unit:%) 
Working nonpoor Working poor Total poor 
Household scale
Single member 1.6 14.9 47.5
Two person 9.8 25.4 30.5
Three person 21.5 20.4 10.6
Four person 44.6 27.1 8.2
Five person 15.8 8.6 2.6
More than six persons 6.8 3.7 0.7
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The Successful Employment Package Program has been successful. In 2009 and 
2010, all or most of the participants finished the program, and more than 60% of 
those who finished were employed. In addition, more than 70% of the participants 
in 2009 and more than 80% of the participants in 2010 and 2011 became insured 
through employment insurance. The employment retention rate also shows that 
above or nearly 70% of the employed remained employed longer than three 
months, and around 40%–50% of people remained employed longer than six 
months.
<Table 2-16> Participants in the “Successful Employment Package Program” and Performance
Source: Ministry of Employment and Labor (2013).
Source: Ministry of Employment and Labor (2013).
(Unit: Number of people, %)
(Unit: Number of people, %)
Year Participants Finished Employed Insured by EI
Employment 
retention rate
Longer 
than 3 
months
Longer 
than 6 
months
2009 9,082 9,082
5,600
(61.7)
4,264
(76.1)
3,077
(72.2)
1,865
(43.7)
2010 25,228 25,109
15,125
(60.2)
12,834
(84.9)
9,411
(73.3)
7,024
(54.7)
2011 56,531 30,397
60,397
(53.8)
25,711
(84.6)
17,435
(67.8)
10,824
(42.1)
Year
Number 
of 
recipients
Finished
(a)
Employed
(b)
Employ
ment rate
(b/a)
Exit from 
bene
ficiary
Employment 
retention rate
% of the 
finished
(c/a)
% of the 
employ-
ed 
(c/b)
2009 2,368 2,368 921 38.9 530 22.4 57.5
2010 2,505 2,499 964 38.6 570 22.1 54.7
2011 7,869 7,010 2,859 40.8 1,197 17.1 41.9
<Table 2-17>  Performance of the Successful Employment Package Program among Basic 
Livelihood Security RecipientsBasic  Livelihood Security Recipients
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The performance of the Successful Employment Package Program among the 
basic livelihood security recipients indicates that the program positively affected the 
employment of the basic livelihood security recipients. Almost all of the participants 
finished the program and around 40% were employed, and the employment 
retention rate shows that when employed, around half of them succeeded in 
maintaining their jobs.
Hope Ribbon Project
The Hope Ribbon Project was implemented also to promote employment and 
help establish start-ups for low-income groups. The Ministry of Health and Welfare 
runs and supervises the project. It provides welfare services at an individual level. 
Participants of the Hope Ribbon Project are mainly those under or near the poverty 
line. The project also covers dropouts from the Successful Employment Package 
Program, those who are excluded from conditional recipients, and homeless people. 
The Hope Ribbon Project is also linked to the Learning Card System (Korea Research 
Institute for Vocational Education and Training, 2014).
<Table 2-18> “Hope Ribbon Project” Participants
Source: Ministry of Health and Welfare (2014).
(Unit: Number of people, %)
Year
Recipients Near 
poverty 
line
Total
General
recipients
Self-
support
Conditional
recipients Subtotal
2009
398
(19.9)
12
(0.6)
1,137
(56.9)
1,547
(77.3)
453
(22.7)
2,000
2010
982
(30.1)
25
(0.8)
2,599
(79.7)
2,599
(79.7)
661
(20.3)
3,261
2011
1,882
(43)
42
(1)
3,518
(80.4)
3,518
(80.4)
858
(19.6)
4,376
2012
1,477
(35.9)
51
(1.2)
3,492
(84.8)
3,492
(84.8)
624
(15.2)
4,116
2013
2,410
(24)
96
(1)
8,620
(85.7)
8,620
(85.7)
1,434
(14.3)
10,054
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As we can see in <Table 2-18>, the number of Hope Ribbon Project recipients 
is increasing. The number of participants in total has increased dramatically from 
2012 to 2013. The number of those who fall in the near-poverty category in the 
project has increased. However, their ratio remains around 15%. Among the project 
recipients, a majority are conditional recipients.
The performance of the Hope Ribbon Project shows that the employment rate 
among its participants has increased since 2011, up to 50%, but decreased to 40% 
in 2012. When employed, more than half of the employed maintain their jobs for 
longer than six months. The number of people who were able to stop receiving 
benefits reached its peak in 2011, up to 18.7%, and decreased to 12.7% in 2012.
As we can see from <Table 2-20>, many advanced countries reformed their 
welfare system for the vulnerable groups to give enough incentives to engage in 
the labor market actively. The USA, for example, started the earned income tax 
credit(EITC) program in 1993 to motivate welfare recipients to take part in active 
job searching and training programs.
<Table 2-19> “Hope Ribbon Project” Performance (based on institutions’ beneficiaries)
Source: Ministry of Health and Welfare  (2014).
(Unit: Number of people, %)
Year Number of personnel
Employment and 
start-up
(1st level)
Employment 
retention for 
more than 6 
months
(2nd level)
Exit from 
beneficiary
(3rd level)
2009 2,000
636
(31.8)
329
(51.7)
181
(9.1)
2010 3,261
1,427
(43.8)
844
(59.1)
592
(18.2)
2011 4,376
2,195
(50.2)
1,317
(60)
820
(18.7)
2012 4,116
1,772
(40.5)
933
(52.7)
555
(12.7)
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Like Hungary, one of the challenging issues in the Korean labor market is the 
low labor-participation rate of the female workforce. The employment rate of the 
female workforce in Korea was 53.6% as of 2013, and it fell in the lowest group 
among OECD countries. In order to promote the female employment rate, the 
Korean government recently launched several programs. The Act on the Promotion 
of the Economic Activities of Career-Break Women was enacted for this purpose. 
The goal of this Act is to contribute to women's economic self-reliance and self-
realization and the sustainable development of the national economy by promoting 
the economic activities of career-break women, etc. Through implementing such 
policies as maternity leave, family care leave, paternity leave, as well as through 
supporting daycare centers within firms and founding more public daycare centers, 
the Act helps women maintain their family lives and careers at the same time. It 
particularly protects young women, pregnant women, and new mothers through 
maternity leave, period leave, miscarriage leave, etc., and supports the job stability 
of these women by paying incentives to the firms that hire temporary workers 
to substitute for the women on maternity leave and other related leaves. It also 
<Table 2-20> Vocational Training for the Vulnerable Groups in Four Countries
Countries Programs
USA
•  Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act promotes a workfare 
system based on the Financial Work Incentive Program.
•  EITC was introduced in 1993.
•  Recipients can receive benefits for a maximum of five years to prevent 
vulnerable groups from being dependent on the welfare system.
•  Standardized policy union focused on working poor has been 
established.
•  Integration of Affirmative Labor Market Program and financial 
incentive.
France
•  Revenue de Solidarite Active was introduced in 2009. 
•  It integrated former work-poor income security.
•  It switched from an employment-based program to a job-placement 
program through short-term job counseling.
Germany
• In 2004, Hartz Ⅳ Innovation lead to an overall amendment of the 
working poor support program.
•  The public assistance program was reformed.
•  •  Basic income security for job seekers: “Grundsicherung fur 
Arbeitsuchende” for the vulnerable groups was detached.
•  It enhanced the short-term job-placement program for those who are 
employable.
UK
•  In 2013, Universal Credit System was introduced.
•  It reinforces the financial incentive system for the vulnerable groups, 
e.g., Working Families Tax Credit. 
•  It provides income tax deduction for the employed households.
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promotes equality between the sexes by legally prohibiting discrimination and 
sexual harassment in the workplace.
In order to promote women’s employment and job stability, the Korean 
government also supports the firms that build or renovate women-friendly facilities 
such as breastfeeding rooms, changing rooms, lounges, dorms, shower facilities, and 
bathrooms by paying for the construction and management of these facilities.
The Korean government set up the Center for Career-Break Women in 2009. This 
center provides individual and group counseling, vocational training, an internship 
program, and job placement for women who took a career break after pregnancy, 
childrearing, or caring for family members. The group counseling also focuses 
on confidence building and life planning in addition to career counseling. After 
the individual career counseling, the participants are regrouped into “immediate 
jobseekers,” “participants of group counseling,” and “those in need of vocational 
training.” Through its system, the center supports women who want to restart their 
careers and promotes the employment of women. <Table 2-21> shows the trend in 
the numbers of group-counseling participants, which is one of the programs offered 
in the center. The numbers of participants have increased substantially since the 
program was launched.
<Table 2-21> Performance of Group Counseling in the Center for Career-Break Women
Source: Ministry of Employment and Labor (2014a).
Year Number of participants
Number of 
graduates
Number of 
employed
Employment 
rate
2009 11,258 10,955 4,574 41.8%
2010 17,482 16,992 6,594 38.8%
2011 19,851 19,348 5,196 26.9%
2012 20,739 20,362 5,245 25.8%
2013 24,429 23,991 4,765 19.8%
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10. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
The main task of this part of the Hungary KSP is to shed light on a direction for 
the reform of the Hungarian public employment and vocational training system 
for effective use of human resources by analyzing Korea’s experience. This chapter 
started with an analysis of the historical and institutional aspects of the Hungarian 
labor market structure. Specifically, the recent development of the Hungarian public 
employment service and skill-development system was analyzed along with the 
challenges that the Hungarian labor market faces nowadays. From the numerous 
analytical results drawn from this chapter, the policy suggestions for reforming the 
Hungarian active labor market programs are summarized as follows.
First, it seems that the most important part of all the successful active labor 
market programs is a reliable funding system. Even though the Hungarian 
government has recently tried to implement various active labor market measures 
to improve their labor market conditions, they still face many challenges in 
implementing further labor market reforms due to the lack of a sustainable funding 
source. Factors such as low employability, a high youth unemployment rate, and 
a significant gender gap in employment are the most serious challenges. The lack 
of a sustainable funding system for active labor market programs such as public 
employment service and skill-development programs corroborate these difficulties. 
In order to implement a reform to revitalize the labor market, which eventually 
can lead to a higher employment rate for the youth, women, and other vulnerable 
groups that generally stay unemployed long term, the Hungarian government 
should set up a sustainable funding system. Korea’s experience during the financial 
crisis clearly showed that the existence of a reliable funding system could make a 
huge difference in carrying out active labor market policies in a timely manner. 
The Hungarian government can significantly boost and develop its successful active 
labor market programs by considering these reforms in Korea.
Second, the effectiveness of ALPMs is directly affected by the timing of the 
implementation of such programs. As we observe from the Korean cases during 
the 1997 financial crisis, active labor market programs have larger impacts when 
implemented during times when economies suffer higher unemployment rates 
due to economic crisis or slow economic growth. Labor market conditions make 
a difference in the relative efficacy of the corresponding active labor market 
programs. It is noteworthy that the Korean public employment service and 
vocational training programs along with the other active labor market measures 
were considerably reorganized and expanded to deal with the imminent massive 
unemployment that would follow the 1997 Asian financial crisis hitting the country. 
The prompt and extensive responses by the Korean government were all possible, 
thanks to the timely introduction of the Employment Insurance System in 1995. With 
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the EIS funding, the Korean government not only provides unemployment benefits 
but also expands public employment service, public work programs, and other job 
training programs to help the unemployed find new jobs. Unlike unemployment 
insurance systems in many developed and developing countries, the Korean 
EIS was implemented as a comprehensive system by covering the employment 
stabilization program, the vocational competency development program, and the 
unemployment benefit program. The timing of the comprehensive EIS introduction 
immediately before the 1997 Asian financial crisis was a critical factor in its success 
in dealing with the threat of possible massive unemployment.
Third, all the services for job search assistance and vocational training programs 
provided by government agencies and private sectors should be easily accessible so 
that participants can be encouraged along the process of the program they choose 
to take. Many advanced countries including Korea offer comprehensive and user-
friendly public employment services and skill-development programs that are linked 
to the welfare system. As we saw from Korea’s experience, the one-stop-service 
system for employment and vocational training expanded to include nontraditional 
welfare services such as credit recovery counseling as well as a welfare counseling 
service. It is also crucial that the public employment and vocational training 
service provide services for employers. Like most developed countries, the Korean 
government also provides subsidies and information services for employers with its 
public employment service and job training service system.
With help from recent developments in information technology, many countries 
have tried to make their public employment service and vocational training service 
user friendly by setting up an online-based service system. Systems such as Korea’s 
Work-Net and HRD-Net are good examples that the Hungarian government can 
consider when setting up a similar system of easily accessible online services. With 
these online-based service systems, people can access the service easily and timely, 
thus, enabling them to acquire potential jobs successfully.
In addition, individually focused comprehensive services including public 
employment, vocational training, and welfare can be easily available through the 
online-based system because it is possible to compile all the relevant individual data 
without a huge effort and cost. Amongst the various services available through 
such online-based systems, the most common services are personalized information 
relating to online job applications, and human resources management and 
recruitment-supporting services such as applicant selection and recommendation 
aid for suitable vocational training programs. In Korea, intranet and Internet 
services are not only locating recruiters but also offering various services relating 
to youth work experience and social service jobs. There are also group-counseling 
services such as achievement programs, youth vocational-guidance programs, and 
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job-seeking programs. The accessibility of information and data relevant to these 
programs is substantiated by the use of efficient online resources.
Fourth, many advanced countries work closely with private sectors for job 
assistance programs and vocational training programs, as we saw in Korea’s 
experience. Government programs are complemented by NGOs (nongovernment 
organizations) and other private sectors in Korea. Employment services become 
more accessible and diversified by maintaining a close partnership with private 
sectors. The relative efficacy of these programs depends on whether or not 
government agencies can maintain these well-established partnerships with said 
NGOs. Private sectors and nongovernment institutions increase the productivities 
of these programs by offering competition, flexibility, as well as monitoring 
roles. Training programs in Korea have rapidly expanded since the financial crisis. 
Obviously, some difficulties and problems accompanied such rapid expansion. 
The expedited growth and expansion of the programs can easily result in the 
deterioration of quality. Close collaboration with private sectors, especially 
business sectors, can offer a good solution for such problems and difficulties. Such 
collaboration can contribute to enhancing program design and the program’s 
delivery system. The approach of private sectors is more market oriented and, thus, 
can eliminate unnecessary red tape that is more common in public programs. The 
Hungarian government also recognized the importance of the private sector’s 
involvement for the efficacy of vocational training programs and recently set up 
programs by expanding the private sector’s involvement. It is crucial to maintain 
such involvement to ensure the success and efficacy of the job assistance and 
vocational training programs.
Fifth, targeted group approaches in public employment service and vocational 
training service can be very effective to reduce long-term unemployment. According 
to a recent comprehensive study on effectiveness of ALMPs in many different 
countries, there is a significant difference in the impact of ALMPs across groups. The 
impact on females and participants from long-term unemployed such as the less 
educated is larger, and we tend to find smaller effects for older workers and youth. 
Additionally, there is much evidence that suggests that certain types of programs 
work more efficiently for specific groups. For instance, the job assistance programs 
seem to be more successful for disadvantaged groups, whereas training and private 
sector employment subsidies tend to work for those who have been in a long-term 
unemployed status (Card et al., 2015),so it is highly suggested to provide active labor 
market programs for targeted groups.
In order to improve the employability of vulnerable groups, the Korean 
government launched two programs that offer comprehensive services combining 
vocational training and welfare programs: the Successful Employment Package 
Chapter  2 _Public Employment and Vocational Training System for Effective Use of Human Resources • 143
Program and the Hope Ribbon Project. These two programs have positively affected 
the employment of vulnerable groups. These programs seem to provide some 
significant implications for the Hungarian government’s labor market reform, since 
Hungary also suffers from low employment and lack of skills among the vulnerable 
groups. Making sure to use such targeted group approaches has been essential in 
maintaining the efficiency of the ALMPs.
Finally, any labor market reforms in public employment service and skill-
development programs cannot be successful if the government (or markets, 
if applicable) neglects the following areas: First, systematic assessment and 
monitoring of the existing labor market program implementation to evaluate their 
effectiveness. Second, consistent collection and release of data and information 
of labor market trends and forecasts to reduce mismatch in the labor market. 
Third, maintaining closer links to connected policies by different government 
organizations and agencies.
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Summary
This report examines the global megatrends that are fast approaching, and we 
begin by reviewing the automotive industry megatrends that respond to the global 
megatrends. Based on this review, we will see future population growth mainly in 
developing nations, economic power will shift towards Asia, and we will witness 
rapid growth in technological improvements and climate change. Consequently, the 
automotive industry will also transition from developed-nation-specific consumption 
and developing-nation-specific production patterns to production and consumption 
mainly by developing nations. Furthermore, the trends in population growth and 
aging will lead to the use of small and smart automobiles. More important, the 
constraints of fossil fuels and climate change will result in a rapid transition for the 
automotive industry, from traditional fossil-fuel-based automobiles to ecofriendly 
automobiles such as electric and hydrogen vehicles.
Based on these global megatrends, this report analyzes and compares Korea’s 
future industry growth policies to Hungary’s policies that aim to increase its share 
of manufacturing through its reindustrialization plan. Through this process, this 
report reviews and compares the industrialization strategies of both countries and 
identifies their policy implications. Additionally, considering the future ecofriendly 
automobile industry as a specific industry, this report investigates Korea’s policies 
to promote their production and supply. The goal is to recognize the importance 
of the automotive industry’s role in the Hungarian manufacturing sector, to review 
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and compare the policies that the Hungarian government wants to promote in 
order to produce and increase the consumption of electric vehicles, and to find 
relevant policy implications. In particular, upon the Hungarian government’s 
request, this report investigates the policies for promoting the supply of ecofriendly 
vehicles, such as those promoted by the local governments of Seoul and Jeju.
In the following, we summarize the policy implications of Korea and Hungary’s 
industrial policies and compare the policies for the ecofriendly automotive 
industries.
It is important to understand how the two countries face different economic 
environments when implementing new growth-driven industry policies. Until the 
1980s, one of the significant ways that Korea achieved rapid economic growth was 
through government-led export promotion policies combined with very strong 
domestic protection. However, it is difficult for Hungary to adopt the government-
led industrial policies that Korea did. This is because Korea used the industrial 
policies when it was less exposed to international pressures. Hence, Korea was 
able to use its independent export-expansion policies as well as promote import-
restricting policies to protect domestic corporations and markets.
In Hungary's case, however, its EU membership prevents it from using similar 
independent industrial policies. It is difficult for Hungary to implement government-
led strategic industrial policies. This is because Hungary, as an EU member, 
should follow the EU’s policy direction. Therefore, various industrial policies that 
contributed to Korea's economic growth cannot be applied to Hungary. For that 
reason, it is necessary to share with caution policy suggestions in order to apply 
them to Hungary.
There are several policy recommendations that are based on the comparative 
studies of new growth-driven industry policies and ecofriendly automotive industry 
strategies.
First, we recommend maximizing the linkage effects in the automotive 
industries by combining the policies of the automotive and parts industries. In the 
automotive industry sectors, there are four multinational companies with domestic 
SMEs. Therefore, it is necessary to attract more SMEs that are global to provide 
components to multinationals located in Hungary and export them to international 
partners. Then, it is necessary to implement policies to promote the international 
competitiveness of domestic component companies and increase component 
exports.
Second, we recommend establishing policy strategies on how to combine the 
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German model with the East Asian model for Hungary’s development process. 
Hungary is in a distinct environment in which it cannot use infant industry 
protection policies as Korea did. Therefore, Hungary needs to implement an 
appropriate policy for its automobile industry based on the German model and the 
East Asian model. The strategic partnership programs that started in 2012 might be 
expanded.
Third, we recommend implementing policies to develop high-quality human 
resources. Because of the lack of sufficient financial resources, it is difficult 
to promote high-quality human resources via direct government investment. 
Collaboration is suggested between universities and companies, such as national 
research institutes like KIST and the automotive contract department between 
academia and automotive companies.
Fourth, investing more aggressively in ecofriendly automobile production is 
necessary. However, we do not recommend initiating automobile production 
directly, with the exception of buses, which Hungary already produces. Since there 
are four multinational automobile companies, it will be useful to attract global 
SMEs that will provide components to the multinational enterprises located in 
Hungary and then export their products to the international markets.
Finally, ecofriendly automobile consumption promotion policies should be 
implemented more extensively. The strategies in the E-mobility Plan include mainly 
dissemination promotion plans without significant financial support. The plan’s tax 
incentives might not be enough to cover the price difference between fossil-fuel 
cars and ecofriendly cars.
1. Introduction
The global megatrends suggested by PWC(2014) and KPMG(2014) include a rapid 
population growth rate in developing countries, economic power shift to emerging 
economies, urbanization, climate change, and technological breakthroughs. The 
global megatrends will affect future automotive industries.24)
Following the megatrends in general, POSRI(2013) lists three global megatrends 
in the automotive industry. It indicates that there will be no significant change in 
engine and steel material technologies, while several of the megatrends described 
will affect automobile industries in the following three ways.
24) A detailed explanation of the global megatrends is given in the Appendix.
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First, the main consumption and production structure will change from 
production by emerging economies and consumption by developed countries to 
production and consumption by emerging economies, especially China. By 2025, 
emerging economies will account for more than 50% of automobile sales. The 
four countries of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) will be about 45%. 
Second, due to climate change and, thus, strengthened environment regulation, 
governments will encourage greener car production. Finally, through aging and 
urbanization, automobile consumption patterns will shift to small and smart cars 
and further personal mobility vehicles, which are specialized for short-distance 
travel (POSRI, 2013, pp.2–3).
Following the global megatrends, Hungary has tried to reindustrialize the 
economy through new industrial policies. These policies are strongly connected 
with the EU’s reindustrializing policy, with targets to increase the industry share to 
20% by 2020 (European Commission, 2014). Based on this EU target, each member 
country established its own target for the industry share as well as industrial 
policies. Hungary’s target is to increase the industry share from 23% in 2014 to 
30% by 2020. One of the main target industries of the reindustrialization strategy 
is the automobile sector, which accounts for 18% of Hungary’s total exports (Nagy, 
2015a). 
The main objective of this report is to investigate how the Korean government 
established its new growth-driven industry policies. In detail, Hungary wants to 
know how Korea planned and implemented the policies on ecofriendly automobiles. 
For this purpose, the report introduces Korea’s new growth-driven industry policies 
and then selects the automotive industry as a specific target industry, which is also 
one of the key growth-driven industries in Korea and Hungary.
Considering the stage of Hungary’s economic development, we examine Korea’s 
industrial policies after the 1990s,especially the automotive industrial policy, which 
is required by the Hungarian government. For the automotive industry policy, it is 
necessary to explore production promotion policies as well as demand promotion 
policies. With respect to the production side, Hungary faces a quite different 
business environment from Korea’s, so it is critically important to realize this 
difference and recommend feasible policies.
However, Hungary should use caution in applying the lessons from Korea’s 
experiences directly, because the economic situations of the two countries are 
different. Korea established industry policies to protect the domestic market 
to allow domestic companies to obtain international competitiveness in the 
automotive industry. The government of Korea protected its automotive and 
components production through high tariffs and import restrictions. As an EU 
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member, however, Hungary cannot establish a policy that is fully independent of 
EU policies. Thus, the economic environment that Hungary faces is different from 
that of Korea, which had relatively autonomous industrial strategies.
This report consists of the following content. First, Korea’s new growth-driven 
industry policies since the 1990s are reviewed, and then we examine the automotive 
industrial policies that reflect Korea’s development experiences. Among the 
automotive industry policies, our focus is on ecofriendly automotive policies. Finally, 
we review Jeju and Seoul’s practical policies on the promotion of ecofriendly 
automobiles.
2. New Growth-Driven Industry Policies
2.1. New Growth-Driven Industry Policies in Korea
It is well known that Korea’s rapid economic growth was achieved by the seven 
five-year economic plans, which continued until 1996.25) However, as the income per 
capita increased, and, thus, the competitive power of the private sector improved, 
traditional macro-level economic planning was not effective any longer. Although 
direct government intervention controlled the private sectors, the interventions 
had limited effect on the private sector, and, therefore, the government could 
not achieve its objectives. Thus, the government began establishing industry-level 
planning called “new growth-driven industry policies” even though specific names 
varied over time.
Beginning in the 1990s, the Korean government began establishing industry-
specific policies rather than the macro-level economic plans, which formally ended 
by 1996. This reflects a paradigm shift in economic development from a traditional 
government-led to a market-led development strategy. This shift was reflected 
by the government visions proclaimed by the respective government regimes, the 
Knowledge Economy (1998–2003), the Innovation Economy (2003–2008), Green 
Growth (2008–2013), and the Creative Economy (2013–present) (Kang, 2014).
The new growth-driven industry policies explained later were quite consistent 
with the government vision over the period, and, further, the industries selected 
by each government mostly overlapped with the industries selected by later 
governments. For example, many industries included in the promotion policy of 
new growth-driven industries (2009–2013)were linked with climate-change-related 
25) See Kim and Koh (2010) for a more detailed explanation of Korea’s economic planning.
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industries, which reflected the green growth vision. <Table 3-1> summarizes the 
government’s visions and its major targets.
Reflecting different government visions, each government selected its own 
targeted industries and invested significant amounts of government funds. Namely, 
there were the Leading Technology Development Project (1992–2002), Development 
Strategy for New-Generation Growth-Driven Industries (1997–2002), Promotion of 
Next-Generation Growth-Driven Industries (2003–2007), Promotion of New Growth-
Driven Industries (2009–2013), and Future Growth-Driven Industries (2013–present) 
(Kang, 2014, p.29). <Table 3-2> summarizes the major target sectors under each 
new growth-driven industry policy.
As <Table 3-2> indicates, even though different governments had different 
policy strategies and, therefore, different policy titles, many industries were selected 
quite consistently. For example, there are next-generation cars with different 
names, ITC-related industries, alternative-energy-related industries, and frontier-
technology industries such as biomaterials, nanotechnologies, etc.
<Table 3-1> Overview of Government Vision and Its Major Targets
Source: Kang (2014), p.15.
Period Vision Major targets
1998–
2003 
Knowledge 
Economy
•  Economic reforms: deregulation, institutional transparency, 
protection of intellectual and intangible assets
•  Venture capital: IT boom, KOSDAQ market cap jumps from 
KRW 5.6 trillion (mid-1998) to KRW 45.6 trillion (end1999)
2003–
2008 
Innovation 
Economy 
•  Government innovation: transparent and efficient 
government through e-government services to better serve 
the public
2008–
2013 
Green 
Growth
•  Sustainable growth: reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
and environmental pollution while creating new growth-
driven industries and job opportunities by using green 
technologies and clean energy 
2013–
present 
Creative 
Economy
•  Creative industries: incorporate imagination and creativity 
with science, technology, and ICT to create new industries 
and markets through the nurturing of an entrepreneurial 
culture
154 • 2014/15 Knowledge Sharing Program with Hungary
2.1.1. Leading Technology Development Project
The Leading Technology Development Project (1992–2002), also called the G7 
Project, aimed to become seventh in the global science and technology ranking 
by the 2000s (Kang, 2014, p.29). This was the first new industry project. The 
government intended to achieve the following three objectives through the project: 
(1) improve economic and social development and quality of life, (2) prepare 
technological coping mechanisms for the global environment agendas, and (3) 
achieve international competitiveness and self-confidence (Kang, 2014, p.30).
The project consisted of 18 industries and the development of two technologies: 
product technology development and base technology development (see <Table 
3-3>). The former promoted key industries as growth-driven industries, and the 
latter improved the quality of life. The former included high-tech-related industries 
such as high-definition TV(HDTV), integrated service digital network(ISDN), and 
medical industries such as new drugs, new pesticides, medical engineering, sub-
miniature precise machinery, etc. The latter included base-technology-related 
fields such as semiconductors, nuclear reactors, new functional biomaterials, 
environmental engineering, etc.
<Table 3-2> Overview of New Growth-Driven Industry Policies
Source: Kang (2014), p.27.
Period Policy Major targets
1992–
2002 
L e a d i n g  T e c h n o l o g y 
Development Project (G7 
Project) 
New-energy technology, environmental 
technology, next-generation cars, etc.
1997–
2002 
Development Strategy for 
New-Generation Growth-
Driven Industries 
Biotechnology, nano, environment, culture, 
space
2003–
2007 
P r o m o t i o n  o f  N e x t -
Generation Growth-Driven 
Industries 
Fu tu r e  au tomob i l e s ,  i n fo rma t i on 
technology (IT), and next-generation mobile 
communications
2009–
2013 
Promotion of New Growth-
Driven Industries
Three sectors and 17 new growth-driven 
industries [green technology (six), high-tech 
convergence (six), and value-added service 
(five)]
2014
Future  Growth-Dr i ven 
Industries 
Nine strategic industries and four base 
industries
Smart cars, Internet of Things(IoT), big data, 
etc. 
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As a leading technology development project, the G7 Project invested about 
KRW 3.61 trillion (about USD 3.64 billion) for ten years, which included about KRW 
1.60 trillion (about USD 1.61 billion) of public funds and KRW 2.01 trillion of private 
funds (about USD 2.02 billion) (Central Officials Training Institute, 2006, p.20). 
<Table 3-4> shows the annual trends in the project’s investment plan from 1992 to 
2001.
<Table 3-3> Product and Base Technology Development in the G7 Project
<Table 3-4> Investment Plan for the Leading Technology Development Project
Source: Kang (2014), p.31.
Note:  The conversion from KRW to USD uses an exchange rate of 818.96 for 1992–1997, 1401.44, 1188.81, 
1130.96, and 1290.99 for 1998 to 2001, respectively, and 992.60 for the total, which is the annual 
average exchange rate for the period between 1992 and 2001.
Source:  Central Officials Training Institute (2006), p.20; World Bank website (http://databank.worldbank.org/
data/views/variableselection/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-indicators#), retrieved on 
April 19, 2014.
Product technology development Base-technology development
• HDTV
• New drugs, new pesticides
• Application-specific integrated circuits
• Next-generation flat-panel displays
• Broadband (ISDN)
• Medical engineering
• Sub-miniature precise machinery 
• Next-generation cars
• High-speed rail
• Next-generation semiconductors
• Next-generation nuclear reactors
•  Advanced materials for information, 
electronics, and energy
• New functional biomaterials
•  Development of advanced 
superconducting Tokamak
•  Advanced manufacturing systems
• Human sensibility ergonomics
• Environment engineering
• New energy
Year 1992–1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total
Public
8,742 
(1.07)
2,110 
(0.15)
1,873 
(0.16)
1,771 
(0.16)
1,512 
(0.12)
16,008 
(1.61)
Private
11,590 
(1.42)
2,991 
(0.21)
2,325 
(0.20)
1,979 
(0.17)
1,196 
(0.09)
20,081 
(2.02)
Total
20,332 
(2.48)
5,101 
(0.36)
4,198 
(0.35)
3,750 
(0.33)
2,708 
(0.21)
36,089 
(3.64)
(Unit: KRW 100 million (USD billion))
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2.1.2. 10 Next-Generation Growth-Driven Industries
The 10 Next-Generation Growth-Driven Industries (2003-2007) aimed to achieve 
USD 20,000 of per capita income and expansion of future growth potential (Kang, 
2014, p.32). The plan selected core strategic products and technologies in ten 
strategic industries <Table 3-5>. This strategy included various new-generation 
technology-related industries: digital TV/broadcasting, displays, intelligent robots, 
future automobiles, and next-generation semiconductors. Even though the strategy 
name was changed, the detailed industry fields were quite consistent, for example, 
in semiconductors, next-generation automobiles, digital industry, biomedicine, etc.
<Table 3-5> Development Strategy for Next-Generation Growth-Driven Industries (2003–2007)
Source: Kang (2014), p.33
Industries Core strategic technologies and products
Digital TV and 
broadcasting
Broadcast systems, DTVs, DMBs, set-top boxes, and combination 
devices
Displays LCD, LED, PDP, OLED, 3D, e-paper, and related materials
Intelligent robots 
Domestic service robots,  IT-based service robots, robots 
for hostile environments, medical service robots, artificial 
intelligence, and related core technologies
Future automobiles 
Intelligent cars, ecofriendly cars, and intelligent transport 
systems
Next-generation 
semiconductors 
Next-generation memories, SoC, nanoelectronics, and related 
materials
Next-generation 
mobile communication 
4G mobile and systems, telematics, signal processing and analysis 
technologies, and all-optical communication technologies
Intelligent home 
networks
Home servers/home gateways, home networking, intelligent 
information appliances, and ubiquitous computing
Digital content and SW 
solutions
Production, digital content utilization and distribution systems, 
cultural content,  embedded  SW,  intelligent total logistic 
services, and GIS/GPS technologies
Next-generation 
batteries
Secondary batteries, fuel cells, hydrogen energy, and related 
materials
New biomedicines and 
organs
New medicines, bio-organs (cloning, transplants), biochips, 
medical  image  diagnosis devices, medical devices for the 
elderly, elderly disease treatment and brain function, immune 
function control, intelligent drug delivery systems, gene 
therapies, and development of new varieties of seeds and useful 
proteins using genes
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In the government’s total research and development budget, the share is low for 
research and development related to next-generation growth-driven industries. In 
2005, it was KRW 397.7 billion, which was 6% of the total government budget of 
KRW 6.7 trillion taking into account the special accounting for 2005.
In 2005, the government invested KRW 29.4 billion, 4.2% of the government 
budget of KRW 704.6 billion, in the biotechnology field. In 2004, KRW 28.4 
billion, 4.7% of the government budget of KRW 530.2 billion, was allocated to 
the new biomedicines and organ industry. As shown above, even though the new 
biomedicines and organs industry requires huge support from the government, 
unlike other next-generation growth-driven industries, the investment is not too 
different from the investment of privately led industries (Choi et al., 2005, p.190).
To promote next-generation growth-driven industries that center on new 
technologies that currently have no markets, it is very important for the government 
to propose a vision regarding future industry developments and effectively convey 
policies that actively cultivate next-generation growth-driven industries and become 
a vision adopted by private fields and markets. To develop certain industries into 
leaders of economic growth and, in turn, into growth-driven industries, resources 
and capabilities throughout society, including human resources, financial resources, 
and social systems, must be concentrated (Choi et al., 2005, p.190).Therefore, a low 
budget for a next-generation growth-driven industry is insufficient to create policies 
that will mobilize the private sector resources and capabilities (Choi et al., 2005, 
p.190).
2.1.3. New Growth-Driven Industry Comprehensive Promotion Plan
The New Growth-Driven Industry Comprehensive Promotion Plan (2009–2013) 
reflected a development paradigm shift from the traditional fossil-fuel-based 
strategies to low-carbon, green growth strategies (Kang, 2012, p.158; 2014, p.17). 
Confronting the risk of natural resource constraint and climate change, the Korean 
government initiated “low-carbon, green growth” policies in 2008, which aimed 
to decrease greenhouse gas emissions by sustaining economic growth (Kang, 2012, 
p.158).
This strategy consisted of 17 new growth-driven industries in three sectors: 
green technology industry, high-tech fusion industry, and high-value-added service 
industry (see <Table 3-6>).
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According to the New Growth-Driven Industry Comprehensive Promotion Plan 
(2009–2013) announced in May 2009 by the Ministry of Knowledge Economy, the 
government decided to invest KRW 24.5 trillion (based on government expenditures, 
temporarily) for five years (2009–2013) in 17 new growth-driven industries in three 
fields (see <Table 3-7>).It was expected that KRW 14.1 trillion would be spent on 
R&D and KRW 10.4 trillion on non-R&D (financial industries, system improvements, 
market creation, etc.).During the next five years, KRW 2.1 trillion will be spent on 
human resource training and KRW 6.0 trillion on small and medium-sized enterprise 
support for functional support methods.
<Table 3-6> Promotion Policies of New Growth-Driven Industry Comprehensive Plan (2009–2013)
Source: Kang (2012), p. 159; Kang (2014), p. 37.
Sectors New growth-driven industries
Green technology industry
New renewable energy, low-carbon energy, water 
technology (advanced water treatment), LED applications, 
green transport systems, high-tech green cities
High-tech fusion industry
Media communication fusion, IT fusion systems,  robot 
applications, new materials and nanofusion, biomedicine 
and medical devices, high-value-added food industry
High-value-added service 
industry
Global health care, global education services 
green financing, content and software, MICE, and tourism 
<Table 3-7> Investment Plan for New Growth-Driven Industry Comprehensive Plan (2009–2013)
Source: Ministry of Education and Science Technology (2009), p.1.
Category Green technology
Cutting–edge 
converging 
industry
High-value-added 
service industry Total
Number of projects 79 62 59 200
Budget 
R&D 3.7 8.8 1.6 14.1
Non-R&D 3.0 3.4 3.9 10.4
Sub-total 6.7 12.2 5.5 24.5
(Unit: KRW trillion)
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2.1.4. Future Growth-Driven Industry Plan
The Future Growth-Driven Industry Plan (2014)established its strategy by dividing 
the industries into the strategic industry, which can establish an independent large-
scale industry environment of specific products and services, and the infrastructure 
industry, which can generate significant synergistic effects through convergence. 
The nine strategic industries are divided into four sectors: (1) the major industry 
(smart cars, 5G mobile communication, deep-sea offshore plants), (2) the future new 
industry (intelligent robots, wearable smart devices, tangible content), (3) the public 
welfare industry (customized wellness care, disaster safety management smart 
systems, renewable energy hybrid systems), and (4) the base industries(intelligent 
semiconductors, convergence materials, intelligent IoT, and big data). <Table 3-8> 
summarizes the plan’s main industries.
The budget for the new industry and market creation was allotted from the 
2015 government budget. The following budgets are allocated for promoting the 
Smart Challenge Project, which commercializes and applies fully developed ICT 
technology to existing industries (new, KRW 38.7 billion):(1)establish, apply, and 
demonstrate a new energy supply model by testing the Fusion of New Renewable 
Energy and Energy Storage System in island areas (KRW 8.0 billion), (2) support 
for creating world-class products by developing new biomedicines such as next-
generation medical equipment and stem-cell medicine (new, KRW 26.6 billion), and 
(3) increased discovery and support for business models in new Internet industry 
fields with high growth potential such as the Internet of Things (KRW 31.1 billion) 
(Ministry of Strategy and Finance, 2015, pp.70–71).
In 2015, in order to promote the implementation plan for new growth-driven 
industries effectively, the plan to connect the budgeting for the National Research 
<Table 3-8> Summary of Future Growth-Driven Industry Plan
Source: Joint Work of Related Ministries(2014), pp. 2–3.
Sector Industries
Major industries Smart cars, 5G mobile communications, deep-sea offshore plants
Future new 
industries 
Intelligent robots, wearable smart instruments, tangible content
Public welfare 
industries 
Customized wellness care, disaster safety management smart systems, 
renewable hybrid systems
Base industries 
(platform) 
Intelligent semiconductors, convergence materials, intelligent IoT, big 
data
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and Development Projects with the implementation plan was announced. For this 
purpose, in April 2014, new growth-driven industries were selected for targeted 
investment in the “2015 Investment Direction and Standards for National Research 
and Development” (Joint Work of Related Ministries, 2014, p.16).
2.2. Revival of Industrial Policies in Hungary26)
Reindustrialization by increasing the share of manufacturing from 23% in 
2014 to 30% by 2020 was a key agenda item of the new Hungarian government 
beginning in April 2014 (Nagy, 2015a, p.1). This policy is quite consistent with the 
reindustrializing Europe agenda by the European Commission, called the A Europe 
Initiative (European Commission, 2014).
Through reindustrialization, the government intends to achieve the following six 
targets:
1) Job creation through an increase in the employment ratio
2) Innovation through higher-value-added production and education
3) Sustainability through long-term economic growth
4)  Energy-effective production through decreasing the long-term costs of 
production
5) Regional equalization through support of the less-developed regions
6)  Export orientation through increasing export production and growing 
competitiveness of SMEs
The government selected several major industries as the center of the 
reindustrialization process: automotive industry, electronic industry, health industry, 
logistics, food industry, and tourism.
1)  The automotive industry is a core industry that generated almost 18% of total 
exports in 2014, and total production increased 20% compared to 2013.
2)  The electronic industry is one of the largest industrial sectors, accounting for 
22% of total manufacturing production in 2014.
3)  The food processing industry remains one of the most important sectors by 
employing 147,000 people in 2014, and it is the second largest producing 
sector with 10% of total production and generating 6% of total exports.
4)  The pharmaceutical industry is one of the most efficient and successful sectors 
in Hungary employing more than 14,000 people, and it had 3% production 
growth in 2014 compared to 2013.
26) This section is mainly based on Nagy (2015a; 2015c).
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In order to revive industrial sectors, Lux (2015, p.16) suggests the combination 
of two representative policy strategies: the German model and the East Asian 
Model. The German model is a multinational enterprise-based model, where a 
host country provides skilled labor. Through linkage effects between multinational 
and local companies, the host country achieves strong export performance with 
a budget surplus. However, the East Asian model, also called the developmental 
state model, is based on strong government intervention in industrial development 
with industry-friendly fundamentals, investment in skilled labor, foreign direct 
investment, and a domestic enterprise network.
In addition, Lux (2015, p.17) suggests industry-friendly structural reforms due 
to weak domestic capital, external dependency, and slowing FDI flows in Hungary. 
Further, he suggests additional factors for revival of industrial policies: (1) medium-
skilled jobs and activities, (2) strong upgrading in competitive branches, increasing 
factor intensity, (3) slowly emerging supplier networks, (4) a low but increasing 
number of domestic medium-sized companies, and (5) knowledge and innovation 
transfer.
As summarized in Sec. 2, Korea continued carrying out economic planning and 
new industrial policy to promote new growth-driven industries. Furthermore, the 
economic plans were successful through a combination of export promotion and 
import substitution policies.27)
3. Ecofriendly Automotive Industry Policies
3.1. Automotive Industry Policies in Korea
The automotive industry policy in Korea can be characterized by strong 
government protection and promotion policies combined with risk-taking private 
companies (Ministry of Strategy and Finance and KIET, 2014, p.15).
The government automotive policy can be summarized as follows.28) Beginning in 
the 1960s, the Korean government fostered the automotive industry as part of the 
heavy chemical industry.29) Automotive industry promotion policies can be classified 
as production promotion and consumption promotion. Production promotion 
includes government R&D investment, import protection of foreign cars and/or 
27)  See Koh (2010) for a more extensive explanation of the economic development process.
28)  See Ministry of Strategy and Finance and KIET (2014) for extensive overview of the Korean 
automotive policies since the 1960s.
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components, and export promotion of cars and/or components. Until the 1980s, in 
Korea it was well recognized that export promotion policies were combined with 
import protection of foreign cars and components. In the early 1980s, the special 
consumption taxes were continuously decreased in order to increase the demand 
for automobiles. Simultaneously, the gradual decrease in import tariffs led to 
opening the market to foreign automobiles.
The automotive policies can be categorized as automobile production 
promotion, component localization, demand promotion, and protection of the 
domestic automotive industry from foreign competitors.30)
First, the Korean government was quite eager to produce automobiles from the 
beginning of economic development in the 1960s. In the 1960s, the government 
intended to promote and protect domestic production of automobiles through 
integration, and in the 1980s, through rationalization of automobile companies. 
<Table 3-9> summarizes the main policies and their strategies.
In 1962, the government established the Automotive Industry Five-Year Plan 
with assembly production by the knockdown assembly method and produced 
the first car branded “Sibal.” In 1973 and 1974, the government established two 
production promotion plans: the Automotive Industry Promotion Plan and the 
Long-Term Automotive Industry Promotion Plan. They intended to produce and 
export automobiles that are more sophisticated beyond the knockdown type and 
to simultaneously localize component industries more. In 1975, the first Korean 
automobile model, Pony, was produced. Facing the global economic crisis and 
too much investment in the automobile industries, the government initiated 
rationalization policies in the automotive sectors. This strategy intended to lead to 
a specialized production system by structural adjustments among enterprises and 
car models. From the 2000s, the government began establishing next-generation 
cars that were followed by the global megatrend of tackling climate change, as 
discussed in the next sub-section.
29)  In 1973, the government of Korea announced that they would develop heavy chemical industries 
focusing on the steel, chemicals, nonferrous metals, machinery, shipbuilding, and electronics 
industries. Through this policy, the industrial structure significantly changed from a high ratio of 
primary industries to a high ratio of manufacturing. Through strong government intervention, 
Korea followed a market-oriented development paradigm. See Ministry of Strategy and Finance 
and Korea University (2014, p.20) for more details. Selecting the heavy chemical industry as a 
strategic sector in the beginning of economic development is one of the main characteristics of 
Korea’s economic development process, which is in contrast to the recent development plans of 
low- and medium-income countries.
30)  These four policy categories cannot be applied to Hungary as a EU member because Hungary 
cannot protect domestic companies with its own protection strategies such as tariffs. Thus, this 
report focuses on production and promotion strategies rather than specific protection through 
tariffs or enforced localization to domestic or multinational companies.
Chapter  3 _New Growth-Driven Industry Policy and Ecofriendly Automotive Industry Policy under Global Megatrends • 163
Second, the government tried maximizing automobile component localization 
through import protection and protecting domestic component industries from 
foreign capitals. Thus, the automobile and parts industries were jointly promoted 
through a combination of export promotions and import restrictions of components 
that were locally produced. In particular, the government continued to localize 
components with more domestic ownership.
The industrial policies for the automobile industry prevented the entry of foreign 
firms into the domestic market by protecting domestic automobile producers 
through export promotion and import control policies. These policies continued 
until 1987, and the import control for finished vehicles was very strong. <Table 
3-10> summarizes the various localization policies since the 1960s.31)
<Table 3-9> Selected Automotive Production Promotion Policies
Source:  Ministry of Strategy and Finance and KIET(2014), pp.20-49;Ministry of Knowledge Economy et al. 
(2010), p.1.
Year Policy Main strategies
1962
Automotive Industry Five-
Year Plan
- Assembly production
-  Comprehensive promotion plan for automotive 
industry
-  Knockdown assembly method (produced Sibal as 
a first car brand)
1973
Automotive Industry 
Promotion Plan
-  Target: produce 500,000cars in the beginning of 
the 1980s
-  Plan to significantly increase localization rate by 
developing own model
1974
Long-Term Automotive 
Industry Promotion Plan
- Export automobiles beyond knockdown assembly
1975
Independent Domestic 
Production (Pony)
- The first Korean model production (Pony)
-  Comprehensive automobile factory that can 
produce 50,000 cars per year
- Become an export sector
1980
Automobile Industry 
Rationalization Measures
-  Specialized production system by structural 
adjustment among enterprises and car models
2003
Future Automobiles
(10 Next-Generation 
Growth–Driven 
Industries)
-  Develop next-generation cars (ecofriendly 
automobiles)
2010
Green Car Development 
Roadmap
- Become fourth in green car technology
-  Provide various incentives for electric car 
purchases beginning in2012
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Third, the automobile production and localization of components were 
promoted through strong protection of domestic automotive sectors by regulating 
automobile imports until the end of the 1980s. Protecting components from 
foreign capital until the mass production and exports were achieved in the 1980s 
and limiting foreign investment to promote domestic automobile production kept 
the ownership of a domestic company. At the same time, in order to promote the 
domestic parts and materials industry, the government controlled the parts and 
materials imports that were produced domestically.
In order to protect the domestic automobile and component industry, the 
government restricted automobile imports and protected the component industries 
from foreign capitals until the end of the 1980s. In 1987, the government completely 
liberalized automobile imports except for cars under 2,000cc,and the tariff rates 
were reduced from 30% in 1988 to 20% and 17% in 1990 and 1991, respectively. 
They decreased further to 15% in 1993 and 10% in 1994, and the tariff was reduced 
to 8% due to the Korea-US FTA in 1995(Ministry of Strategy and Finance and KIET, 
2014, pp.47–48).
Last, in order to promote domestic automobile demand, the government 
decreased the special consumption tax starting in 1987, at which time it was 
decreased from 15% to 10% for small cars under 1,500cc. Further, in 1988 it 
decreased from 20% to 10% for cars between 1,500 and 2,000cc.
31)  Since 1980s, the automotive policies have been established by function rather than industry under 
the name of the parts and materials industry.
<Table 3-10> Selected Component Production Promotion Policies
Source:  Ministry of Strategy and Finance and KIET(2014), pp. 63–64.
Year Policy Main strategies
1965 Localization Five-Year Plan
-  Achieve complete localization of 
automobile components
1969
Basic Plan for Automotive Industry 
Promotion (Three-Year Localization 
Plan)
- Localization Targets by Component
-  Set up localization targets by 
component
1974
Long-Term Automotive Industry 
Promotion Plan
-  Enlarge and specialize by detailed 
component
1980s
Policies by Function Rather than 
Industries under the Name of the 
Parts and Materials Industry
- SME promotion policies 
-  Achieve localization of automobile 
components through localization 
policy of machinery, parts, and 
materials
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Through continuous and consistent support for automotive production and 
localization of components as an aggressive industrial policy by the central 
government, Korea made significant achievements in automotive production as 
well as localization of components.
<Table 3-11> shows the automobile unit production and ratio of the global ten 
automobile producing countries. The number of automobiles produced in Korea 
increased from 2,818,000 in 1997 to 3,699,000 and 4,521,000 in 2005 and 2013, 
respectively. However, its share remained almost the same, around 5.2%, in terms 
of the global production share. The U.S. ranked first in 1997, but China became first 
in global production in 2013. This is a significant improvement in the automotive 
industry after Korea made the Sibal brand as a knockdown type in 1962 and the 
Pony as the first Korean model in 1975.
However, the target for component localization was not achieved by the 
schedule planned in the 1960s. This is mainly because the government targeted 
rapid economic growth through automobile exports. Therefore, component 
localization was delayed until the domestic component industries achieved 
international competitiveness. For example, in 1965, the government established 
a plan to achieve 100% localization of components for five years, but this was not 
achieved mainly because the Shinjin preferred the knockdown type of production 
for new models (Ministry of Strategy and Finance and KIET, 2014, p.30). However, 
a significant increase in automobile exports and the competitive promotion of the 
domestic components industry led to the promotion of the component industry’s 
international competitiveness, higher localization, and increased exports.32)
32)  See Ministry of Strategy and Finance and KIET (2015) for more details on localization policy and its 
performance of component sectors.
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<Table 3-12a> and <Table 3-12b> summarize Korea’s automotive industrial 
policies since 1992. They include the automotive production promotion and 
component localization on the supply side and domestic consumption promotion 
on the demand side. The government continued protecting domestic production 
until the end of the 1980s (Ministry of Strategy and Finance and KIET, 2015, p.113).
<Table 3-11> Global 10 Automobile Production Countries
Source:  OICA Production Statistics (http://www.oica.net/category/production-statistics) retrieved on May 23, 
2015; Ministry of Strategy and Finance and KIET (2014),p.22.
1997 2005 2013
1 U.S.
12,130
(22.8)
U.S. 11,947 (17.8) China 22,117 (25.3)
2 Japan
10,975
(20.7)
Japan 10,800 (16.1) U.S. 11,046 (12.6)
3 Germany 5,022(9.5) Germany 5,758 (8.6) Japan 9,630 (11.0)
4 Korea 2,818(5.3) China 5,701 (8.5) Germany 5,865 (6.7)
5 France 2,579(4.9) Korea 3,699 (5.5) Korea 4,521 (5.2)
6 Spain 2,562(4.8) France 3,549 (5.3) India 3,896 (4.5)
7 Canada 2,256(4.2) Spain 2,764 (4.1) Brazil 3,740 (4.3)
8 Brazil 2,069(3.9) Canada 2,688 (4.0) Mexico 3,052 (3.5)
9 UK 1,935(3.6) Brazil 2,528 (3.8) Thailand 2,457 (2.8)
10 Italy 1,827(3.4) UK 1,803 (2.7) Canada 2,380 (2.7)
Total 53,116(100) 67,204(100) 87,377 (100)
(Unit: 1,000 (%))
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<Table 3-12> Comparative Study of Automobile Industry Policies
Source:  Ministry of Strategy and Finance, and KIET (2014), p.113.
Category 1992–94 1995–97
Technology
development stage
Learn core technology
Individual technology
development
Independent model automotive 
development
Small and medium-size cars 
(jeeps)
Full-size cars (commercial)
Parts
Engine
Establish planning and testing 
technology (lean-burn engine)
Low-pollution engine
(alternative engine)
Transmission Low-noise transmission Auto transmission
Chassis
Establish system planning 
technology
Electric-control chassis system
Car body
Establish system planning 
technology
Optimize car body planning
Electronic devices
Sensor and electronic control 
unit
Complex wire device, solid-
type instrument, warning 
information system
Safety devices Passive seat belt Air bag
Category 1998–2000 2001-2014
Technology
development stage
Application technology 
development
Future new technology 
development
Independent model automotive 
development
Electric cars Future cars
Parts
Engine
High-performance 
engine(ceramic engine)
Future engine(Stirling engine)
Transmission
Continuously variable 
transmission
New technology application of 
electric control
Chassis
High-performance chassis 
system of electric control
Comprehensive control of 
chassis system
Car body
New material application car 
body, car body group service 
technology
Highly safe car body
Electronic devices External information system High-level information system
Safety devices
Collision avoidance system, 
system to keep distance 
between cars
Automatic operation system
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3.2. Automotive Industry Policies in Hungary
As a main growth-driven industry, Hungary’s automotive industry achieved 
EUR 18 billion (about USD 23 billion) in sales, which accounts for 18% of the 
manufacturing production, 10% of GDP, and 18% of total exports. Furthermore, 
94% of the automobile production (165,000) and 88% of the component 
production were exported. The major export partners in the EU are Germany (39%), 
Italy (7%), Romania (5%), Austria (5%), UK (4%), and France (4%). The export share 
for the non-EU countries was 14%.33)
There are four automobile multinational companies in Hungary (Mercedes Benz, 
Suzuki, Audi, and Opel). The automobile production in 2013 was 161,000 (Suzuki), 
108,000 (Mercedes Benz), and 43,000 (Audi). Additionally, there are well-developed 
component industries. Since 2010, 14 out of 20 global automobile component 
companies have been located in Hungary. Since 88% of component production 
is exported, it is well known that the component industries in addition to the 
automobile sectors are internationally competitive. The representative component 
companies are Hankook Tire, Audi, Bosch, Continental, Delphi-Calsonic, Denso, 
GM-Opel Powertrain, Rava, Valeo, and Visteon.34) The R&D centers of about 20 
global automobile companies such as Audi and Bosch are located in Hungary.
As of 2013, there were about 712 automobile and component companies 
with approximately 116,000 employees in Hungary. The four major automobile 
companies have approximately 17,000 employees.
There are several reasons why global companies should invest in Hungary.
First, the Hungarian government is very committed to streamlining business 
processes and increasing the competitiveness of both SMEs and large enterprises in 
its country. Both refundable and nonrefundable incentives are available to investors 
coming to or expanding in Hungary. The regulations on incentive opportunities 
must be in accordance with EU rules (Nagy, 2015c, p.8).
33)  This section is summarized by reviewing the materials written by the Hungarian consultant, Dr. 
Ádám Nagy (2015a, 2015c) and several website documents:hun.mofat.go.kr/webmodule/htsboard/
template/read/korboardread.jsp?typeID=15&boardid=3675&seqno=901214&tableName=TYPE_
LEGATION and http://hun.mofa.go.kr/webmodule/htsboard/template/read/korboardread.jsp?typ
eID=15&boardid=3675&seqno=1050597&c=&t=&pagenum=1&tableName=TYPE_LEGATION&pc=
&dc=&wc=&lu=&vu=&iu=&du= retrieved on May 18, 2015.
34)  Audi produces engines, Bosch produces component systems such as brakes, and Continental 
produces sensor equipment. Hankook located in Dunaujvaros hires about 810 people per year at 
its 10-million-tire-production facility (The Export-Import Bank of Korea, 2010).
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Second, Hungary has relatively cheap but very capable, highly skilled labors.35) 
FDI in Hungary is attracted because of the high-quality labor in the major industries 
such as the IT, pharmaceuticals, and professional services sectors. Around two-thirds 
of the workforce in Hungary has completed a secondary, technical, or vocational 
education(Nagy, 2015c, p.8).For example, about 100,000 laborers who are well 
trained at universities or technology-oriented high schools work in the automotive 
industry.
Third, Hungary as the center of Europe is the center of transport, logistics, 
and manufacturing. Even companies that have no factories in Hungary operate 
distribution centers there.
Fourth, there is strong link among excellent global component production 
companies, which leads global automobile companies to invest in Hungary.
Finally, due to technological traditions with renowned scientists and innovators, 
there is an increasing trend for global companies to locate their R&D centers in 
Hungary. For example, Dr. Anyos Jedlik developed the world’s first electric engine 
in 1828, and Joszsef Galamb developed the Ford Model t-type production line 
(1913). Most notably, Ferenc Pavlics is known as a developer of the NASA Apollo 
Lunar Roving Vehicle. Furthermore, Nagy(2015c, p.9) mentions Hungary’s additional 
competitive advantages of industrial parks, science parks, low labor costs, various 
governmental incentives (cash subsidies, tax allowances), investment-friendly 
economic policy, competitive tax system, financial and fiscal stability, and success in 
reducing public debt.
3.3. Ecofriendly Automotive Industry Policies in Korea
This section reviews the ecofriendly automotive policies in Korea.36) As Chap. 2 
summarizes, the Korean government has continued establishing industrial policies 
to promote the production of ecofriendly automobiles even though the specific 
terms used changed from next-generation cars, ecofriendly cars, intelligent cars, 
green cars, and finally, to smart cars.
35)  The average wages in Hungary are ca. 60% less than the average of the EU 27, which makes the 
Hungarian workforce highly competitive. High English proficiency (90% of students speak English) 
and a high number of work hours per year make Hungarians a highly efficient workforce (Nagy, 
2015c, p.8).
36)  In this report, ecofriendly cars include plug-in electric vehicles (PHEVs), hybrid electric vehicles 
(HEVs), electric vehicles (EVs), fuel-cell electric vehicles (FCEVs), and compressed-natural-gas (CNG) 
vehicles.
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3.3.1. Production Promotion Policy
The promotion policies for ecofriendly automobiles are classified as production 
promotion with a localization strategy of the component industry and demand 
promotion for domestic and foreign automobiles.
The production promotion policy was already implemented in the leading 
technology development plan in 1992, but this policy was more at the technology 
level rather than the industry level. The component localization policy was 
implemented in the beginning of economic development in the 1960s, as 
we discussed in the previous section. Further demand promotion policies for 
ecofriendly automobiles were implemented beginning in2012. Here, we review the 
production promotion policies by the new growth-driven industry policies described 
previously.37) 
3.3.1.1. Leading Technology Development Projects (G7 Project)
The G7 Project divided the main targets into product technology development 
and base technology development. The production promotion in the automobile 
sector, which is part of product technology development, was undertaken with the 
name “Next-Generation Car Development Projects” (The Central Officials Training 
Institute, 2006, pp.5–6).
The project was composed of three parts: low pollution, safety, and electric cars. 
The government invested KRW 220 billion over ten years, and the private sectors 
invested KRW 230 billion. Korea began showing development performance in 
hybrid cars through the G7 Project (Cho, 2007, p.27).
<Table 3-13> summarizes the period, investment amounts, and participating 
agencies of the Next-Generation Car Development Projects, and <Table 3-14> shows 
the performance of the automobile production companies’ projects.
By investing KRW 220 billion in the public and private sectors, the government 
aimed to achieve low pollution and safety by 2001 through the Next-Generation 
Car Project. Additionally, in 1996, Asia Motors developed a trial parallel-type hybrid 
bus with an automatic transmission. Hyundai Motors developed the trial Avante 
car in 1999, and in 2000 they developed the trial Verna car, trial County minibus, 
37)  Because of the lack of performance data and policy evaluation, it is unfortunate for reviewers 
to evaluate the performance of each production promotion policy. Or, it can be said that it is 
too early to evaluate the performance of the policies because technology development is now 
in process, and, therefore, the government needs to invest more with the expectation of future 
performance.
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and series-type straight hybrid bus with a diesel engine. In 2001 and 2004, Hyundai 
Motors developed the Click hybrid and conducted a trial run of the Click car, 
respectively.
3.3.1.2. 10 Next-Generation Growth-Driven Industry Project
Under the 10 Next-Generation Growth-Driven Industry Project, an intelligent 
fuel-cell (hybrid) car was chosen as an item for the next-generation growth-driven 
industries. The Korean government considered the automobile industry to be 
<Table 3-13> Main Content of the Next-Generation Car Project
<Table 3-14> Project Performance of Next-Generation Car Development
Source: The Central Officials Training Institute (2006), p.6; Cho (2007), p.27.
Source: Cho (2007), p.28.
Project content
Targets Low pollution and safety by 2001
Period 1992–2001
Investment Government, KRW 220 billion KRW; private, KEW 230 billion
Participating institutions 46 corporations, academies, and research institutes
Government agency
Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy 
(Ministry of Science and Technology)
Year Company Development content
1996 Asia Motors 
Development of a trial parallel-type hybrid bus with an 
automatic transmission
1999 Hyundai Motors Development of a trial Avante car
2000 Hyundai Motors 
- Development of a trial Verna car
- Development of a  trial County minibus
-  Development of a series-type straight hybrid bus with 
diesel engine
• 1,500cc diesel engine + 50kW generator
• Maximum speed: 80km/h
2001 Hyundai Motors 
Development of a trial Click hybrid
• 1,600cc gasoline engine + 12kW motor + CVT
• Maximum speed: 188km/h
2004 Hyundai Motors • Trial run of a Click car
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entering a mature stage. Therefore, the government suggested the automobile 
sector as a growth-driven industry because it has the comparative advantage of 
developing new technologies (Choi et al., 2005, pp.5–6).
3.3.1.3. Green Car Development Roadmap
The representative government policy on ecofriendly automobiles was the Green 
Car Development Roadmap in 2010 for 2011–2015. As <Table 3-15> indicates, for 
example, the plan aimed to produce 1.2 million cars and export 700,000 in 2015. 
Furthermore, the plan targeted a 21% domestic market share of green cars in 
2015, thus, reducing greenhouse gases by 3.3 million tons. In order to achieve these 
targets, the government planned to invest KRW 3.1 trillion by 2015 (Ministry of 
Knowledge Economy et al., 2010, pp.1–2).
This strategy offered four sub-strategies and established detailed plans for 
each: (1) Green Car Production Roadmap, (2) Development of Eight Principal 
Components, (3) Plan for Supply of Green Cars, and (4) Expansion of Infrastructure 
for Recharging(see <Table 3-16>) (Ministry of Knowledge Economy et al., 2010, 
p.11).
<Table 3-15> Targets of the Green Car Development Roadmap
Source: Ministry of Knowledge Economy et al. (2010), p.11.
Strategy Category Targets
Production
Year 2011 2013 2015 2020
Domestic production
(10,000 cars)
90 100 120 190
Exports(10,000 cars) 70 80 90 130
Supply
Year 2011 2013 2015 2020
Market share of green cars (%) 14 17 21 43
Greenhouse gas reduction (million 
tons, cumulative)
0.3 1.3 3.3 18
Investment
Year 2006–2010 2011–2015
Public investment(KRW trillion) 1.0 1.7
Private investment(KRW trillion) 1.3 3.1
Total (KRW trillion) 1.4 4.8
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The targets for the Green Car Development are EVs, PHEVs, HEVs, FCEVs, and 
CDVs covering a wide range of vehicles such as small, sub-compact, mid-sized, and 
full-sized in each vehicle type. Development of each vehicle is currently in progress 
or will soon begin, and production took place in stages starting in 2011. In response 
to this production plan, the finished car industry, which includes Hyundai Kia, 
Renault Samsung, and GM Daewoo, sought to establish production facilities for 
electric vehicles and build new production lines, while the component industry 
started increasing investment in research, development, and facilities (Ministry of 
Knowledge Economy et al., 2010, pp.12,14).
<Table 3-16> Production Targets for Green Car
Vehicle type Development began 2011 2012
EVs
Small 2010 Mass production
Sub-compact
SUV
2011 Completed development Mass production
Mid-sized 2011 Development begins
Mid-sized 2012 Review Development begins
Bus 2010
PHEVs Mid-sized 2008 Completed development Demonstration
PHEVs
Mid-sized 2000
Completed development (2009) 
Mass production (2010–)
Mid-sized 2006
Completed development (2010) 
Mass production (2011–)
FCEVs
Car 2004 Completed development Test
Bus 2006 Development in progress
CDVs
Mid-sized 2010 Completed development Mass production
Full-sized 2012 Development begins
Bus 2013
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<Table 3-17> shows the green car production plan by vehicle type and 
component. The Roadmap for Production of Green Cars includes plans to develop 
green finished car and support for production systems of all ecofriendly vehicles 
types (EVs, PHEVs, HEVs, PCEVs, and CDVs). In addition, the Development of Eight 
Principal Components includes development of original technology for EVs and 
support for domestic production and improved efficiency in the areas of motors, 
heating and air conditioning, weight reduction, batteries, chargers, transmissions 
and transfers, stacks, and preprocessing and filtering. The demand incentives 
for production promotion support are subsidies, tax support, and establishment 
of infrastructure for recharging, which includes supply of electric and hydrogen 
chargers.
<Table 3-16> continued
Source: Ministry of Knowledge Economy et al. (2010), p.12.
Vehicle type 2013 2014 2015
EVs
Small
Sub-compact
SUV
Mid-sized
Completed 
development
Mass production
Mid-sized
Completed 
development
Mass production
Bus Completed development
Demonstration
mass production
PHEVs Mid-sized Mass production
PHEVs
Mid-sized
Completed development (2009)
Mass production (2010–)
Mid-sized
Completed Development (2010)
Mass production (2011–)
FCEVs
Car Test Mass production
Bus
Development in progress Test,
mass production
CDVs
Mid-sized
Full-sized
Completed 
development
Mass production
Bus
Development 
begins
Completed 
development
Mass production
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3.3.1.4. Smart Car Plan
In 2014, the government announced the Smart Car Production Promotion 
Strategy as a future growth-driven industry (see <Table 3-18>). In order to be ranked 
third in the global smart car industry, the strategy aimed to secure independent 
techniques of core components, ICT-based transport service construction, and 
revitalize transport service based on users. This plan began in 2014, and it will 
be carried out in three stages until 2020.Itincludesa roadmap for technological 
development and product development for each period. The roadmaps include 
technological development, market creation, and SME fostering (Joint Work of 
Related Ministries, 2014, p.6).
<Table 3-17> Targets of the Four Strategies for Green Car Industry Development
Source: Ministry of Knowledge Economy et al. (2010), pp.11, 17.
Strategy Content Target
Green Car Production 
Roadmap
- Develop green finished car
-  Support for production 
system in the industry
-  Vehicle types: EVs, PHEVs, 
HEVs, PCEVs, CDVs
Development of Eight 
Principal Components
-  Develop original technology 
for EVs
-  Support for domestic 
production and efficiency 
enhancement
-  Eight main components: 
motors, heating and air 
conditioning, weight 
reduction, batteries, 
chargers, transmissions 
and transfers, stacks, 
preprocessing and filtering 
Plan for Supply of 
Green Cars
- Subsidies, tax support
-  Establish infrastructure for 
recharging
-  Includes vehicles for 
production and operation
Expansion of 
Infrastructure for 
Recharging
-  Maintenance of green car 
system
-  Establish environment for 
green cars
Supply of electric and 
hydrogen chargers
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In addition, the government presented the “Plan to Promote the Market to 
Expand Supply of Electric Cars and Create Jobs” in December 2014. This plan 
included investment of KRW 22.2 billion from 2014 to 2020 for research and 
development of core components for improving the travel distance of electric 
cars. The plan also promotes the supply of electric cars by expanding the car-
charging facilities and operating battery-leasing businesses (Office for Government 
Coordination and Prime Minister’s Secretariat, press release on December 19, 2014, 
pp.2,9–10).
<Table 3-18> Implementation Plan for Future Growth-Driven Industries: Smart Cars
Source: Joint Work of Related Ministries (2014), pp. 6–7.
Category Content
Objective To be ranked third in the global smart car industry
Strategy
-  Procure independent technologies for core components → Establish 
infrastructure for ICT-based transport services → Vitalize the user-friendly 
transport service industry
-  R&D: Autonomous driving on vehicle-only roads, ICT-based transport service, 
and development of core technologies for vehicle platooning
-  Market creation: Frequency allocation for vehicle communication, 
improvement of legal system
- SMEs: Support for ICT SMEs to expand into the automobile industry
Roadmap for 
each stage
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Develop modules, components and core elements related to NCAP Promote 
global component producers
Vitalize industrial convergence through operation of new biz support Group 
for automobile-IT convergence
Discover transport 
product and 
service for 
demand-centered 
ICT convergence 
and integration
Develop core 
technologies for 
autonomous 
driving, service, 
and BM
Realize vehicle platooning 
and support for autonomous 
driving
Test autonomous 
driving and 
develop license 
standards
Core safety 
technologies and 
prepare standards 
and system for 
commercialization
Autonomous driving and 
vehicle platooning safety and 
prepare standards to expand 
supply
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3.3.2. Dissemination Promotion Policy
As described above, the Korean government continued promoting the 
production of ecofriendly automobiles as a part of new growth-driven industries. 
However, due to the high production cost, it is not possible to compete with fossil-
fuel automobiles. To support production, the government implemented demand 
promotion policies using various subsidies, tax subsidies, and incentives.
In order to popularize environment-friendly cars, the Ministry of Environment 
reinforces financial support (subsidies, tax reduction, etc.) and increased operational 
incentives (parking fee reduction in public parking lots, congestion fee reduction, 
etc.) in order to decrease the price differential between environment-friendly cars 
and internal-combustion vehicles. Moreover, the Ministry plans to promote a supply 
strategy for each type of vehicle by reinforcing the supply policies for environment-
friendly cars. The biggest obstacle yet is the fact that ecofriendly vehicles are more 
expensive than traditional vehicles with internal combustion engines, but the 
government plans to deal with the price differential by offering various benefits 
such as financial support for purchases and tax reductions (Ministry of Environment, 
2014, p.11).
<Table 3-19> summarizes the various demand promotion strategies by 
automobile type.
<Table 3-19> Tailored Dissemination Strategy Responding to the Market Changes
Source: Ministry of Environment (2014), p.10.
Types Current conditions Dissemination strategy
HEVs
(current version)
Various vehicles, reduced fuel 
cost, competitive price
Dissemination based on market 
competit ion and consumer 
preferences, subsidy provision 
with tax reduction
EVs
(current + near-
future version)
Improved price competitiveness 
(reduced battery cost), expansion 
of models
Support vehicles before securing 
market competitiveness, support 
charging facility installations
FCEVs
(future version)
Next-generation ecofriendly 
vehicles, first production in Korea 
(2013)
Support preoccupancy of world 
market, pilot supply mainly in 
public sector (500 vehicles in 
2000)
CNG vehicles
(upgraded 
version)
Mainly support for general CNG 
buses, pilot supply of ecofriendly 
and fuel-efficient CNG hybrid 
buses
Changes in dissemination policies 
more focused on CNG hybrid 
buses and garbage trucks (since 
2015)
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To establish the initial market for hybrid cars, the government provided subsidies 
of KRW 14–28 million per vehicle in the public sector from 2004 to 2008 and 
changed the incentive for tax reduction in 2009.Yet, the hybrid vehicle sales were 
low (2%–3% of new car sales), so the government plans to provide subsidies for 
small and medium hybrid cars with greenhouse gas emissions below 100g/km. 
Additionally, through tax reductions of up to KRW 3.1 million, the government 
intends to prepare conditions for establishing a market infrastructure that can 
survive by itself with a market share of 15%–20% (Ministry of Environment, 2014, 
p.11).
Electric vehicles are expensive, priced between KRW 30.5 and 60.9 million, and 
it is difficult to promote their usage without government subsidies. Hence, the 
government has provided subsidies of KRW 10.5 million per vehicle since 2011 (as of 
2014).The government also aims to increase the number of electric cars to 200,000 
by 2020 by enhancing accessibility of the private sector with tax incentives such as 
additional support for local taxes (KRW 3–8 million KRW) and reductions in the 
individual consumption tax (up to KRW 4.2 million) (Ministry of Environment, 2014, 
pp.12–13).
For CNG vehicles, the government’s supply project has been providing subsidies 
of KRW 6–20 million per vehicle since 2000 in order to replace diesel buses that emit 
a large quantity of exhaust gas. As a result, 88% of intracity buses were replaced 
with natural gas buses, and the urban air quality greatly improved. The accumulated 
decrease in the pollutant emissions went from 11,640 tons in 2011 to 13,833 tons in 
2013(Ministry of Environment, 2014, pp.12–13).
In addition, in order to increase the number of public charging facilities, the 
government planned to increase the number of public charging facilities from 177 
in June 2014 to 1,600 by 2020. The 177 public charging facilities include 77 public 
institutions, 11 parking lots, 56 large supermarkets, six expressway rest areas, and 
27 miscellaneous facilities. The hydrogen fuel-cell electric vehicle is expensive, so the 
government provides subsidies of KRW 60 million per vehicle for the public sector, 
which includes local governments and public institutions. The government also 
plans to expand the supply of FCEVs by providing incentives such as tax reductions 
and transitioning to a private-oriented supply project when the commercializing 
of FCEVs becomes feasible and the price stabilizes (Ministry of Environment, 2014, 
pp.12–13).
In 2015, the government increased the budget again to expand the supply 
of environment-friendly cars. <Table 3-20> summarizes the financial support for 
ecofriendly automobile purchases.
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The total budget in 2015 for the 34,417 environment-friendly cars is KRW 130 
billion (an increase of KRW 74.3 billion compared to the previous year). The budget 
for the 30,000 hybrid cars is KRW 30.4 billion and KRW 78.8 billion for the 3,000 
electric cars (KRW 10.5 million for vehicles and KRW 7 million for slow chargers), 
KRW 2 billion for the 72 hydrogen fuel-cell cars (KRW 27.5 million in government 
expenditures), and KRW 18.9 billion for the 1,345 natural gas cars (KRW 6 million 
for CNGs, KRW 20 million for CNG HEVs, government expenditures) (Ministry of 
Environment, 2015, p.6).
HEV subsidies are provided for small and medium hybrid cars with CO2 emissions 
below 97g/km in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and promote the 
consumer culture for environment-friendly cars. Beginning January 1, 2015, KRW 
1 million was provided to consumers who purchased the vehicles eligible for the 
subsidies. The PHEV, which is operated with the electric energy provided by external 
electricity sources, is categorized as a hybrid car, yet there are no designated vehicles 
currently (during the first half of 2015, Hyundai released its PHEV Sonata)(Ministry 
of Environment, 2015, pp.1, 4).
In addition, EVs and HEVs are supported by government subsidies and tax 
reductions, provided they are designated as "environment-friendly cars" according 
to the Environment-Friendly Automobile Law. During the current year, the 
government will consider plans to establish the standards for subsidies and its 
amount for PHEVs based on case studies of other countries and consultation with 
experts and producers(Ministry of Environment, 2015, p.24).
<Table 3-20> Financial Support for Ecofriendly Automobile Purchases
Source: Ministry of Environment (2015), p.24.
Type of 
vehicles
Current status of support Domestic 
vehiclesSubsidies Tax Reduction
HEVs
National subsidies
Of KRW 1 million(support provided 
for vehicles with CO2 emissions 
below 97g/km since 2015)
Maximum of KRW
3.1 million
Five vehicles: 
Sonata 2.0, Prius 
1.8, etc.
EVs National subsidies (KRW 15 million)
Maximum of KRW
4.2 million
Five vehicles:
Ray, Spark, Soul, 
SM3, i3
PHEVs
Maximum of
KRW 3.1 
million(classified as 
hybrid vehicle)
No designated 
vehicle
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3.4.  Ecofriendly Automobile Industry Policies in 
Hungary39)
The vision of the Hungarian government is to establish electromobility in 
Hungary by providing all the possible circumstances that will lead to the more 
common usage of electric vehicles. By identifying and collecting the possible 
participants of this plan, the government took the first step to implement a project 
with broad social acceptance.
The Jedlik Plan will be made in line with the intention of the European 
community but on the basis of a highly anticipated rise of the Hungarian 
electromobility industry. Bus manufacturers are capable of providing high-
technology vehicles, and suppliers wait for the opportunity to develop innovatively 
and build the capability to enter the supply chains in the electric vehicle sector(Nagy, 
2015b, p.9).
In order to revitalize industrial sectors, the Hungarian government established 
a new industrial plan.40) One of the plan’s key sectors is the automotive industry. In 
March 2014, the prospective E-mobility Plan, the Jedlik Plan, was announced, and 
then in September 2014, the Jedlik Cluster was founded with the establishment 
of an action plan. Harmonizing with the EU action rules, the action plan is in 
accordance with Hungary’s industry strategy policy of supporting electromobility 
and in line with the policy of developing education and creating new jobs (Nagy, 
2015a, p.3).
3.4.1. Production Promotion Plan
The main policy directions of the Jedlik Plan are as follows: (1) connect research, 
development, and innovation(R+D+I) and support domestic production, (2) expand 
infrastructure and support project financing, (3) review legal and taxation conditions 
such as incentives, (4) community role in E-mobility, and (5) pilot project.
As a production promotion plan, the most important policy is to support R+D+I 
for manufacturers and suppliers of the automotive industry by operative programs 
39)  This section is based on the document ”Jedlik Ányos Plan: E-mobility Concept of the Hungarian 
Government” (Nagy, 2015b) and discussions in several meetings on the industrial policy and electric 
car policy in Hungary with several Hungarian specialists (Laszlo Gyorgy and Peter Virovacz with the 
Szazadveg Economic Research Institutes, Jozsef Petho with Jedlik Anyos Cluster, Zsolt Barady with 
Evopro Group, and Gabor Lux with the Institute for Regional Studies of Hungarian Academy of 
Science). The final version of detailed plan for ecofriendly car production and promotion will not 
be released until the final report is submitted.
40) The final report was yet to be released at the time this report was submitted.
Chapter  3 _New Growth-Driven Industry Policy and Ecofriendly Automotive Industry Policy under Global Megatrends • 181
for 2014–2020. The plan includes support of high-quality infrastructure development 
projects and education of specialists and technicians.
3.4.2. Demand Promotion Plan
Unlike Korea, Hungary suggests nonfinancial types of support to promote 
electric cars. As a financial incentive, the current allowances for electrical vehicles 
are zero registration tax, zero vehicle tax, and exemption from pecuniary transfer 
duty (Nagy, 2015b,p.7). However, as seen in Korea’s case in terms of the price 
difference between traditional fossil-fuel automobiles and ecofriendly automobiles, 
the financial incentives in Hungary are not enough to increase the demand for 
electric cars. In Hungary’s case, the direct financing of electric cars is not possible 
due to the fact that most of the population is unable to buy an electric vehicle with 
their own sources or even with the additional governmental incentives. By adding 
indirect incentives, the Hungarian government intends to increase the number of 
electric vehicles step by step, urging the automobile manufacturers to keep with the 
increasing demand for electric automobiles.
Thus, the government set up nonfinancial allowances as follows: (1) as resellers, 
charging point owners shall be allowed to trade electricity with other owners, (2) 
the availability of night power (for at least eight hours at night) was expanded, (3) 
a green license plate number was offered, (4) plug-in hybrid, long-range electric 
vehicles and hydrogen-cell vehicles will be added to the beneficiary category, (5) 
parking boards and road margins will be different, and other policies to allow bus 
lanes, toll discounts, and free entry to reserved zones will be offered (for example, 
Buda Castle).
Another strategy to expand demand is to increase the number of charging 
networks for electric vehicles(Nagy, 2015b).In Hungary, there were only 60 
charging points available to the public as of May 2015. As part of the Jedlik Plan, 
business associations and local municipalities will be given opportunities to provide 
alternative locations for charging points. Lightning chargers will be located like a 
spider’s web, moving away from the cities. The charging period is 20–25 minutes. 
In the cities, the service centers and parking lots will be equipped with fast chargers 
with charging periods of 90–150 minutes. Homes will be equipped with the normal 
plug-in chargers with around six to eight hours of charging time.
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4.  Ecofriendly Automobile Dissemination 
Policies and Their Performance
4.1.  Recent Status of Ecofriendly Automobile 
Dissemination
As discussed in Sec. 3, the government has continued to promote production of 
ecofriendly automobiles since 1992. The government investment under the next-
generation car project for 1992–2001 achieved the development of a trial parallel-
type hybrid bus with an automatic transmission (Asia Motors) in 1996 and a trial 
Click hybrid (Hyundai Motors) in 2001, etc. (see <Table 3-5> and <Table 3-6>). Even 
after this project, the government invested a huge amount to promote ecofriendly 
automobiles through the 10 Next-Generation Growth-Driven Industry Project and 
the New Growth-Driven Industry Comprehensive Promotion Plan.
Even with consistent government investments and support, ecofriendly cars are 
not yet a growth-driven industry. This is because the production cost of ecofriendly 
cars is still higher than that of fossil-fuel-based cars, and, thus, market demand is not 
promoted without government support. However, the demand for ecofriendly cars 
is growing in Korea as well as the global markets through technological innovation 
and government support. <Table 3-21> shows the world sales trend of hybrid cars.
From 2005 until 2013, there were approximately 7.5 million hybrid cars sold in 
the USA, Japan, and Europe. In 2005, 290,000 hybrid cars were sold in the USA, 
Japan and Europe, and by 2013, the number of hybrid cars sold increased to 1.7 
million. With this increase, the market share of hybrid cars increased from 1.1% in 
2005 to 7.3% in 2013.
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<Table 3-22> shows the hybrid and electric car sales in Korea since 2005. In order 
to promote demand for hybrid cars, the central government allocated KRW 28 
million from2004 to 2006, KRW 14 million by 50% central government from 2007 to 
2008, and tax subsidies in 2009 (Ministry of Environment, 2015, p.10). With central 
government support, only 121 ecofriendly cars were sold in 2005, but it increased 
significantly to about 35,000in 2014. Thus, for 2005–2014, the total number of 
ecofriendly cars sold was about 140,000. With an increase in car sales, the market 
share of hybrid cars increased from 0.01% in 2005 to 2.60% in 2014.
<Table 3-21> World Hybrid Car Sales Trend
<Table 3-22> Hybrid Car Sales Trend in Korea
Source: Ministry of Environment (2015), p. 10.
Note: Total cars are in thousands.
Source: Ministry of Environment (2015), p. 10.
(Unit: 1,000 cars (%))
Car 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total
Hybrid 
cars 
(a)
Total 290 380 490 500 830 800 1,030 1,450 1,720 7,490 
USA 210 250 350 310 290 270 270 440 490 2,880
Japan 60 90 90 120 460 440 660 870 1,020 3,810
Europe 20 40 50 70 80 90 100 140 210 800
Total 
sales
(b)
Total 26,870 27,140 26,730 24,570 22,990 22,810 22,400 23,570 23,680 220,760
USA 7,650 7,760 7,560 6,760 5,400 5,630 6,080 7,240 7580 6,1660
Japan 4,740 4,640 4,400 4,220 3,930 4,210 3,520 4,570 4560 3,8790 
Europe 14,480 14,740 14,770 13,590 13,660 12,970 12,800 11,760 1,1540 12,0310 
Share 
(a/b)
(%)
USA 2.7 3.2 4.6 4.6 5.4 4.8 4.4 6.1 6.5
Japan 1.3 1.9 2.0 2.8 11.7 10.5 18.8 19.0 22.4
Europe 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.2 1.8
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Sales
(cars)
121 145 724 997 7,312 8,473 20,271 37,030 28,092 35,383
Share 
(%)
0.01 0.02 0.07 0.10 0.59 0.65 1.54 2.83 2.17 2.60
Total 
cars
94 97 104 102 124 131 132 131 129 136
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<Table 3-23> shows the trend of electric car sales in Korea for 2011–2014. 
Compared to hybrid car sales, electric car sales were relatively lower. For 2011–
2014,3,044 electric cars were sold, with an increase from 338 in 2011 to 1,173 in 
2014.41)
Based on the recent electric car sales trend, the government established a 
roadmap for disseminating and promoting electric cars and charging facilities 
<Table 3-24>. Through public and private sector collaboration, the government 
planned to disseminate200,000 electric cars by 2020 and install 632 charging 
facilities by 2017.
<Table 3-23> Korea Electric Car Sales Trend by Region
Source: Ministry of Environment (2015), p. 15.
Total 2011 2012 2013 2014
Total 3,044 338 753 780 1,173
Seoul 890 73 285 330 202
Busan 116 8 10 3 95
Daegu 22 7 5 4 6
Incheon 87 11 23 15 38
Dajeon 20 4 6 6 4
Ulsan 16 7 2 3 4
Gwangju 166 1 3 62 100
Sejong 7 0 2 2 3
Gyeonggi 204 35 74 31 64
Gangwon 45 9 10 6 20
Chungbuk 20 5 6 6 3
Chungnam 127 8 59 33 27
Jeonbuk 17 1 9 3 4
Jeonnam 175 50 40 22 63
Gyeongbuk 119 15 40 32 32
Gyeongnam 266 58 35 62 111
Jeju 747 46 144 160 397
41)  As of the end of June 2015, the total number of electric cars in Jeju Special Self-Governing Province 
was 1,000 cars (http://m.khan.co.kr/view.html?artid=201507031145471&code=620117, retrieved 
on July, 5, 2015).
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To promote electric car demand, the government established a subsidy plan in 
2015 for the price difference between electric cars and gasoline cars. First, there 
are KRW 15 million subsidies for high-speed compact sedans because the price 
difference with gasoline cars is about KRW 22–23 million, which is the same as the 
subsidies in 2014. Second, KRW 100 million will be subsidized for electric buses. 
Third, electric trucks will be subsidized by KRW 12 and 15 million for 0.5- and 1-ton 
electric trucks, respectively. Furthermore, the government will subsidize KRW 1 
million for 3kWh class and KRW 6 million or 7 kWh class charging facilities (Ministry 
of Environment, 2015, pp.12–13).
4.2. Jeju Special Self-Governing Province
This chapter covers practical case studies of ecofriendly automobile strategies in 
Jeju and Seoul. Jeju has a vision to replace all automobiles with electric cars by 2030 
(Jeju Special Self-Governing Province, 2015, pp.2–3).The province has a target to 
replace 10% of cars with electric cars (29,000 cars) by 2017 and 30% (94,000 cars) by 
2020(Jeju Special Self-Governing Province, 2015, p.2).
In order to achieve the electric car dissemination target, Jeju provides various 
financial subsidies and tax incentives. Jeju provides KRW 22 million in subsidies for 
sedans and KRW 17 million for electric trucks even with the diverse car prices of 
KRW 35 million to 64.7 million (Jeju Special Self-Governing Province, 2015, pp.6–7). 
Furthermore, about KRW 6 million is offered for fixed-type charging facilities and 
about KRW 1 million for movable types.
In addition, Jeju province provides various local tax incentives. <Table 3-25> lists 
the detailed tax exemptions by automobile brand.  There is financial exemption 
support of about KRW 4 million on the condition that nominal transfer is 
not allowed for two years. The exemption limit is KRW 2 million of personal 
consumption tax, KRW 0.6 million of education tax, and total acquisition tax 
exemption for small cars but KRW 1.4 million for other cars. The acquisition tax is 
5% of the car price (Jeju Special Self-Governing Province, 2015, p.11).
<Table 3-24> Roadmap for Electric Car Dissemination and Charging Facilities
Source: Ministry of Environment (2015), p. 11.
–2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Cars 800 3,000 10,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 64,000
Charging facilities 60 100 150 150 198 170 400
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In total, the financial support to promote electric car demand is about KRW 28 
million regardless of vehicle type (sedan or truck) or brand.
4.3. Seoul Metropolitan City
<Table 3-26> shows the tax benefits for electric car consumers in Seoul in 2015. 
Excluding subsidies from the central government, the city of Seoul provides subsidies 
of up to KRW 6 million for the purchase of electric cars. The subsidies include partial 
exemption of individual consumption tax, education tax, acquisition tax, and urban 
railway public bonds. The benefits for acquisition taxes were originally scheduled 
to expire on December 31, 2014, but they were extended for one more year(Seoul 
Metropolitan City, 2015, p.47).
<Table 3-25> Tax Benefits for Electric Cars in Jeju City
Source: Jeju Special Self-Governing Province (2015), p.11.
(Unit: KRW 1,000)
Category
Ray
(subcompact)
Spark
(small)
SM3.Z.3.
(small)
Labo PEACE
(sub-compact) Miscellaneous
Before
tax cut
After
tax cut
Before
tax cut
After
tax cut
Before
tax cut
After
tax cut
Before
tax cut
After
tax cut
Before
tax cut
After
tax cut
Total 3,151 130 4,334 543 4,509 634 3,299 28.5 5,420 1,420
Individual
consumption 
tax
1,590 - 1,831 - 1,904 - 1,722 - 2,300 300
Education tax 477 - 543 - 571 - 516 - 690 90
Acquisition tax 954 - 1,813 413 1,904 504 1,033 - 2,300 900
One-year
automobile 
tax
130 130 130 130 130 130 28.5 28.5 130 130
Factory price 31,818 36,272 38,090
34,454
(expected)
46,000 
(example)
Automobile
sales price
35,000 39,900 41,900
37,900
(expected)
50,000 
(example)
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5. Conclusion and Policy Suggestions
Reviewing the recent new growth-driven industry policies in Korea after 
the 1980s, this report investigates ecofriendly automotive policies focusing on 
production promotion and demand promotion. For production promotion, the 
government of Korea continues to support the ecofriendly automotive (next-
generation cars, smart cars, green cars, etc.) sector through huge R&D investment. 
In addition, due to the price difference between fossil-fuel cars and ecofriendly cars, 
the government tried boosting market demand for ecofriendly cars through huge 
support through tax cuts (consumption, educational, acquisition) and subsidies. For 
example, in Jeju, about USD 28,000 is subsidized for electric car purchases with a 
price of about USD 35,000–60,000 in Jeju(Ministry of Environment, 2015, p.10).
Hungary plans to reindustrialize its economy, and it selected the automotive 
industry as a major growth-driven industry. Even before the transition reform in the 
1990s, Hungary played an important role in producing automobiles and electronics. 
Even though the country gave up producing automobiles too quickly(especially 
buses), Hungary still has competitive, skilled laborers and historically renowned 
engineers and scientists. Thus, by sharing economic and industrial development 
experiences, especially new growth-driven industry policies focusing on the 
ecofriendly automotive industry, between Hungary and Korea, this report suggests 
several policy recommendations.
First, it is important to realize how the two countries face different economic 
environments when implementing new growth-driven industry policies. As already 
explained, the important strategies to achieve rapid economic growth in Korea 
were government-led export-promotion policies combined with very strong 
<Table 3-26> Financial Support to Promote Demand for Ecofriendly Cars in Seoul
Note:  The benefits for urban railway public bonds are provided only when purchasers register by December 31, 
2016 according to the revision of the enforcement ordinance.
Source:  The Enforcement Ordinance for the Urban Railway Law(Presidential Decree No. 25840, enforced on 
January 1, 2015); Seoul Metropolitan City (2015), p.47.
Category Tax cut limit (KRW 1,000) Time limit
Total 6,000
Individual consumption tax 2,000 2015.12.31
Education tax 600 2015.12.31
Acquisition tax 1,400 2015.12.31
Urban railway public bonds 2,000 2016.12.31
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domestic protection until the 1980s. However, it is difficult for Hungary to follow 
the government-led industrial policies that Korea did. This is because Korea used 
the industrial policies when it was less exposed to international pressure. Hence, 
Korea was able to use its independent export-expansion policies as well as promote 
the import-restricting policies to protect its domestic corporations and market.
In Hungary's case, however, its EU membership prevents it from using similar 
independent industrial policies. It is difficult for Hungary to implement government-
led strategic industrial policies. This is because Hungary, as an EU member, 
should follow the EU’s policy direction. Therefore, various industrial policies that 
contributed to Korea's economic growth cannot be applied to Hungary. Hence, it is 
necessary to share careful policy suggestions when applying the Korean policies in 
Hungary.
There are several policy recommendations through comparative studies for new 
growth-driven industry policies and ecofriendly automotive industry strategies.
First, we recommend maximizing the linkage effects in the automotive industries 
through combined policies between automobiles and parts. Even before the 
transition in the beginning of the 1990s, Hungary played an important role in 
producing automobiles, especially buses, with skilled workers and expertise. 
Unfortunately, Hungary stopped producing these automobiles by stopping trade 
with its former trade partners.42)
In the automotive industry sectors, there are four multinational companies 
with domestic SMEs. Even with strong production capacity in expertise and 
labor, Hungary still depends on component imports. Therefore, it is necessary 
to attract more SMEs that are global to provide components to multinationals 
located in Hungary and export them to international partners. Then it is necessary 
to implement policies to promote international competitiveness of domestic 
component companies and increase component exports.
Since the 1960s, Korea has continuously implemented policies to increase the 
share of domestically produced goods in the domestic market via subsidies for the 
automobile industry as well as the protection of the domestic parts and materials 
industry and the domestic market. Hungary should examine these policy directions 
and search for actions it can take while considering its EU membership.
42)  This is based on the summary of opinions by the Hungary consultant Ádám Nagy and meeting 
discussion with Dr. Garbor Lux, Hungarian Academy of Sciences CERS Institute for Regional 
Studies.
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Second, we recommend establishing policy strategies to combine the German 
model with the East Asian model development process. As already mentioned, 
Hungary is in a distinct environment, in which it cannot use the infant industry 
protection policies that Korea did. Therefore, within this distinct environment, 
Hungary needs to implement an appropriate policy for its automobile industry 
based on the discussion of the German model and the East Asian model.
As Lux (2015) indicated, the German model attracts multinational companies to 
boost domestic component companies and, thus, expects linkage effects between 
automotive companies and component companies. By becoming more competitive, 
domestic companies can export their components. However, the East Asian model 
(the development state model)has strong government-led industrial policies. This 
was why the Korean government declared the heavy chemical industry as a new 
growth-driven industry in 1973 through a rapid economic growth process.
As an EU member and due to international pressure on globalization, Hungary 
cannot implement the East Asian model like Korea did. Therefore, we recommend 
combining two different development models. For the automotive industry, 
we recommend attracting multinational automotive companies and promoting 
domestic component companies. However, electric buses produced locally can 
be exempted.  Since Hungary already has production experience and production 
capacity, it will be promising to establish and implement automobile production 
strategies. For this purpose, produced by domestic companies and used by 
multinational companies can be produced for the buses produced by domestic 
companies as well.
For this purpose, we recommend expanding the strategic partnership programs 
started in 2012 to more global companies. More details on this program’s policies 
are given in the Ministry of Strategy and Finance and KDI (2014, pp.137–141). We 
know that until 2013,13 of the 38 partnerships were with automobile-related 
companies.
Third, we recommend implementing policies to develop high-quality human 
resources. Hungary already has skilled workers and the capability to develop 
highly skilled human resources.44) However, due to insufficient financial resources, 
it is difficult to promote high-quality human resources by direct government 
investment.
43)  Even under a communist regime, Hungary produced and exported the bus called the “Ikarus Bus” 
to other socialist countries such as the Soviet Union and China.
44)  More details on the education system and system to develop human resource promotion are 
covered in Chap. 2 of this KSP program.
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Since Hungary plays an important role in producing and exporting automobiles, 
there are automobile-related workers, implying that there is capacity to increase 
these workers. However, producing ecofriendly cars following the global 
megatrends of the future automotive industry should be conducted by updated 
technologies such as the most advanced technology, ICT, semiconductors, and 
electronics. With collaboration of multinational automobile companies located in 
Hungary, research institutes and collaborative programs between corporations and 
universities will be quite helpful to promote human resources with more advanced 
technological capacity. Furthermore, this kind of collaboration can be included in 
the strategic partnership program as well.
Since the 1960s, Korea has been continuously implementing policies to develop 
human resources in order to support corporations and train researchers and 
technicians. Korea consistently supported the national research and development 
institutes such as KIST and developed new technologies and human resources.
For the development of high-quality human resources through the connection 
between corporations and academia, in Korea, there are several contract 
departments in the automotive sector. The Hyundai Motor Company has a contract 
department at Korea University(http://hyundai.korea.ac.kr/, retrieved on June 1, 
2015) and Hanyang University (http://aec.hanyang.ac.kr/intro/intro.php, retrieved on 
June 1, 2015). The department teaches courses infields related to electronic control 
and convergence in the automotive sectors and delivers special lectures by field 
experts, which leads to students finding work in their field right after graduation.45)
Fourth, investing more aggressively in ecofriendly automobile production 
is necessary. In Korea, it is too early to assess the outcomes of the ecofriendly 
automotive policies clearly, because they are still developing ecofriendly cars. When 
we examined the new growth-driven industry policies, we found that the Next-
Generation Car Promotion Policy was implemented during the Leading Technology 
Development Project in 1992, yet its performance was not as sufficient as desired. 
However, it is quite important to invest more resources to promote ecofriendly 
cars and components. As was discussed, the industries that cannot follow global 
megatrends cannot survive in the future.
Hungary declared the E-mobility Plan in March 2013 and established the Jedlik 
Cluster under the Ministry of National Economy and National Innovation Office. 
The main characteristics of the plan are (1) the combined R+D+I strategy to produce 
domestic electric cars, (2) infrastructure expansion to support project financing, (3) 
45)  See http://www.hyundai-scholar.com/ContractCurriculum.do (retrieved on June 1,2015) for a more 
detailed explanation.
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readjustment of legal issues and tax incentives, exemption from acquisition tax, etc., 
and (4) strengthened community role to allow electric bus and taxi usage.
For ecofriendly car production, there are no sufficient investment resources yet, 
but the government needs to consider this investment as a priority. However, it is 
especially not recommended to initiate production of automobiles directly, except 
for buses. Since there are four multinational automobile companies, it will be quite 
useful to attract global SMEs that will provide components to the multinational 
enterprises located in Hungary and then export their products to the international 
markets.
Finally, ecofriendly car consumption promotion policies should be more 
extensively implemented. In Korea, the strategies in the E-mobility Plan include 
mostly dissemination promotion plans without significant financial support. The tax 
incentives offered by the plan might not be enough to cover the price difference 
between fossil-fuel cars and ecofriendly cars.  As Sec. 4 summarized, about USD 
28,000 is provided for electric car purchases in the 2015 Jeju and Seoul electric car 
dissemination promotion plan. This includes support from the central government 
and local tax subsidies.
46)  Since the final version of the new industry policies is not formally released, it might be too early to 
evaluate the strategy planned by the Hungarian government.
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Appendix: Global Megatrends and Industrial Policy
PWC (2014) and KPMG (2014) suggested the following megatrends: (1) 
demographic and social change: population growth and workforce diversity, (2) 
shift in global economic power, (3) rapid urbanization, (4) climate change and 
resource scarcity, and (5) technological breakthroughs.
More details on these megatrends follow.
1. Demographic and Social Change
(a)  Population growth and social welfare system: Because of the increase in the 
absolute population, longer life expectancy, and declining birth rate,  another 
challenge for the aging population is maintaining the solvency of social 
welfare systems, including rising healthcare costs and pensions (PWC,2014, 
p.5; KPMG,2014. p.11).
(b)  Population growth and work diversity: People who are planning to move will 
increase 50% by 2020. This reflects the rising workforce diversity(PWC, 2014, 
pp. 5–6).
2. Shift in Global Economic Power: Purchasing Power and Middle Class 
(a)  Purchasing power: By 2030, the aggregate purchasing power of the emerging 
economies, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, and Turkey, 
will overtake that of the current G7 countries. The change of economic 
purchasing power between countries and/or groups will lead to significant 
change in consumption patterns. The change also leads to different patterns 
of infrastructure investment. Because of China’s fast growth, the share of 
global infrastructure spending by the Asia Pacific will be 60% by 2025(PWC, 
2014, p. 7–8).
(b)  Middle class: Further, by 2015 the middle class in the Asia Pacific will be larger 
than that of Europe and North America combined.
3. Rapid Urbanization
In 2014, 54% of the world’s population lived in urban areas. The ratio was 
30% in 1950. By 2050, 66% of the population is projected to be urban (UN, World 
Urbanization Prospects, 2014 revision, p.7). In order to make cities livable, it is 
inevitable that we will need to think more about the environment, infrastructure, 
and social fabric.
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4. Climate Change and Resource Scarcity
(a)  As the world’s population and urbanization expand, the demand for energy, 
food, and water will rise as well. However, the planet’s natural resources 
are finite and may not be sufficient for the growing demand. Sustaining the 
current economic growth and development is highly dependent on fossil fuels 
with high carbon emission, and, thus, it looks difficult to reach the target 
of maintaining a 2 °C temperature increase. Governments and businesses 
realize the environmental and social impacts of their policy decisions and 
actions(PWC, 2014, p. 3–4).
(b)  The combined pressures of population growth, economic growth, and climate 
change will place increased stress on natural resources such as water, food, 
arable land, and energy. The possible exhaustion of fossil fuels and climate 
change will lead to energy security and further national security.
5. Technological Breakthroughs
(a)  The time it takes to go from breakthrough technology to mass-market 
application is collapsing. In the U.S., it took the telephone 76 years to reach 
half the population. The smart phone did it in under ten years. The price 
of new technologies is falling equally and rapidly. The impacts of digital 
disruption are now so pervasive that no business in any sector—from the 
smallest family business to the largest multinational—is immune from 
them(PWC, 2014, p.9).
(b)  ICT transformed society over the last 30 years, and a new wave of 
technological advances is creating new opportunities(KPMG, 2014, p.22).
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